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ABSTRACT
In recent decades, in-house policy experience and expertise within Congress has
fallen as members of Congress have shifted resources towards constituent-casework,
communications and leadership functions and away from personal office or committee
policy staff. Headcounts in the legislative support agencies at Congress’s disposal
have shrunk by over 40 percent since 1979. At the same time, American politics
has seen an explosion of activity by policy demanding groups, and privately funded
policy research and planning organizations. These organizations are able to serve as
auxiliary service bureaus to staffers and members of Congress, strategically providing
legislative subsidy in the hopes of affecting policy outcomes.
In this dissertation, I develop a micro-level theory of information processing in
Congress, in which individual congressional staffers serve as agents of members tasked
with the challenge of learning about policy issues and making recommendations to
their bosses in complex information environments. It is these individual staffers, I
argue, that mediate the institution’s need for policy relevant information and these
potential sources of outside subsidy.
Though dedicated public servants, congressional staffers are generally under-resourced,
over-stretched, and frequently on the losing end of an information asymmetry with
the policy-demanders that they meet and interests they must rely on for legislative
subsidy. As a result, staffers serve less as policy or subject matter experts in their
own right, and more as gatekeepers or selective aggregators, engaged in a process of
search and evaluation of policy expertise produced by outside interests. The impli-
cation of this theory is that members of Congress rely on biased sets of information
xviii
produced by outside, often ideological interests, and selected for them by constrained
and bias-prone staffers.
Using original survey data from the 2017 and 2019 Congressional Capacity Sur-
veys, comprising the largest academic survey sample of congressional staff gathered to
date, I investigate how congressional staff evaluate privately provisioned, outside pol-
icy information depending on the ideological nature of the information source. This
work highlights the importance of these ideological networks of outside information
purveyors. Finally, I use IRS 990 data from Washington D.C.-based think tanks to
map the network of coordination between these subsidy providing organizations that
is implied by their interlocking directorates.
This dissertation contributes to a broader understanding of Congress by present-
ing and testing a micro-level theory of information evaluation within the institution,
highlighting the importance of individual staffers and their motivations in the collec-
tive functioning of the institution. In doing so, it offers a theoretical bridge between
scholars of the political organizations that produce these subsidies, and the scholars




Patterns of organizational innovation and change [are] highly dependent
on the perspectives of those responsible for the search function. It is not
that their expertise and professional ability are unimportant; it is rather
that other characteristics of the seekers and transmitters of information-
their inclinations and incentives to undertake “high-intensity searches,”
the goals they bring to the search, and the point at which they perceive
a satisfactory “equilibrium” between aspiration and reality, the way they
communicate their findings and employ them in devising plans of action-
will be equally if not more important.
— Price 1971
Set against the backdrop of “alternative facts,” and competing narratives, effec-
tive governance is, at its core, a monumental information processing undertaking.
Governance requires: gathering information about the state of the world; assessing
and prioritizing problems that may require policy responses; compiling, developing
and evaluating policy alternatives; and ultimately, collective choices over which issues
to address and how to address them. As Hayek (1945) famously noted, knowledge
about the state of the world is unevenly and widely distributed. Relevant infor-
mation about real world conditions, the needs and preferences of constituents and
policy-impacts are not immediately evident to lawmakers. Rather, lawmakers, their
staffs, and the institutions they constitute, must strive to solve this problem of dis-
tributed information. In this dissertation, I focus primarily on a micro-level theory of
1
information processing in Congress, in which individual congressional staffers serve
as agents of members, tasked with the challenge of learning about policy issues and
making recommendations to their bosses in complex information environments. I
argue that staffers, though dedicated public servants, generally are under-resourced,
over-stretched, and frequently on the losing end of an information asymmetry with
the policy demanders that they meet, and interests they must rely on, for legislative
subsidy. As a result, staffers serve less as policy or subject matter experts in their
own right, and more as gatekeepers or aggregators, engaged in a process of search
and evaluation of policy expertise produced by outside interests.
1.1 Organizational Context of Outside Information Produc-
tion
Fundamentally, this dissertation addresses how Congress, as an institution com-
prised of individual staffers, engages with interest groups that seek to influence pol-
icy by providing policy relevant information. Interest group activity is pervasive in
Congress. Since the 1990s, contributions from interest groups’ political action com-
mittees (PACs) to federal candidates have tripled,1 and now regularly total nearly half
a billion dollars per election cycle. Perhaps more importantly, interest groups’ disclose
more than three billion dollars a year spent on lobbying activity, paying more than
eleven thousand registered lobbyists, numbers which almost certainly under-count the
true scope of lobbying activity due to the rise of so-called “shadow lobbying"(Thomas
and LaPira 2017). The provision of favorable policy information is a well-established
influence strategy (Hall and Deardorff 2006; Drutman 2015) in this sphere. This
multi-billion dollar industry funds the production and dissemination of policy infor-




The existence of this privately provisioned network of organizations which produce
policy subsidy is not necessarily anathema to democratic governance or legitimacy,
of course. These organized interests may help non-specialist lawmakers translate the
grievances of a diverse public into concrete policy changes (Salisbury et al. 1987).
Insofar as all interests are weighed fairly, such activity beneficially aids governing in-
stitutions in their collection and processing of dispersed information and diverse pref-
erences. Indeed, mid-twentieth-century pluralist scholars argued that diverse political
voices were well represented in government precisely because of how interest activity
interacted with institutions such as federalism, political liberty (Truman 1951), and
multiple modes or avenues of influence (Dahl 1961). Prominent critiques of this view,
of course, argued that some interests are better “heard” than others, as the resources
and ability to organize and mobilize are unequally distributed (Schattschneider 1975;
Olson 1965; Walker 1983).2 This inequality of organizational resources is significant,
in part, because it implied an inequality of information production, with more and
better financed institutions generating policy subsidies for some sets of interests or
positions than others (Hall and Deardorff 2006). Debates over the breadth and scope
of interest group representation in politics should be understood as the organizational
backdrop for the production and dissemination of outside policy information (Salis-
bury 1984; Sorauf 1992; Schlozman and Tierney 1983, 1986; Schlozman, Verba, and
Brady 2012; Drutman 2015; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Hertel-Fernandez 2019; Bonica
2013, 2014, 2016; Crosson et al. 2020a).
1.2 Information Use in Congress
The study of information in Congress is not a new pursuit, to be sure. Indeed,
Krehbiel (1992) famously argues that Congress is organized into committees with
power over specific policy jurisdictions precisely to incentivize legislators to invest in
2. See Crosson, Furnas, and Lorenz (2020) for a more thorough review.
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the necessary expertise and knowledge gathering to effectively legislate on complex
issues. Through much of the post-war era, the United States Congress was viewed
as a model information gathering institution (Kelly 2012). However, despite this
apparent strength of institutional design, recent decades have been marked by a
steady decline in investment in legislative staff with substantive expertise (Crosson et
al. 2020a). Since 1993, total staff within congressional support agencies has dropped
approximately 38 percent, while stagnant wages and high turnover limit retention
(Roberts 2019; Furnas and LaPira 2020). In interviews conducted as part of the
Congressional Capacity Project — a collaborative research effort on which I was a
co-PI — legislative staffers described how it was rare to have in-house expertise and
that instead they needed to know where to find policy relevant expertise outside of
Congress.
Scholars have devoted considerable attention to how legislators make voting or
cosponsorship decisions based on logics of bounded rationality, and cue-taking (e.g.,
Kingdon 1989, or more recently, Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson, and Craig 2019). A
host of important legislative activity, however, happens prior to these sorts of position-
taking decisions by legislators, in the form of issue prioritization and agenda setting
(Hall 1996). Members of Congress delegate the vast majority of the information
processing—and communication with relevant interests that underpin this activity—
to their professional staff (Whiteman 1995; Salisbury and Shepsle 1981b). However,
to date there is little empirical research on how staffers evaluate information and
how their activities and cognitive processes shape which sources are trusted, what
information is used, and ultimately, how the Congress as a policy making institution
is able to engage in sense-making.
In this dissertation, I explore how congressional staffers evaluate policy information—
much of it produced outside of the institution—as they try to meet Congress’s infor-
mation needs despite the apparent contraction of in-house resources. Previous work
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has tended to focus on information and policy-change either within Congress, or from
the perspective of interest groups (Krehbiel 1992; Baumgartner et al. 2009). In my
view, understanding how Congress uses information requires an integrated perspec-
tive, blending congressional, interest group and party-network scholarship. Interest
groups and lobbyists fill the information needs of under-resourced offices by providing
information goods such as research, talking points, speech text, policy memos and
draft legislation that function as a form of legislative-subsidy (Hall and Deardorff
2006). As a result, congressional staffers often serve as gatekeepers to legislators, as
they may choose selectively what to include in briefing materials and upon which
subsidies to rely. At the same time, the proliferation of external, interested sources
producing policy information offers staffers a set of subsidy choices of previously
unimaginable breadth (Rich and Weaver 2000; McGann 2016). It matters greatly,
then, how staffers evaluate the information sources available to them. The particu-
lar heuristics that these staffers rely on, limitations in their information search and
evaluation processes, and their resultant cognitive biases can have profound impact
on congressional representation and policy-making.
Information overload faced by individual staffers in this complex decision-making
environment heightens the likelihood that they will rely on partisan or ideological
heuristics (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). I develop and test a theory in which the use
of outside information in Congress is driven by individual staffers’ cognitive and
behavioral responses to their competing incentives for information that is accurate
versus information that conforms with their partisan or ideological positions. As a
result, staffers often end up choosing information that confirms their ideological priors,
rather than compiling a full and accurate picture of the state of the world. Ultimately,
members of Congress rely on biased sets of information produced by outside, often
ideological interests, and selected for them by constrained and bias-prone staffers.
Prior research on the psychology of political decision-making structures my ex-
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pectations over staffers’ use of information. Kunda (1990) captures the competing
incentives between accuracy and ideological (directional) goals. Research on confir-
mation bias suggests that staffers seek out information that aligns with their pre-
dispositions (Taber and Lodge 2006; Petersen et al. 2013; Taber 2013). Similarly,
research on motivated skepticism suggests that those with strong partisan goals con-
struct counter-arguments in order to dismiss information that might challenge their
preferred outcome (Fiske, Kinder, and Larter 1983; Taber and Lodge 2006; Nyhan
and Reifler 2010).
1.3 Dissertation Roadmap
This dissertation is comprised of three separate studies, which address the role of
outside organizational information in the congressional policy-making process. Across
these studies, I focus particularly on congressional staffers and ideological think tanks.
In Chapter 2, I develop and present a theory of congressional information process-
ing in which staffers act as information gate-keepers whose own ideological preferences
shape the picture of the world that they present to their bosses. This represents the
first systematic empirical test of three competing perspectives on congressional staffer
behavior: staffers as faithful agents, staffers as independent agents and staffers as mo-
tivated reasoners. I adjudicate between these perspectives using original survey data
from the 2017 Congressional Capacity Survey. I find strong evidence that 1) rather
than simply selecting sources that are attitudinally-aligned with their bosses, staffers’
own attitudes shape how they evaluate and use information, 2) staffers trust and use
attitudinally-aligned information sources at far higher rates than attitude incongruent
sources, 3) this relationship is more pronounced among more ideologically extreme
staffers, 4) there is considerable asymmetry in the relationship between ideological ex-
tremism and evaluations of internal sources for conservatives and liberals, 5) at least
some of these effects appear to be driven by cognitive biases rather than strategic ac-
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tion intended to advance staffers’ positions. Together, these results show substantial
support for the proposition that staffers act as largely independent agents, exercising
considerable leeway to present a biased selection of information to their bosses.
In Chapter 3, I build on the theory and findings from Chapter 2, reporting the
results of two survey experiments that I fielded on samples of congressional staffers
in 2017 and 2019. In the first experiment, staffers are presented with a hypothetical
lobbying vignette in which I manipulate the identity of an individual making a legisla-
tive request, the substance of the request, and the supporting evidence being offered.3
Several response variables are included to test how likely staff are to take a meeting,
to use the information being offered, and to recommend taking a position consistent
with the request, as well as whether they perceive the request to be congruent with
constituent preferences. This study reveals that bringing aligned policy information
to a meeting is important in shaping how that meeting request is evaluated, and
the actions that a staffer is likely to take in response. In the second experiment, I
employ a conjoint design in which staffers are forced to choose between two hypothet-
ical white papers from think tanks, in which I randomized information source and
policy valence. This design allows me to estimate the average marginal component
effects (ACME) of a white paper coming from a think tank with a well-established
ideological identity, and conservative or liberal policy content (Hainmueller, Hopkins,
and Yamamoto 2014). Together, these results shed light on how the ideology of out-
side information sources substantively shapes important representational decisions by
congressional staffers.
The research presented in Chapters 2 and 3 highlight the importance of infor-
mation providers outside of the institution of Congress. The implication of these
findings, in my view, is that scholars of Congress and of policymaking should adopt
3. This experiment was conducted in conjunction with Timothy LaPira, Alexander Hertel-
Fernandez, Lee Drutman and Kevin Kosar. This experiment is currently written up as a working
paper, (Furnas et al., n.d), which Chapter 3 draws heavily from with the permission of my co-authors.
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a broader view of the policymaking process, encompassing the full ecosystem of elite
institutions and actors involved in agenda-setting and legislative subsidy creation,
consonant with the emerging school of American Political Economy (Hacker et al.,
n.d). Indeed, recent work has revealed the role of private, ideological infrastructure
in policy creation and legitimation that underpin the rightward shift in state policy
(Hertel-Fernandez 2019), how think tanks set party agendas (Fagan 2019), and how
they are cited in speeches and called to testify in Congress (Lerner 2018). In Chap-
ter 4, I add to this nascent literature on think tanks by mapping the Washington,
D.C. policy-planning network. I examine the community structure of organizations
involved in policy knowledge production and map the ideological and partisan coali-
tions of research organizations. Following a rich tradition in organizational sociology
(Mizruchi 1996), I use shared membership on think tank boards as a measure of co-
ordination between organizations. Using digitized IRS 990 tax records, I construct
and analyze a board inter-lock network of 277 public policy research organizations,
the largest analysis of its kind to date. While this undertaking is primarily descrip-
tive, I view it as necessary context setting for the further study of this community of
privately provisioned policy production. In this analysis, I find substantially stronger
evidence for issue-based rather than ideology based coordination, as well as evidence
consistent with existing organizational sociology theories of resource seeking and risk-
mitigation.
Ultimately, this dissertation investigates a fundamental function of American rep-
resentative democracy by focusing on the implications of ideological information pro-
cessing by congressional staff. While recent work has begun to investigate the im-
portance of congressional staff (Montgomery and Nyhan 2017; LaPira, Drutman, and
Kosar 2020; Hertel-Fernandez, Mildenberger, and Stokes 2019; Crosson et al. 2020a;
Furnas and LaPira 2020), there have been no systematic studies of the policy-making
ramifications of how staffers navigate the complex, often-overloaded information envi-
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ronments they inhabit. The proliferation of outside information providers has created
a wider array of options available to serve the information needs of Congress than
ever before. This research demonstrates that legislators’ knowledge about important
policy issues are subject to selection effects introduced by staffers’ biased cognitive
processes and strategic considerations in choosing which information sources to use.
Furthermore, institutional reliance on these outside sources creates new avenues for
interest group influence as the strategic creation of legislative subsidy becomes a
central locus of partisan and ideological activity.
9
CHAPTER II
Biasing Their Bosses: Staff Ideology and the
Distortion of Information in Congress
2.1 Introduction
In the representational, democratic system of the United States, legislators are
tasked with identifying and addressing policy problems through three fundamental
types of activity: legislation, oversight and constituent service. Each of these activities
requires legislators to gather and synthesize widely dispersed information about the
state of the world, and map potential actions onto outcomes. Accordingly, when
developing national policies, Congress must understand and act on a wide array of
complex issues often on short notice. To meet the challenging informational needs that
this entails, members of Congress delegate to their staffers. This delegation empowers
staffers to act as information gate-keepers and, as such, they may have the ability
to bend the entire legislative process to meet their own preferences. Such delegation
puts staffers in a position of extraordinary power, giving them the ability to shape
their bosses’ perspectives on issues, policies, and political incentives. Concentration
of such power in the hands of unelected staffers is fundamentally at odds with our
conventional wisdom of representation by democratically elected legislators (Malbin
1980).
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In this chapter, I investigate the understudied role of congressional staffers as
critical mechanisms of information processing, potentially evaluating and selecting
information according to their own goals. The central questions I address are funda-
mental to representation: whether and how staffers select information in a manner
which may bias their bosses’ understanding of politics and policy. Scholars have de-
voted considerable attention to other mechanisms that may bias legislator behavior,
such as money in politics, gerrymandered districts, institutional features of Congress,
and interest group activity. Despite the obvious importance of information in congres-
sional policy-making, and the clear role that congressional staff play as information
gatekeepers and filters, there has been no large-n empirical analysis of how staffers se-
lect information and the biases their selection processes may create. Consequently, we
have little sense of the depth of involvement that staffers have on legislative outcomes.
I begin to fill this gap by examining how congressional staffers — ostensibly as
agents of their bosses — evaluate, process, and rely on different sources of infor-
mation. The study of the information processing of congressional staff is important
for several reasons. First, assessing the state of the world and evaluating potential
policy alternatives is necessarily antecedent to actual policy-making, but this infor-
mation gathering and evaluation is carried out almost exclusively by congressional
staff. Second, while scholars and reformers have paid close attention to the potential
for interest group influence through campaign influence or lobbying activity, this in-
fluence is largely mediated by staffers who may be more or less receptive to influence
and information from the sources depending on their own predispositions. Lastly,
that staffers ultimately can shape policy, with very little oversight, interferes with
the accountability and responsiveness of an elected government to its citizens. Ulti-
mately, it is critical that we understand how staffers engage in information evaluation
and selection in order to evaluate the impact they may have on legislative behavior
and policy outcomes. I present three different theories of congressional staff behavior
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that each imply distinct patterns of staffers’ evaluations of information sources: 1)
staffers as faithful agents, 2) staffers as independent agents, acting according to their
own priorities, and 3) staffers as motivated reasoners.
This chapter makes three important contributions to our collective understanding
of legislative behavior and representation. First, I present a new theory of congres-
sional information processing that centers the role of staffers in the institution’s ability
to meet its core functions. This theory allows me to articulate clear theoretical ex-
pectations over how we should expect staffers to wield their information gate-keeping
authority, based on longstanding but untested concerns from the literature on con-
gressional staff. Second, I bring a social psychological perspective to the question of
congressional staff. I argue that staffers are in a decision-making environment that is
conducive to motivated reasoning and as a result, staffers’ evaluations of information
may be driven by cognitive bias.
Finally, this chapter makes use of original survey data with responses from over 550
active congressional staffers. Congressional staffer survey response data enables me
to evaluate the longstanding, but previously untestable assumptions about legislator-
enterprises that underpin much of our contemporary understanding of legislative be-
havior. In addition to collecting this survey data, I conducted a series of interviews
with congressional committee staff, to ground my theories of staffer evaluation of infor-
mation in the lived-experience of actual staffers. Together, these novel contributions
suggest that the member-centric focus of legislative studies is seriously underestimat-
ing the impact that individual staffers, their ideologies and their incentives may have
in shaping policy outcomes.
Using the in-person interviews and original survey data I collected as part of the
2017 and 2019 Congressional Capacity Surveys (Drutman, Furnas et al., 2017; Furnas
and LaPira 2019), I find that staffers can and do influence information selection used
in congressional policymaking. First, I find strong evidence that staffers do not evalu-
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ate information neutrally with respect to the ideology of an information source, as we
might expect from an idealized objective staffer, nor do they function as perfect agents
of their bosses, as the literature to date has canonically assumed, both explicitly and
implicitly, as I describe in the next section. Instead, congressional staffers’ behavior
is substantially shaped by their own personal ideological perspectives. Staffers act as
imperfect agents, responding both to their bosses’ preferences and their own in how
they evaluate and select information. More ideologically extreme staffers tend to re-
port higher levels of trust and more frequent use of external sources with which they
are ideologically aligned than their more moderate counterparts. This is true among
both liberal and conservative staffers. I also find evidence of ideological asymmetry,
with stronger ideological selection effects among more conservative staffers. Lastly, I
present additional evidence that suggests that staffers’ selection of ideologically con-
sonant information sources is driven, at least in part, by motivated reasoning rather
than simply the rational actions of rogue agents.
2.2 Theories of congressional staff behavior
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 initiated a fundamental change to
Congress as an institution, increasing staff sizes and budgets across personal and
committee offices in both chambers (Galloway 1951; Polsby 1968). As the size and
scope of congressional staffs grew, scholars began to question the implications of this
increased capacity on member behavior and institutional output (Kofmehl 1962; Fox
and Hammond 1977; Malbin 1980). These early canonical treatments of congressional
staff were largely descriptive, providing demographic, background, career trajectory
and limited time use data on congressional staffers (Fox and Hammond 1977; Kofmehl
1962). They highlight the transformative role that staffers played in expanding the
range of activities undertaken by members, but critically, with the exception of Malbin
(1980), they ignored the representational implications of that extensive delegation.
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Salisbury and Shepsle (1981b) offer a corrective to prior work on Congress that
helps integrate staff, arguing that Congress should be understood as a collection of
semi-independent enterprises led by members of Congress. The focus of Salisbury
and Shepsle’s 1981 legislators-as-enterprises insight is the manner in which these
enterprises enable members to pursue an expanded range of goals and activities.
Further, they posit that as the enterprises grow, staff themselves serve as a source of
“substantial guidance” for legislators. However, they leave unexamined the extent to
which the delegation this entails results in meaningful agency loss as staffers’ actions
deviate from their bosses’ goals.
Within these enterprises, staffers serve as the primary actors engaged in commu-
nicating with interest groups, stakeholders and experts, and serve as the main path-
way by which external policy and political information is transmitted to members
(Fox and Hammond 1977; Whiteman 1995; Weiss 1989; Patashnik and Peck 2016).
Staffers also serve as the primary conduit of information from congressional support
organizations like the Congressional Research Service (CRS) (Kosar 2018). How-
ever, unless we understand how staffers use the independence they may be afforded
within legislator-enterprises, it is impossible to know how much legislator behavior
should be attributed to the legislators, and how much is, instead, the outcome of
a complex decision-making process, shaped by individual staffer motivations within
the enterprise. While recent work has begun to emphasize the role that staffers play
in member behavior—including legislative effectiveness, voting patterns, and percep-
tions of constituent opinion (Montgomery and Nyhan 2017; Crosson et al. 2020b;
Hertel-Fernandez, Mildenberger, and Stokes 2019)—we still have no empirical evi-
dence about whether staffers are responsive to their own preferences or those of their
bosses.
While the legislator-as-enterprise theory has informed subsequent scholarship, es-
pecially regarding the expansion of individual legislator capabilities, it has not been
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taken as a call to unpack the internal dynamics of the enterprise (c.f. Crosson et
al. 2020b). The legislator-staffer relationship can be understood within the frame-
work of a principal-agent problem1, in which the legislator (the principal) seeks to
induce behavior from their agents (their staffers). However, while principal-agent re-
lationships have captured the attention of scholars in many arenas, the relationship
between legislator and staffer in Congress has gone largely unexamined.
In this chapter, I focus specifically on how staffers evaluate information, as an
arena in which to assess the principal-agent coupling between legislator and staffer. As
Frances Lee puts it, “information is a powerful weapon” in Congress (Lee 2009, p. 121).
Information and its control has the power to impact the balance of institutional power,
agenda setting, and critical votes in Congress (Lee 2009; Baumgartner and Jones 2015;
Curry 2015; Patashnik and Peck 2016). Indeed, projections from the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), meaningfully shape the course of debate and fortunes of a bill
(Joyce 2011; Patashnik and Peck 2016). For example, when the Republican majority
sought to undo the Affordable Care Act and pass various versions of so-called “repeal
and replace,” policies, after an initial extremely negative assessment by the CBO,
their proposal was seen as largely dead on arrival. Weiss (1989) and Patashnik and
Peck (2016) find that members tend to use information to support positions that they
already hold, using evidence to bolster their case rather than identify other alternative
solutions or new problems. These findings make clear that a responsive staffer would
evaluate information and select in accordance with their boss’s prior beliefs.
In the subsequent sections, I present two possible versions of this principal-agent
relationship and their implications for staffer behavior and information processing: 1)
staffers as faithful agents and 2) staffers as independent agents. The principal-agent
framework suggests that staffers make information choices rationally, according to
the incentive structure around them. Insofar as legislators are effective principals, we
1. (see Holmstrom and Tirole 1989; Sappington 1991)
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should expect staffers to select information according to their bosses’ preferences. If
legislators are not able to incentivize their staff to act faithfully, we should expect
staffers to more readily use information that aligns with their own preferences.
Both of these possible outcomes implied by the principal-agent framework, as-
sume that staffers are rationally selecting information sources according to various
incentives. Well-known findings from political psychology suggest that this may not
be true. In this chapter, I incorporate a third perspective on staffer information pro-
cessing outside of the principal-agent framework, which has so far been absent from
the literature on congressional staff. Staffers may be engaged in motivated reasoning,
and will trust and use information that accords with their prior beliefs and attitudes,
despite potential losses to the accuracy of conclusions they draw or their incentives
to faithfully respond to their bosses.
In the next sections, I describe these three views of staffer information processing
in more detail.
2.2.1 Staff as Faithful Agents
The predominant view among scholars of Congress, whether endorsed explicitly or
not, is that staffers by and large act as faithful agents of their bosses. The standard
response to concerns over agency loss within congressional enterprises is that employ-
ment is at-will; members may simply fire any rogue or shirking agents within their
offices (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981b; Weiss 1989; Whiteman 1995). There are no
civil service protections for staff in Congress, and the continuing existence of staffers’
jobs is dependent on their bosses’ re-election. According to the faithful agent view
of congressional staff, these conditions lead staffers to quickly internalize strong pro-
fessional norms of responsiveness to their members (Romzek and Utter 1997; Weiss
1989). Ultimately, Salisbury and Shepsle (1981 p. 568) suggest that these professional
incentives select for staffers they call “politicos,” whose primary concern is neither to
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provide professional expertise, nor to pursue specific policies they care about, but
rather is “the career of the member who heads the enterprise.” They argue that while
staff may fill different roles and “pursue multiple policy objectives, [...] these are
always subordinate to the needs of the member” (p. 568). Salisbury and Shepsle
(1981a) interpret the fact that individual staffers’ careers and turnover seem to track
those of their bosses, especially among personal office staff, as suggestive evidence of
staffers’ personal loyalty. This scholarship argues that because of a combination of
sufficiently similar preferences between legislators and their staffs and staffers’ self-
motivated interest in their bosses’ re-elections, staffers either naturally seek to pursue
their bosses’ goals, or, through fear of monitoring and dismissal, are induced to do
so.
While this largely untested expectation that staffers simply serve their bosses
faithfully is common in the descriptive literature, it has been unquestioningly incor-
porated into the majority of the theoretical and formal literature on legislator behavior
and policy-making. For example, foundational theories of member behavior focus on
individual legislator incentives (e.g. Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978). These theories dis-
regard the fact that members’ understanding of their districts, the political context,
interest group priorities, and even their evaluations of plausible activities may be fun-
damentally shaped by the gatekeeping behavior of their staffers (see Hertel-Fernandez,
Mildenberger, and Stokes 2019).
Moreover, canonical formal models of vote choice (Kingdon 1977; Krehbiel 1998),
agenda setting (Romer and Rosenthal 1978), oversight (McCubbins and Schwartz
1984; Ferejohn and Shipan 1990), distributive politics (see Collie 1988), and legisla-
tive organization (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990) all rest on an assumption of members
as unitary strategic actors (see Shepsle and Weingast 1995, for review). This foun-
dational assumption of rational choice theory does not sit well with the insight that
legislative behavior is better understood as the output of an enterprise comprised of
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dozens.2 This literature implicitly builds the assumption — that staffers act as faith-
ful agents of their bosses — into the rest of our understanding of legislator behavior.3
2.2.2 Staff as Independent Agents
Although scholars have been attentive to the role of principal-agent problems in
policy delegation and the development of expertise in other institutional contexts
(e.g. Gailmard and Patty 2007), it remains unexamined within legislative enterprises
in Congress. Traditionally, representatives are viewed as accountable to their con-
stituents through the electoral connection (Mayhew 1974), and thus their actions are
understood to be democratically legitimate. However, if principal agent problems
abound inside legislative enterprises, we cannot view legislative behavior as neces-
sarily driven by representatives’ calculations about their district, grounded in their
reelection concerns. Rather, legislator actions should be understood as mediated by
their staffers, who may be acting according to their own, rather than their members’,
goals.
The independent agent view recognizes that staffers have considerable autonomy
within legislator-enterprises (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981b). Staffers often are in a
position to engage in information search processes with little to no direction, and
determine which information is important (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981b; Romzek
and Utter 1996, 1997). Romzek and Utter (1997) note the limits of legislators as
supervisors in ensuring staffer accountability. Members of Congress have “limited
time, inclination, and ability to discern when staff have deployed their expertise in
2. These enterprises range from roughly 18 staffers (the cap for a House personal office), to several
hundred for committee or leadership in the Senate.
3. It is commonplace in formal literature to represent large bodies of actors as a single actor by
black boxing the decision-making process within that body, and to understand that representation as
the body’s decision maker. For example, this is what we do when representing different institutions
by the location of their pivotal actors. Representing the legislative enterprise, with the preferences
of the legislator themselves is fine if they are in fact the decision-maker within their enterprise. This
is what the faithful agent hypothesis describes. However, if staffers are not faithful agents, then
legislators are not actually the true decision-makers within their own enterprise and this formal
simplification obscures the biases that unfaithful agents may induce.
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ways that undermine institutional purposes” (Romzek and Utter 1997, p. 1254).
Where previous studies of congressional staff were satisfied that staffers’ personal
loyalty led staff to be highly responsive to members’ interests (c.f. Price 1971), Malbin
(1980) raises the specter of democratic illegitimacy in which the “unelected representa-
tives” (staffers) unduly influence the elected ones (legislators). Malbin’s 1981 careful
case study of information provision in four committees in Congress highlights the in-
fluence that various key staffers can have on outcomes from allocating agenda space to
bill passage. His concern is that these entrepreneurial staffers may use this power in
pursuit of their own policy motivations (see also Price 1971). Staffers may have their
own ideological or issue motivations, aside from their bosses, or may act in service of
particular constituencies to increase future employment opportunities for themselves.
The concern raised by this view is that staffers’ preferences diverge from the legis-
lators they work for, and they may exercise the autonomy provided by the legislator-
enterprise context to act according to their own, rather than their bosses’ preferences.
In this chapter, I test for this possibility in the information selection choices of staffers.
2.2.3 Staff as Motivated Reasoners
Both the faithful- and independent-agent perspectives described above implicitly
assume that staffers rationally select information according to either their principals’
or their own interests. However, as the contemporary understanding of political
decision-making makes clear, this may not be the case because motivated reasoning
is widespread (see Taber 2013). In this section, I bring insights from the political
psychology literature to the question of congressional staff behavior. I argue that
staffers’ information evaluations are, in fact, subject to their own cognitive biases. I
then detail how we should expect staffers who are engaged in motivated reasoning to
behave differently from either the faithful or independent agents theorized above.
Staffers’ decision-making environments map closely to those studied by cognitive
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and political psychologists. Staffers are highly politically sophisticated, and operate
under time and resource constraints in complex information environments; often they
are tasked with multiple issues or bills at the same time under pressing deadlines. In
such environments, constraints of circumstance and human cognition force people to
satisfice rather than optimize, and rely heavily on cognitive heuristics and shortcuts
in complex information environments (Simon 1955; Tversky and Kahneman 1974;
Lupia 1994). Lau and Redlawsk (2001) argue that people rely more on heuristics in
more complex information environments, and find that among political sophisticates,
endorsement and ideology serve as particularly strong cues.
While canonical findings about political information processing were demonstrated
in the general public, there is good reason to believe that they should hold among an
elite population like congressional staffers. Motivated reasoning effects are commonly
conditioned on the interaction between political knowledge (or sophistication) and
ideology (or partisanship) (Taber 2013). Political sophisticates are more likely to have
strong and coherent prior ideological commitments (Converse 1964), and thus tend to
have stronger ideological goals driving their reasoning. They are also more likely to
process information schematically (Lodge and Hamill 1986). Indeed, Fiske, Kinder,
and Larter (1983) show that experts are actually more able to come up with counter-
arguments to counter-attitudinal information, while they accept attitude-confirming
information uncritically.
By the standards of the general public, staffers are highly knowledgeable, polit-
ically sophisticated, and tend to have strong partisan identities and coherent ide-
ological commitments. As such, there is every reason to believe that staffers are
subject to the same tendencies to trust and use attitude-confirming information over
counter-attitudinal information as the general public.
Kunda (1990) shows that when people have directional goals—preferences in one
direction or another over the outcome of a question— they engage in information
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search and evaluation processes that tend to arrive at the conclusions favored by
their prior attitudes. To some degree this is constrained by their ability to construct
seemingly reasonable justifications for their conclusions (Kunda 1990). This result is
particularly relevant for the representational implications of outside information. I
argue that by producing and disseminating ideologically driven information, outside
groups can alter the distribution of information over which staffers aggregate. The
existence of more extreme ideological information may provide ideologically driven
staffers the necessary rationalizations that underpin their motivated reasoning.
People with ideological goals are subject to both confirmation and disconfirma-
tion (Taber and Lodge 2006). When given a range of information options, individuals
select information that is likely to confirm their pre-existing attitudes at much higher
rates than counter-attitudinal information. Additionally, they are selectively skep-
tical, subjecting counter-attitudinal information to a higher degree of scrutiny than
information that supports their prior beliefs. Nyhan and Reifler (2010) find that cor-
rective information is often ineffective at countering a pro-attitudinal misperception.
There is a key distinction between the view that staffers are independent agents
with instrumental preference for information that favors their preferences, and the
theory I present above, that staffers are cognitively biased in favor of pro-attitudinal
information: the former view is strategic, while the latter is largely sub-conscious.
This fact reveals a crucial difference between the observable implications of indepen-
dent agent staffers and motivated reasoning staffers. If staffers operate largely as
independent agents, we should expect the degree to which they select according to
their own preferences to vary depending on the incentives they face, since they are
operating strategically. However, if staffers’ bias towards pro-attitudinal information
is subconscious, as the cognitive perspective would suggest, we should observe staffers
engaging in this sort of selection regardless of how their institutional circumstance
alters their incentives. In the next section, as I lay out hypotheses that distinguish be-
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tween the three theoretical perspectives detailed here, I specify in more detail how this
difference can be leveraged to differentiate the motivated reasoning view of staffers
from the independent agent view.
2.2.4 Evaluating theories of staff behavior
The three perspectives described above provide clear, testable implications re-
garding staffer selection of information sources. In this section, I describe several
observable implications which should distinguish between staffers as faithful, inde-
pendent, or motivated reasoning agents. I focus particularly on the ideological di-
mension of staffer information selection and gatekeeping, and test expectations about
the ideological valence of sources that staffers select, which we should expect to differ
depending on which of these three theories of staff behavior obtains.
Faithful Agents
Recalling Weiss (1989) and Patashnik and Peck’s (2016) findings that members
seek information that support their prior policy positions, we should expect staffers
to select information that is aligned with their bosses’ ideologies if they were truly
acting as faithful agents. This expectation yields the Faithful Agent Hypothesis. This
Hypothesis, H1, is the most simple and direct test of the theory of staffers as faithful
agents, described in the prior section.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Faithful Agent Hypothesis
Staffers with more conservative (liberal) bosses will be more likely to trust and use
information from conservative (liberal) sources.
In general, internal information sources like the Congressional Research Service
(CRS), Government Accountability Office (GAO), and Congressional Budget Office
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(CBO) are considered to be highly credible among members and staff.4 However,
these sources are constrained in their ability to take political or ideological posi-
tions by strong professional norms of objectivity and impartiality (Kosar 2018; Joyce
2011). Because of this, responsive staffers who work for members of Congress with
more extreme ideological positions will have a greater need to seek out external, ideo-
logical sources to meet the needs of their bosses. This intuition leads to the Principal
Extremism Hypothesis, which is also a test of staffers as faithful agents.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Principal Extremism Hypothesis
Staffers with more ideologically-extreme bosses will report higher levels of trust
and use of external information sources that are ideologically-aligned with their bosses
than their counterparts with more moderate bosses.
H2 differs from H1 in that the relationship between ideological alignment and
trust and use of an information source should be particularly stronger among the
most extreme staffers—and may differ depending on whether staffers are extreme on
the left or right ideologically.
Independent Agents
If, as Price (1971) argues, staffers are “policy entrepreneurs” driven by their own
policy goals, then Malbin’s 1980 representational concerns are well founded. The in-
dependent agent perspective suggests that supervision by members of Congress is not
an effective accountability mechanism for staff, and that staffers exploit this agency
slack to select sources for their bosses that accord with their own, instead of their
bosses’ preferences. In order to test the staffers as independent agents perspective, I
introduce the Independent Agent Hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Independent Agent Hypothesis
4. This was a repeated theme in the in-person interviews that I conducted with committee staffers
in October 2018.
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More conservative (liberal) staffers will be more likely to trust and use information
from conservative (liberal) sources.
For the same reason that I expect faithful agents of more extreme principals to rely
more heavily on external ideological sources, independent agents with more extreme
ideologies themselves should display a similar increased preference for ideologically
aligned external sources. Because of this analogous reasoning—more extreme staffers
will need to find more extreme sources to support their prior positions—the Indepen-
dent Agent Extremism Hypothesis takes a similar form to the Principal Extremism
Hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Independent Agent Extremism Hypothesis
More ideologically-extreme staffers will report higher levels of trust and use of ide-
ologically aligned external information sources than their more moderate counterparts.
Hypotheses one through four, articulated above, are intended to adjudicate whether
or not staffers operate as faithful agents of their bosses by selecting information
sources that are consonant with their bosses’ ideological positions. A lack of support
for hypotheses one and two coupled with evidence in support of hypotheses three and
four would be strong evidence that staffers are not effectively constrained by their
bosses, instead selecting information according to their own attitude. However, such
a result would do little to clarify whether the agency loss in the legislator-staffer rela-
tionship is the result of intentional agent shirking (pursuing their own policy goals), or
potentially unintentional bias in agents’ selection process due to ideological motivated
reasoning.
Both an independent agent instrumentally selecting information to advance their
own policy goals, and a motivated reasoning agent subject to subconscious bias would
select information in line with their own, rather than their principal’s beliefs. This
makes it difficult to distinguish between these two possible theories of congressional
staff behavior. However, there are a few points of leverage that I exploit.
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Motivated Reasoners
First, one of the recurring themes in the early literature on congressional staff is
that staffers are loyal and responsive to their bosses, because their career fortunes
are tied to their bosses’ political success (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981b; Weiss 1989;
Romzek and Utter 1997). If a member loses a bid for re-election, many of her staffers
lose their jobs as well (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981a). Because of this, we may expect
staffers who work for members of Congress who are more electorally vulnerable, to
be more responsive to their bosses than those in safe seats. In the language of the
principal-agent model, when the principal is electorally vulnerable, career self-interest
should align the incentives of the principal and the agent, and we should expect less
shirking by the agent (a switch from an independent to a faithful type). I call this
expectation the Vulnerable Principal Hypothesis. Importantly, this result should only
obtain if staffers are operating according to the principal-agent paradigm. If, instead,
staffers favorable evaluations of ideologically consonant information sources is the
result of largely subconscious cognitive biases, they will not respond strategically to
the vulnerability of their principals.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Vulnerable Principal Hypothesis
Staffers of legislators from competitive districts or states will trust and use in-
formation according to their own ideology less than staffers of legislators with safe
seats.
Support for this hypothesis would indicate that staffers are using information
aligned with their own preferences strategically and, that sufficient motivation (in
the form of an electorally vulnerable boss) induces them to act as faithful agents.
This result would suggest that the rest of the time staffers act relatively indepen-
dently, according to their own ideologies. On the other hand, if there is no observable
difference between staffers of vulnerable and safe legislators it would suggest that the
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effects of individual staffers’ ideologies on the information they trust and use is the
product of subconscious bias or motivated reasoning.
Together, these hypotheses represent testable implications of the three different
theoretical perspectives on congressional staff behavior that I have offered. Evaluating
these expectations represents a substantial step forward in understanding the funda-
mental role that staffers play in the representational process. If staffers that frequently
behave as independent or motivated reasoning agents within legislator-enterprises, it
calls into question the democratic legitimacy of actions taken by legislators insofar
as their actions may be informed and shaped by staffers not pursuing the interests of
their legislator principals. As such, findings contrary to the faithful agent hypotheses
should represent a substantial concern for both scholars and practitioners.
2.3 Congressional staff interviews
To qualitatively evaluate the plausibility of the theory of staffers as information
gate-keepers and potentially biased aggregators that I have advanced above, I con-
ducted a series of interviews between October 8th and October 24th, 2018, with
congressional committee staffers. However, these interviews should not be viewed as
dispositive evidence capable of adjudicating between the alternate models of staffer
behavior. Rather, they provide valuable context, detailing the decision environment
and competing incentives that shape staffer behavior. While I rely on large-n sur-
vey data to test my hypotheses more fully in subsequent sections, my conversations
with these 16 staffers lend texture and facial plausibility to the hypotheses I have
proposed.5 It is also worth noting that I interviewed staffers in committee staff, who,
compared to their personal office counterparts have more time and attention to devote
to particular issues and develop substantive expertise (Malbin 1980; Krehbiel 1992;
5. I conducted 16 interviews during this period with current and former members of committee
staff in both the House and Senate, on the Republican and Democratic side. I interviewed members
of both authorizing and appropriating committees.
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Hall 1996). Because of this, committee staffers may be under less pressure than per-
sonal office staff to rely on heuristics, and may tend to have weaker directional goals.
This makes committees a “least likely case” for detecting information environments
most conducive to motivated reasoning (Eckstein 2000).
Despite this, the staffers I interviewed described a set of constraints and pres-
sures much in line with the sorts of work environments I expected, and which may
lead to motivated reasoning. They frequently detailed working on multiple issues or
bills simultaneously, often under pressing deadlines. In many cases they were the
only staffer assigned to handle a particular hearing, bill, or issue. While interviewees
tended to view themselves as having the resources necessary to complete their jobs,
one staffer highlighted the effects of the resource and time constraints they operate
under: “I think there’s a lot of mistakes that occur in terms of data and people’s in-
formation flow. Just because they don’t have time to really sit down and learn more
about things and figure out what they should be trusting and who they should be
trusting.[...] [Y]ou start making lower quality choices about your data and informa-
tion” (Anonymous, personal communication, October, 2018). Several committee staff
I spoke with viewed this problem as particularly pronounced in the House and in per-
sonal offices. In short, staffers make decisions in an environment which is conducive
to high levels of reliance on heuristics and prior attitudes. This lends plausibility to
the concern that staffers may act as motivated reasoners.
The need to be responsive to their bosses, as we might expect from a faithful
agent, was a recurring theme across multiple interviews. “[W]e obviously work for
members of Congress who ... have certain stances on issues. And sometimes those
bear on what we find out about how money is being spent.” The staffers I spoke with
are in a position where they need to be responsive to partisan or ideological agendas,
but also have a real interest in understanding the link between policy tools and the
outcomes over which they have preferences.
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A professional staffer for the minority on an authorizing committee in the Senate
noted, “We absolutely still work for [the Ranking Member] at the end of the day.
[When...] working on [a] bill, I’m going to make sure that it reflects the interests of
[his/her] constituents and [state].” Another staffer remarked that “[M]y boss is my
subcommittee ranking member [and is] very active in [the] immigration front. [S/he]
is [v]ery close to the immigration advocacy community. I can’t look at my job that
way. I can’t be an advocate. [...] But, because I know that my person I work for
is sympathetic to the approach that these folks have, I mean, that certainly makes
a difference versus somebody who might come in from the other side of that issue.”
Another interview subject described their committee chair as constraining them such
that they are only being able to stray so much from the chair’s preferred outcome.
For them, this meant that certain sources are not useful.
Several spoke about this pressure being in tension with their desire to get the
best information possible to evaluate policy options. One staffer noted,“you want a
good piece of legislation, you want it right, you want to make sure it’s not doing
things that you’re not expecting. You want that legislation to carry out the policy
you’re trying to implement.” The incentive for accuracy fits with existing theoretical
expectations. Esterling (2004) suggests that risk averse legislators have an incentive
to rely on research to implement socially efficient policies; that is, the ultimate fear
of electoral repercussions from failed policies induces an accuracy goal in legislators.
Another staffer described how their concern over unintended consequences induced
accuracy goals as well, stating, “I do not want to cherry pick information, that ends
up with bad policy and we get unintended consequences no matter what, we get way
more if we don’t know what we’re actually walking into.”
Of course this desire to “get it right” leaves the unanswered question of how staffers
evaluate which information is trustworthy. In interviews several staffers highlighted
how they and others use ideological or partisan cues in their evaluation of information
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sources. As one Democratic staffer put it:
All institutions sort of have a focus or an area of concern or way they
think about things. So I’m aware of that and some are more aligned with
Democratic ways of thinking and some are less aligned so that is taken
into account [...] I’m like ‘What is this person’s bias and where do I think
they’ve got it right and where do I think they’ve got it wrong, what is
their overall policy agenda, to shrink government?’ [...] I would think
that the [Republican] majority doesn’t particularly go to the Center on
Budget Policy Priorities website because the Center on Budget is focused
on insuring benefit rights for people who need them and that’s not usually
the main focus of the majority so they wouldn’t be using their material
to advance their positions.
Another Democratic staffer offered a similar perspective on ideological selection
of their outside information sources.
We look a lot at studies, for example, from Brookings Institution, which I
find great. But I think Brookings tends to be viewed as [a] more left, left-
ish think tank by some folks. And the same way I would view something
from American Enterprise Institution. I tend to think of that as a right-
wing institution. So you kind of have to think of the biases when you’re
taking in this data.
A Republican committee staffer highlighted the usefulness of outside sources as
partisan signals on policy. “I need an answer quickly, I know the Republican Party’s
answer is probably close to what someone at AEI or Heritage is saying. And vice
versa. That’s true for every issue and every political stripe. [P]eople have their kind
of go-to where they know people most closely.”
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However, he cautioned that ideological information sources can trigger skepticism
from non-aligned minority staffers that he may be working with in committee, noting,
“[I]f I cite even good work that’s happening at Heritage or AEI and I’m presenting
that to someone from the other side, they’re going to immediately discount it [...]
People are very quick to dismiss what you’re saying because of who you’re citing [...]
[I]t happens quite a bit.”
The impression given by the staffers I interviewed was one that is largely consis-
tent with the gate-keeping view of staffers that I advance in this chapter. Staffers
work under considerable constraints to find sources that provide information about
issues and policies they are tasked with evaluating, and use this information to inform
their bosses. However, they face competing pressures as they do this. Staffers report
pressure to be responsive to their bosses’ needs, but must also rely on their individual
judgements about sources. A frequent refrain was reliance on their personal, individ-
ual understandings of the credibility of sources, often influenced by their perception
of those sources’ ideologies or partisan affiliation. In short, the three alternative
frameworks I propose in this chapter, all seem plausible given my conversations with
staffers. In order to assess their merit, I turn to analyses of staffers’ evaluations of
information sources that I have collected through the CCS.
2.4 Survey Data
I evaluate the competing theories of staffer behavior presented above using original
survey data that I collected as part of the Congressional Capacity Survey (CCS).6 The
2017 CCS was a joint survey venture between New America and R Street, conducted
by Tim LaPira, Lee Drutman, Alex Hertel-Fernandez, Kevin Kosar and myself.7 This
6. The Congressional Capacity Surveys (2017, 2019) have been supported by the Hewlett Foun-
dation’s Madison Initiative, Democracy Fund, and the Center for Effective Lawmaking.
7. The questions measuring the use of, and trust in, a battery of information sources were designed
by me and included in the survey at my request. I have received agreement from my co-PIs on the
CSS to use these data in my dissertation and to publish on results based on these data in a solo-
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represents the largest academic survey of congressional staffers to date. It was fielded
between August 9 and November 4, 2017. Using a complete census of congressional
staffers purchased from LegiStorm, we identified 8,485 prospective respondents who
worked in D.C. offices whose primary responsibility was to contribute to legislative
operations, as broadly construed as possible.8 The survey was sent to the full sample
of identified staffers using their congressional email addresses. Staffers and offices
were contacted by a variety of outside validator organizations to encourage them to
participate in the survey.9 Recipients were reminded to participate in the survey two
times following initial outreach.10
Overall, the final response rate of the survey was 5.2 percent (441 of 8,485).
These data are the largest and most comprehensive existing dataset of congressional
staffer attitudes towards information sources. The final sample used in the analy-
sis is well over three times the size of the recent similar staff survey conducted by
Hertel-Fernandez, Mildenberger, and Stokes (2019). The difficulty surveying this
population and scarcity of data of this kind have made direct study of congressional
staff behavior a comparative blind spot in the study of Congress. These data are
the best currently available to assess these fundamental questions of representation,
information processing, and policy-making by congressional staffers.
However, low survey response rates are concerning as non-representativeness in
the sample can present significant challenges to inference. The sample is actually
quite representative of the overall population of congressional staffers, and I take
several additional steps to address the challenges to inference presented by possible
authorship capacity.
8. We excluded staffers that worked in offices with strictly administrative, facilities, or mainte-
nance missions (such as House Office of Logistics and Support and Senate Office of Printing, Graphics
and Direct Mail).
9. Validators included LegBranch.com, the R Street Institute, PopVox, Congressional Manage-
ment Foundation, Pew Charitable Trusts, Bipartisan Policy Center, Stennis Center, and various
congressional staff.
10. More details on the survey timeline and outreach procedure can be found in the 2017 CCS
methodological addendum, reproduced in Appendix D.
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selection and non-response bias. The CCS respondents comprise a diverse and largely
representative sample of congressional staff on observables. These responses come
from staffers in 133 House personal offices, 27 House committee or leadership offices,
60 Senate personal offices, and 24 Senate committee or leadership offices. Figure
D.1 in Appendix D, shows the unweighted difference in means between the survey
respondents and a separate random selection sample of 450 non-respondents for whom
complete career history data was purchased from LegiStorm. In general, balance is
very strong on career trajectory covariates (number of prior employers, tenure, salary),
several key institutional covariates (party, chamber), and the party and ideology of
their bosses. I report detailed balance statistics in Appendices C and D.11
Finally, throughout the analyses I report below, I use several approaches to address
non-response bias. All respondents were given inverse probability weights using a
post-stratification procedure conditioning on the joint distribution of chamber, office
type (personal, committee, other), and party (Democratic, Republican, other) in the
population, using the sampling frame purchased from LegiStorm (Lumley et al. 2004;
Lumley 2017). The maximum weight applied to any case was 4.82, and the minimum
0.749. Comprehensive balance tests, both pre and post-weighting can be found in the
2017 CCS Methodological Appendix (Furnas & LaPira, 2018), which is reproduced
in full in Appendix C. Because the application of these post-stratification weights
improves balance generally, I use them in all of the subsequent analyses in this chapter.
Additionally, all of the econometric models reported here use a two-stage Heckman
selection procedure in an attempt to account for selection bias in who chooses to
respond to the survey. There is more detail about this procedure in the Methods
section of this chapter, and an example stage-one model is reported in Appendix A.
11. Additionally, rates are consistently low for this type of survey. In recent years ma-
jor public opinion firms routinely receive response rates of between 5 and 7 percent to
their telephone surveys, and social scientists routinely rely on these data to estimate pub-




This chapter is concerned with how staffers’ incentives and attitudes influence
their behavior as information gate-keepers. To evaluate this, I turn to questions I
asked on the 2017 CCS in which staffers were asked to report their level of trust in
a variety of information sources and the frequency with which they use these infor-
mation sources when they make recommendations to their bosses.12 These ratings of
the trustworthiness and frequency of use of different categories of information sources
are the primary dependent variables for the analyses in this chapter.
The primary constructs of interest are staffers’ ideologies and the ideology of the
Members of Congress they report to. I measure Staffer Ideology as a latent variable
derived from a five question battery taken from Heinz (1993), validated by Esterling
(2018). I use the items in this battery to create an ideal point estimate for each
staffer using a Partial Credit Model (PCM), a Rasch model extension of item-response
theory (IRT) that is appropriate for ordinal variables (Fischer and Molenaar 2012;
Mair and Hatzinger 2007).13 I standardize this ideology score to have a mean of 0 and
a standard deviation of 1. For more information on the structure of the questionnaire
and question wording see Appendix B. The ideology of the Member of Congress the
staffer reports to, Boss Ideology, is captured by the first dimension of DW-Nominate
(Poole and Rosenthal 2000), which has also been standardized to a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1. In several sets of models, the absolute value of these scores
are used as measures of extremism.
It is important to note that, at least descriptively, there appears to be substantial
12. It is worth noting that in the subsequent empirical analysis, I use survey responses from staffers
regarding their perception of the trustworthiness of and their frequency of use for a variety of
information sources. Because these questions were asked in close proximity to each other, it is
difficult to disentangle the extent to which they are truly measuring different concepts. Put another
way, I expect staffers to report higher likelihood of using information sources that they report trusting
and vice versa. A staffer rating a source as one they use frequently may experience a demand effect
to also then rate that source as something they find trustworthy. As such, I expect most of the
hypotheses enumerated above to apply to both the reported trust and use of information sources,
even if conceptually we might expect them to differ in some cases.
13. Results were substantively the same using a simple additive index of the ideology battery
question items.
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variation between staffer’s ideology and the ideology of the Member of Congress they
report to. These two ideology measures are not jointly scaled, so direct tests of
absolute differences between a staffer’s ideology and their boss’s are not possible.
However, as Figure 2.1 shows, the relationship between the ideology of a staffer and
that of their boss is by no means perfectly predictive. Overall, the two measures
display a Spearman rank correlation of 0.752. However, within party the correlation
between staffers’ and their bosses’ ideologies are much lower, 0.256 among Republicans
and 0.338 among Democrats. Staffers have a strong tendency to work for Members
of Congress on the same “side” as them politically, with left-of-center staffers working
for left-of-center Members of Congress and vice versa.



































This Figure shows the relationship between staffers’ ideology and the ideology of the members of
Congress they report to. Within party rank correlations are low to moderate. Both measures are
standardised to mean = 0, SD = 1 to aid comparison.
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2.5 Evaluating staffer trust and use of individual sources
In this section, I present a series of statistical models aimed at testing the relation-
ship between Staffer Ideology, their Boss’s Ideology and a staffer’s reported level of
Trust and frequency of Use of six information sources of interest: left-of-center think
tanks, right-of-center think tanks, university researchers, Congressional Research Ser-
vice (CRS), Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Government Accountability
Office (GAO).
2.5.1 Tests of principal and agent ideology (H1 & H3): Methods
The single biggest threat to inference presented by the data used in this chapter
is the potential for non-response bias, which is exacerbated by the comparatively low
response rate of the CCS. This limitation of the survey data collected is a critical
factor in the methodological approach I take in this study. While this is a potential
problem in all survey research, I take care to address this issue insofar as it is possible
with existing data. In addition to using post-stratification weights based on the
joint distribution of chamber, office type, and party, each model is estimated using
a two-stage Heckman selection model (Heckman1977sample). The first stage uses
a probit regression to model the probability of response in the dataset comprised
of 441 survey respondents and 450 randomly selected non-respondents with multiple
imputation for missing data (Honaker, King, Blackwell, et al. 2011). The inverse Mills
ratio, or non-selection hazard, from this first stage probit model was then included as
an independent variable in the second stage model to account for individual staffers’
likelihood of not responding to the survey (Heckman1977sample).
Because the dependent variables used in this study are likert-type survey ques-
tions, with four categories of “trustworthiness” and three categories of “frequency of
use,” I opt against using an ordinary least squares in the second stage of the selection
models. Instead, I use ordinal logistic regression models with a cumulative (logistic)
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link function (Greene 2003). This better captures the structure of the dependent
variable.14 Finally, I use multiple imputation to account for low levels of missing
data in independent variables from the survey responses (Honaker, King, Blackwell,
et al. 2011).
In order to appropriately propagate the uncertainty of the non-selection hazard
(estimated in the first stage) and the imputation procedure, I use a repeated sampling
and model averaging approach. I generate 1000 imputed datasets using Amelia II
(Honaker, King, Blackwell, et al. 2011). For each imputed dataset, I predict each
respondent’s non-selection hazard using a selection dataset resampled with replace-
ment. I then run an ordinal logistic regression including the non-selection hazard as
an independent variable to model respondents’ reported level of trust in or use of
each information source in each imputed dataset and then combine the results using
Rubin’s rules as implemented by Lumley (2006).
In the first, and simplest, set of models I estimate Staffer Ideology and the ideology
of their boss, Boss Ideology, as separate ratio-scale independent variables. These
models are intended to test hypotheses 1 and 3. I estimate models with these two key
independent variables on both the Use and Trust dependent variables. These models
test the relationship between an agent’s (staffer) ideology and their trust and use of
a source, and their principal’s ideology and that agent’s trust and use of a source.
Each model uses the following functional form, where Yi is the ordinal response
category of J categories of the dependent variables (Agresti 2003).15
14. Results are substantively similar when estimated with OLS.
15. These models are replicated in Appendix F using Ordinary Least Squares as the second stage.
Results are substantively the same.
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logit(P (Yi < j)) = θj + β1(Staffer Ideologyi) + β2(Boss Ideologyi) + β(Xi)
i = 1, ..., n j = 1, ..., J − 1
(2.1)
In these models, Xi represents a vector of individual conditioning variables :
• Tenure, a sum of the number of years the staffer has worked in Congress.
• log(Salary), the natural log of the staffer’s yearly salary.
• Seniority, a three category ordinal variable.
• Office Type, which captures whether a staffer is a member of a personal, com-
mittee, or leadership office.
• Chamber, a dummy variable for the chamber in which the respondent works.
• Issue, a dummy variable for which issue battery the respondent was asked to
evaluate sources under.
• IMR, the inverse Mills ratio (non-selection hazard) estimated in the first stage
model.
These control variables are chosen to account for other potential factors that may
shape how staffers view different information sources. Staffers who have served in the
institution for longer may have developed different relationships with these sources,
or have similar patterns of source trust or use based on being socialized into the insti-
tution when internal knowledge providers were more prevalent. Staffers with higher
salaries or those in more senior roles may have more responsibility, operate under
more extreme time constraints, and need to rely on different cues or shortcuts in
their evaluation of information sources. A categorical variable for the issue about
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which the information source questions were asked is included to account for the fact
that certain information sources may be viewed as more trustworthy or useful on some
issues than others. For example, we might imagine that staffers report higher levels
of trust and use of the Congressional Budget Office when asked about making recom-
mendations on budgetary issues than when asked about making recommendations on
national security issues. Dummy variables for chamber and office type help account
for the different information environments and imperatives of staffers within different
institutional settings. Finally, the inverse Mills ratio is included to condition on the
individual respondent’s propensity to have responded to the survey as estimated from
the first stage regression model. 1617
If staffers aggregate in a politically or ideologically unbiased fashion — that is,
ideology, both their own and their bosses’, is not associated with selection of informa-
tion — β1 and β2 should not be distinguishable from 0 even at very generous levels,
as we should not expect staffer or boss ideology to play a role in the selection process.
On the other hand, if staffers act as faithful agents, we should expect their bosses’
ideology to be a strong determining factor in the information sources they report
trusting and using, as Hypothesis 1 (Faithful Agent Hypothesis) articulates. Finally,
if staffers act according to their own preferences, we should expect staffer ideology
to have a strong association with staffer’s judgements of these sources as detailed in
Hypothesis 3 (Independent Agent Hypothesis).
16. A reasonable reader may be concerned that this particular collection of conditioning variables
was selected in order to bolster the desired results. However, these conditioning variables were
selected for both theoretical reasons, and their availability in the CCS dataset, and no alternative
collections of control variables was tested.
17. Results were also estimated without the Inverse Mills ratio using only a single stage cumulative
logistic regression. These results were substantively the same as those that include the non-selection
hazard estimate.
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2.5.2 Results: evaluating hypotheses 1 and 3
In this section, I report the results from the models detailed above. For ease of
interpretation, the coefficient estimates for the independent variables of interest are
presented graphically in Figure 2.2, with the full regression results in Appendix A,
Tables A.1 and A.3.
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Effect of boss and staffer ideology on information trust and use. Ninety-five and eighty-five percent
confidence intervals shown around coefficient estimates.
Figure 2.2 shows results which demonstrate that staffer ideology corresponds with
differing levels of trust across sources. For example, conservative staffers tend to
report lower levels of trust in the CBO, CRS, GAO, left-of-center think tanks, and
university researchers than more liberal staffers. On the other hand, more conservative
staffers are considerably more likely to report higher levels of trust in right-of-center
think tanks than their liberal counterparts. That conservative staffers trust right-of-
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center think tanks more and liberal staffers trust left-of-center think tanks more is not
surprising on its face. Furthermore, the models of trust in the CRS, GAO and CRS
demonstrate that conservative staffers are less likely to trust these highly-regarded,
independent, internal sources than liberal staffers.
It is especially significant that this strong correspondence between staffer ideology
and evaluations of information sources is this pronounced in models which are also
conditioning on the ideology of these staffers’ bosses. Irrespective of the ideologies of
their principals, staffers appear to evaluate information sources largely according to
their own personal preferences.
In more substantive terms, the effects represented in Figure 2.2 show that a one
standard deviation more conservative staffer is 183 percent more likely to report a
higher level of trust in a right of center think tank than a staffer with the mean
ideology score, and only 44 percent as likely to report a higher level of trust in a
left-of-center think tank than a staffer with the mean ideology score. Additionally
a one standard deviation more conservative staffer is between 59 and 55 percent
as likely to report a high level of trust in the internal government sources than a
staffer with the mean ideology score. To be clear, these results are reported as the
effect of a more conservative staffer (or boss) because the positive end of the ideology
scale is associated with conservatism, not because there is anything special about
conservatives in these models. These are linear results, and a staffer one standard
deviation to the left would be associated with a commensurate, but opposite increase
in trust.
On the other hand, the ideology of the member that the staffer reports to has
a much less consistent relationship to the staffer’s trust of the source. Having a
one standard deviation more conservative boss is associated with a staffer being 206
percent more likely to report higher levels of trust in right-of-center think tanks.
However, while the estimated association between boss ideology and staffer trust
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of a source is in the same direction across all six sources, the relationship is not
statistically distinguishable at conventional (alph = .05) levels for any source except
right-of-center think tanks.
There is no discernible effect of staffer ideology overall on the use of the internal
sources tested. This suggests that while more conservative staffers may trust these
sources less, and thus potentially put less weight on the results of these reports, the
conclusions of these highly regarded internal sources cannot be ignored. Despite their
lower relative levels of trust, more conservative staffers still use these materials when
they make recommendations to their bosses.18 For external sources (left-of-center
think tank, right-of-center think tank and university research), the use results are
consistent with the trust results. Conservative staffers tend to report lower levels of
use for left-of-center think tanks and university research. In contrast to other sources,
staffers use right-of-center think tanks more when they have a more conservative prin-
cipal, whereas more conservative agent (staffer) ideology is not distinguishably asso-
ciated. This unexpected finding may reflect that conservative members of Congress
have particularly strong preferences about this specific category of sources.
Together these results suggest strong evidence for the independent agent hypoth-
esis, and mixed to weak evidence in favor of the faithful agent hypothesis. It is clear
that staffer ideology is strongly associated with staffers’ evaluations of information
sources, even when conditioning on the ideology of their bosses. On the other hand,
the relationship between a staffer’s boss and that staffer’s evaluations of different
information sources tends to be weaker and less consistent, obtaining in just three of
12 models estimated here.
18. Of course, the manner in which they use the sources may differ because of that lower level of
trust, but I do not test that possibility here.
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2.5.3 Tests of principal and agent extremism (H2 & H4): Methods
Next, I turn to evaluating hypotheses 2 (Extreme Principal Hypothesis) and 4
(Independent Extreme Agent Hypothesis). These hypotheses suggest that staffer
and member ideology have a more complex relationship with staffers’ evaluations of
information sources than the simple linear one assumed by the test I’ve just presented
above.
Hypotheses 2 and 4 suggest that more extreme staffers should engage in ideological
evaluation of sources more strongly than more moderate sources. I have operational-
ized this test of the relationship between extremism and source evaluation to allow
for the association to differ depending upon whether the staffer (or boss) are left- or
right-of-center. This is particularly important because we should expect differential
results depending on the valence of the source and its alignment with the staffer and
boss. In order to test this, I create Staffer Extremism and Boss Extremism measures
by taking the absolute value of their respective ideology scores. I then interact these
extremism variables with a dummy variable indicating whether the staffer (or boss)
is left-of-center.19 These models are estimated on both the Use and Trust dependent
variables, use the identical imputation and two-stage selection approach described
above, and take the functional form shown below, where Yi is the ordinal response
category of J categories of the dependent variables (Agresti 2003).20
19. Distributions of these ideology scores and the relationship between staffer and boss ideology
can be found in Appendix B.
20. These models are replicated in Appendix F using Ordinary Least Squares as the second stage.
Results are substantively the same.
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logit(P (Yi < j)) = θj + β1(Staff Extremismi) + β2(Boss Extremismi) + β3(Staff Lefti)
+β4(Boss Lefti) + β5(Staff Lefti × Staff Extremismi)
+β6(Boss Lefti × Boss Extremismi) + β(Xi)
i = 1, ..., n j = 1, ..., J − 1
(2.2)
In these models, Xi represents the same vector of the conditioning variables as
those detailed above.
2.5.4 Results: evaluating hypotheses 2 and 4
Estimates of coefficients for the effect of Staffer Extremism, conditional on whether
that staffer is left-of-center or not are shown in Figure 2.3; full regression results are
available in Appendix A, Tables 3 and 4. As Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006)
suggest, I plot the marginal effects of the interaction terms for these models.
These results indicate some asymmetric effects of staffer ideological extremism
depending on whether a staffer is liberal or conservative. In five of the six sources
investigated, the difference between the effect of increased ideological extremism in a
liberal staffer was statistically distinguishable from the effect of increased ideological
extremism in a conservative staffer, as indicated by their non-overlapping 85 percent
confidence intervals (Payton, Greenstone, and Schenker 2003).
As staffers who are left-of-center become more extreme ideologically they are sta-
tistically distinguishably more likely to trust left-of-center think tanks and univer-
sity produced research than their more moderate counterparts, and less likely to
trust right-of-center think tanks. The pattern of ideological selectivity is even starker
among staffers who are ideologically right-of-center. Among right-of-center staffers,
43
Figure 2.3: Agent Extremism Results
Use of Information
Trust in Information
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Effect of staffer extremism on information trust and use. Ninety-five and eighty-five percent
confidence intervals shown around coefficient estimates.
those who are more extreme ideologically actually tend to trust all sources except
for right-of-center think tanks less than their more moderate right-of-center coun-
terparts. More extreme staffers are less likely to trust the GAO, CRS, and CBO,
three highly-regarded non-partisan government sources of information, as well as left-
of-center think tanks and university researchers. These models suggest extremely
strong support for ideological selectivity in the sources that staffers tend to trust.
Turning to reported levels of use of these information sources, I find similar, albeit
less pronounced, patterns of ideological selectivity among more extreme staffers. The
results from the models of information use are shown in the bottom panel of Figure
2.2. More extreme liberal staffers are more likely to use information from left-of-
center think tanks and university researchers than their more moderate counterparts.
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Ideologically conservative staffers, on the other hand, are less likely to report using
university research, information from left-of-center think tanks, or the Congressional
Research Service than more ideologically moderate conservative staffers. Here too,
staffer ideology does not appear to be associated with differential rates of use of right-
of-center think tanks.21 In general, staffer ideology is less strongly associated with
use than it is with trust.
Figure 2.4: Boss Extremism Results
Use of Information
Trust in Information
CBO CRS GAO Left TT Right TT Univ.























































Right of Center Left of Center
Right of Center Left of Center
Effect of boss extremism on information trust and use. Ninety-five and eighty-five percent confi-
dence intervals shown around coefficient estimates.
Figure 2.4 shows the marginal effects of the interaction between staffers’ bosses’
ideology and an indicator variable for whether their boss is left- or right-of-center.
There are no statistically distinguishable relationships between boss extremism and
staffer trust or use in 11 of the 12 models. Boss extremism is a strong predictor of
21. A VIF test does not reveal problems of multicollinearity in these models.
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reported levels of use of right-of-center think tanks.
The main result from these models is a strong association between staffer ideology
and trust in information. There is a consistent, but weaker, relationship between
staffer ideology and their reported levels of use of information from these sources.
In particular more extreme ideologues selectively trust and, to a lesser extent, use
sources that are more likely to be aligned with their preconceptions, and that they
do so independent of the ideological positions of their bosses. These results are
particularly strong among conservative staffers. These results support the extreme
independent agent hypothesis (H4), but, with exception of use of right of center think
tanks, offer little support to the extreme principal hypothesis (H2).
2.5.5 Analysis of variance
A core question this chapter seeks to address is whether staffers’ ideologies or
their bosses’ ideologies have greater explanatory power over staffers’ evaluations of
information sources. I further assess this question by conducting an analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) on separate models of each information source. For these models, I
use two-stage Heckman selection models to account for potential non-response bias,
and robust linear regression in the second stage. Other than modeling the dependent
variable as ratio rather than ordinal scale, these models take the same form as those
presented above.
Across all information sources tested, staffers ideology explains much more vari-
ance in how trustworthy staffers rate information sources than their bosses ideology.
This difference ranges from 7.4 times as much variance explained for the CRS to 21.3
times the variance explained for left-of-center think tanks. This is strong evidence in
favor of the independent agent thesis of staffer information evaluation.
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Percent of Variance Staffer’s Trust in Information Explained
Source Staff Ideology Boss Ideology p
CRS 8.33 1.11 0.01
CBO 8.28 1.11 0.01
GAO 9.67 0.37 <0.00
Right TT 22.56 2.72 <0.00
Left TT 22.93 1.08 <0.00
Univ. 15.38 1.08 <0.00
Note: p = proportion of 10,000 bootstrapped rlm replicationa in
which Staff Ideology explains more variance than Boss Ideology.
Table 2.1: Staff and Boss Ideology ANOVA
2.6 Evaluating the effect of source alignment
In this next section, I evaluate whether Staffer Extremism and Boss Extremism is
associated with how a staffer evaluates ideologically aligned or non-aligned sources.
This analysis is a useful and necessary addition to the single source models I have
reported above. First, by estimating models on a pooled dataset in which staffers’
evaluations of different sources are included as separate rows allows me to evalu-
ate the relative levels of trust and use, which previous single source models could
not. Secondly, this pooled dataset can be thought of as a repeated-measures design
which produces multilevel structure that has some beneficial properties for empirical
modeling. I discuss the approach I take in the section below.
2.6.1 Methods: multilevel models of staffer evaluation of (non)aligned
sources
The models which follow use staffers’ responses to multiple information sources:
left-of-center think tank, right-of-center think tank, CRS, CBO, and GAO (Agresti
2003; Christensen 2018).22 This can be thought of as a repeated measures design. I
code each source according to two sets of dummy variables, indicating whether either
22. I have excluded responses to the university researcher source, because I wanted to use these
models to compare explicitly ideological outside information to internal government sources.
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is aligned or not aligned with a staffer or boss. Staff and Boss alignment variables
are measured dyadically. A staffer-source dyad is coded as Staff Aligned if the source
is a left-of-center (right-of-center) think tank and the staffer has an ideology score
left (right) of zero. The dyad is coded as Staff Non-aligned if the source is a right-
of-center (left-of-center) think tank and the staffer has an ideology score left (right)
of zero. The coding of Boss Aligned and Boss Non-aligned follows the same pattern
as coding for the staff variable, but the dyadic alignment is based on whether the
source and the staffer’s boss are on the same side of the ideological spectrum. This
multilevel design allows me to include a mixed effect for each respondent, and each
source type (left- and right-of-center think tanks, CBO, CRS and GAO). This helps
account for unobserved staffer and information source effects.
For these models, I follow the same two-stage process with 100 separate multi-
ply imputed datasets of respondents, each with their own set of inverse Mills ratios
separately estimated from a bootstrap resampled selection dataset in stage one.
I estimate the following model where Yik is the ordinal response category of i
respondent, on k information source, over J categories of the dependent variable.
logit(P (Yik < j)) = θj + β1(Staff Extremismi) + β2(Boss Extremismi) + β3(Staff Alignedik)+
β4(Staff Non-alignedik) + β5(Staff Alignedik × Staff Extremismi)+
β6(Staff non-Alignedik × Staff Extremismi) + β7(Boss Alignedik × Boss Extremismi)+
β8(Boss Non-alignedik × Boss Extremismi) + β(Xi)− u(stafferi)− u(sourcek)
i = 1, ..., n k = 1, ..., 6 j = 1, ..., J − 1
(2.3)
I estimate this model on both the trust and the use dependent variable. The
independent constructs of interest are captured by the interaction between Staffer
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Extremism, Boss Extremism and the indicator variables for whether the staffer or their
boss are aligned with the source. Additionally, Xi represents a vector of the additional
respondent specific control variables used in the prior models, and β their coefficient
estimates. Finally, to account for the repeated measure design, I include staffer
level random effects, u(stafferi), and information source random effects u(sourcek).
Post-stratification weights, psweight, from CCS 2017 are used in all analyses.
2.6.2 Results: the effect of ideological extremism and source alignment
The marginal effects of staffer extremism are shown in Figure 2.5, while the full
model results are shown in Table A.5 of Appendix A.
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Effect of staffer extremism on information trust and use of aligned and non-aligned sources.
Ninety-five and eighty-five percent confidence intervals shown around coefficient estimates.
When interpreting these results, it is important to bear in mind that the refer-
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ence category – that is, the set of sources which are coded as neither aligned nor
non-aligned, is the group of internal government sources, the CBO, CRS and GAO.
The first thing these results make clear is that internal sources are highly trusted, re-
gardless of staffer or boss ideology. In general, staffers trust outside sources less than
they trust internal sources. For the most moderate staffers, there is no appreciable
difference between aligned and non-aligned sources, as both are trusted much less
than internal sources. However, among more extreme staffers there is an enormous
difference in the level of trust that staffers are likely to report for aligned and non-
aligned sources. The odds of most extreme staffers saying that they completely trust
(as opposed to mostly, somewhat or not at all) an aligned source is roughly 50 percent
of the odds they would report complete trust in internal sources, although this effect
is not statistically distinguishable from no difference in trust between internal and
aligned external sources. On the other hand, the odds of the most extreme staffers
saying they completely trust (as opposed to mostly, somewhat or not at all) non-
aligned external sources is 365 times less likely than reporting internal government
sources as completely trustworthy.
This effect is more muted when it comes to staffer use of information. For most of
the range of staffer extremism, the association between source alignment and staffer
extremism is smaller. There is no statistically discernible difference between Use of
aligned and non-aligned sources for most of the range of staffer extremism. However,
among the most extreme staffers we are able to distinguish between aligned and
non-aligned sources. Additionally, the most extreme staffers report rates of use of
aligned sources that is indistinguishable from internal government sources. This is a
particularly important result theoretically, as it demonstrates that the most extreme
staffers find aligned sources to be as trustworthy as highly reputed bipartisan expertise
from the CRS, GAO and CBO. In this regard, ideologically extreme staffers view the
world quite differently from their moderate counterparts.
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The effect of boss extremism on staffers’ evaluations of information sources follow
a similar pattern to the results shown above.
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Effect of boss extremism on information trust and use of aligned and non-aligned sources. Ninety-
five and eighty-five percent confidence intervals shown around coefficient estimates.
There is no discernible effect of boss extremism on staffers reporting higher levels
of trust of either aligned or non-aligned information sources. The marginal effect of
boss extremism on staffer use is only statistically distinguishable among staffers that
work for the most extreme members of Congress. In all other instances, the effects
are not discernible from each other.
These results again provide more support for the independent agent hypotheses,
than the faithful agent hypotheses. In the various models tested here, there is a
persistent relationship between staffer ideology (and extremism) and the evaluations
that staffers report about sources of information. These relationships exist indepen-
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dent of the ideology (or extremism) of the member that a staffer reports to, while the
members’ ideology does not, in most cases, have a strong association with staffers’
trust or use of information.
2.7 Evaluating the Vulnerable Member Hypothesis
The prior results suggest that staffers do not act as faithful agents of their bosses.
However, they do not help distinguish between whether staffers are functioning as
rational rogue agents, or if the impact of their own preferences on their judgements is
the result of cognitive biases on their part. To distinguish between these possibilities, I
turn to the vulnerable member hypothesis. This hypothesis holds that staffers should
be more responsive to their bosses if those bosses’ seats are in districts or states which
will be competitive in the next election, as fear for their career futures induces them
to act as more faithful agents. If we observe this to be true, it follows that staffers
who act independently in other circumstances are doing it intentionally rather than
as the result of subconscious motivated reasoning. This finding would support the
notion that staffers are independent agents at the expense of the view of staffers as
motivated reasoners. I categorize staffers into those who work for vulnerable or safe
members depending on the Cook Political Report rating for competitive seats which
was current in the middle of fielding the 2017 CCS (Sept 18th for the House, Sept 23rd
for the Senate). Only senators up for election in 2018 were considered as potentially
vulnerable, and any member or senator that was not seeking re-election was coded as
safe, even if their district would be competitive.
2.7.1 Methods: evaluating the vulnerable member hypothesis
To test this hypothesis I use the same multilevel models on the pooled sources,
and use the same functional form of the models. However, I re-estimate these models
on the subset of staffers who work for members of Congress from safe seats. Ideally,
52
I would like to estimate the models separately on staffers with bosses in safe and
vulnerable seats, but because of small sample size (66 staffers) and perfect collinear-
ity between the alignment variables in the vulnerable seat subset, these models are
not estimable. Instead, I compare the results of the models estimated on the safe
seat subset with the models estimated on the full dataset. If the vulnerable member
hypothesis were true, we should expect the inclusion of staffers who work for vul-
nerable members to be attenuating the results in the models estimated on the full
dataset. Models estimated only on staffers with bosses in safe seats should show more
pronounced staffer selection effects according to ideological alignment.
2.7.2 Results: vulnerable member hypothesis
Figure 2.7 shows the marginal effect of staffer extremism on trust by whether the
sources are aligned or non-aligned with the staffer. Full model results are in Table
A.5 of Appendix A. There is no association between safe seats and whether staffers
select information according to their own or their bosses’ preferences.
This Figure makes clear that there are no discernible differences between these
estimates for staffers in all offices and the estimates for staffers in electorally safe
offices. Staffers do not appear to exhibit a stronger propensity for trusting or us-
ing ideologically aligned information when they don’t fear for their bosses’ political
futures.
Similarly, staffers do not appear to be any less responsive to their bosses’ ideolog-
ical preferences when their bosses are electorally safe.
The estimates of the marginal effect of boss extremism conditional on source align-
ment are indistinguishable between staffers in all offices and staffers in offices of safe
members. In addition to these results, I present additional evidence in support of the
view that staffers act, at least in part, as motivated reasoners from a conjoint survey
experiment from Chapter 3. These results suggest that in addition to evaluating the
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Comparison of effects of staff extremism on aligned and non-aligned sources, for all offices and
safe seat offices. Eighty-five percent confidence intervals shown around coefficient estimates.
ideology of content in policy proposals, staffers rely heavily on the ideology heuristic
provided by the source of policy information.
These results provide no evidence for the vulnerable member hypothesis. This
lends credence to the notion that staffers act as motivated reasoners, because we
would expect strategic, independent agents to be more responsive to their bosses
when their bosses are vulnerable politically. Instead, it suggests that staffers evaluate
ideologically consonant sources more positively because they believe them to contain
the best and most useful information.
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Comparison of effects of boss extremism on aligned and non-aligned sources, for all offices and
safe seat offices. Eighty-five percent confidence intervals shown around coefficient estimates.
2.8 Discussion
Prior to this study, the central functional assumption of legislative behavior—that
staff action is interpretable as action by the legislator—had been largely untested.
Both theoretical and empirical scholarship on Congress and legislator behavior took
as a matter of faith that staffers act as faithful agents of their bosses. At the root of
this assumption, was the notion that the at-will employment of staffers was sufficient
to curtail the possibility of agency loss within legislator-enterprises. Notably, some
scholars questioned whether members of Congress had sufficient resources and time
to engage in the necessary agent selection or oversight to ensure fidelity (Malbin 1980;
Romzek and Utter 1997; Price 1971). This chapter is the first to systematically test
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this assumption that congressional staffers act as faithful agents of their bosses.
I test this assumption in the context of the information gate-keeping role that
staffers play within legislator-enterprises in Congress. Staffers’ positions — at the
center of solving complex problems with distributed information — lend them ex-
traordinary power to shape the perspective of the members they work for. As such, it
is enormously important whether staffers evaluate and select information according
to ideological considerations, and if so, whose preferences they are responsive to.
I have presented theoretical expectations based on three accounts of how staffers
might act in this position. The first, and in some ways the most normatively ap-
pealing, ”faithful agent” view, contends that staffers are sufficiently motivated and
accountable to their bosses that they act in accordance with their bosses’ preferences.
I find little support for this theory empirically. While the ideology of a staffer’s prin-
cipal is occasionally associated with a staffer’s evaluations of information sources, this
is the exception rather than the rule.
Rather, when I condition on a staffer’s boss’s ideologies, the ideology of the staffer
is much more strongly associated with the source evaluations that a staffer makes than
the ideology of the staffer’s boss. These findings are much more in line with both the
“independent agent” and “motivated reasoner” perspectives, which imply that staffers
will select sources that are consonant with their own ideological preferences rather
than their bosses’.
I present additional evidence that at least some of staffers’ tendency to use ide-
ologically consonant sources is likely to be driven by ideological cues and cognitive
biases of the staffers, rather than the rational calculations of independent agents.
This is evinced by the fact that staffers that work for members with safe seats do
not appear to operate with any more agency impunity than staffers that work for
vulnerable members, as we would expect of independent agents that are motivated
to keep their jobs.
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Together the results presented here pose a serious challenge to the predominant
assumption that staffers are largely responsive to their bosses’ demands. This ques-
tions core assumptions of much of the literature on legislative behavior. If staffers
exercise their substantial discretion to pursue their own ideological ends, as this study
suggests, it has the potential to meaningfully distort the representational activities of
elected members of Congress. This chapter demonstrates that staffers are capable of
exercising considerable independence as they evaluate information and choose what
to pass on to their bosses.
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CHAPTER III
Experiments on Staffer Information Use and
Evaluation
3.1 Introduction
Congressional staff are central to the representational, legislative, and oversight
capabilities of the institution. As members are increasingly time-pressured and sub-
ject to fundraising obligations, they necessarily delegate substantial functions to their
staffers. Congressional staff serve as gatekeepers for members’ of Congress time and
attention, communicating with constituents and other stakeholders, assembling infor-
mation on constituent views and pending policies, strategically identifying support-
ive coalitions, and making recommendations on credit claiming and position taking
opportunities (Whiteman 1995; Kingdon 1989; Hall 1996; Whiteman 1987). Profes-
sional staff routinely make recommendations on whether to introduce or co-sponsor
legislation, what questions to ask during committee hearings, what remarks to make
on the floor, or what statements to issue to the press. Despite the fact that they
serve at the pleasure of members and are often hired to reflect their priorities and
preferences, both qualitative and quantitative research indicates that staff can and
do exert independent effects on lawmakers’ behavior (Montgomery and Nyhan 2017;
LaPira, Drutman, and Kosar 2020), and have preferences which may not align with
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their members (see Chapter 2).
This chapter adds to a growing literature recognizing the importance of congres-
sional staff in the legislative process. While scholars of congressional politics have
long recognized that Members of Congress manage legislative enterprises (Polsby
1968; Malbin 1980; Salisbury and Shepsle 1981b; Hammond 1996; Romzek and Utter
1997), it is only relatively recently that research has reconsidered how the training,
resources, incentives, and background of staffers independently affect the legislative
process (Montgomery and Nyhan 2017; LaPira, Drutman, and Kosar 2020; McCrain
2018; Crosson et al. 2020b; Furnas et al. 2020).
In a recent survey of senior staff, Hertel-Fernandez, Mildenberger, and Stokes
(2019) find evidence that these individuals often misperceive the opinions of their
constituents on highly salient policy issues, like health reform, gun control, and min-
imum wage. These misperceptions, moreover, appear to relate to the interactions
that staffers have with economically advantaged actors, like campaign donors and
corporate interests, raising the possibility that the access enjoyed by these interests
may shape staffer behavior.
In this chapter I explore how staffers respond to ideological policy information
using data from two separate, large scale surveys of congressional staff that measure
individual staffer attributes such as their party identity, ideology, employment setting,
and policy and procedural knowledge, among others attributes. The studies presented
here ask how legislative staff evaluate policy information from different sources, and
whether and how they act on the information provided to them by different political
interests — and whether in doing so, they are biasing the recommendations they
offer to their bosses. This work uses two different experimental studies to gain causal
leverage on how staffer partisanship and ideology structure information processing
within Congress, an issue raised in Chapter 2. Accordingly, these designs test how
staffers’ preferences for particular kinds of information shape their political strategies
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and policy recommendations (Miler 2010; Hertel-Fernandez, Mildenberger, and Stokes
2019). I show that staffers use partisan and ideological heuristics to filter information
and to recommend positions their bosses should take.
Lastly, these experiments carry implications for broader debates over the represen-
tation of organized interests in American politics. In particular, these studies speak
to whether and how economic inequalities might translate into inequalities of political
representation (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2014). While our results
do not indicate that staffers admit to preferring donors over others (Hertel-Fernandez,
Mildenberger, and Stokes (2019), they do show that staffers defer to actors who bring
think tank sponsored research to bear on their advocacy efforts. Thus putatively
non-partisan think tanks have the ability to shape policy proposals by members of
Congress in decidedly partisan ways. Furthermore, donors or other wealthy interests
that fund think tank agendas may have a powerful indirect role in influencing agendas
in Congress (Smith 2018; Esterling 2004; Medvetz 2012; Drutman 2015; Hollis-Brusky
2015; Fagan 2019).
Staff in Congress are responsive to very different kinds of arguments, data, and
research depending on which side of the aisle they identify. Selective attention to
some sources of policy research may explain why Republicans are so responsive to
the ideologically unified well-off, while Democrats respond more to the diverse inter-
ests of the middle class and economically disadvantaged (Hacker and Pierson 2010;
Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Grossmann and Isaac, n.d. Lax, Phillps, and Zelizer
2019).
Since at least Schattschneider (1975), political scientists have been concerned
about elite and upper-class influence in representative institutions. Amidst high
and rising levels of inequality in the United States, scholars have focused more on
whether out-sized economic resources afford political actors privileged access and in-
fluence in the policymaking process (Jacobs and Skocpol 2005; Bartels 2008; Gilens
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2012; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Lax, Phillps,
and Zelizer 2019; Bowman 2020; Grossmann and Isaac, n.d.). While some have ques-
tioned the relationship between economic resources and political clout (Ansolabehere,
Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Enns et al. 2014; Branham,
Soroka, and Wlezien 2017; Prasad 2018), other research has documented that greater
economic resources afford wealthier individuals and private sector businesses more
opportunities to shape public policy (Miler 2010; Drutman 2015; Kalla and Broock-
man 2016; Page and Gilens 2017; Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol, and Sclar 2018; Miler
2018).
This research complements a growing body of work documenting how political
elites—including state legislators and senior staff in Congress—misjudge their con-
stituents’ opinions in ways that systematically favor concentrated economic interests
(Brookman and Skovron 2018; Hertel-Fernandez, Mildenberger, and Stokes 2019).
These studies suggest that the wealthy and well-organized interests enjoy greater ac-
cess because politicians think they are congruent with constituents’ interests. Yet,
the process by which this unequal access converts to policy influence is unobserved.
In this paper I report two separate experimental studies designed to test how
congressional staff evaluate policy requests.
3.2 Description of experimental studies
The first experimental study (Study 1, hereafter), directly tests how much wealthy
interests and their lobbyists affect legislative action in addition to seeking access
alone. Like similar experiments (Chin, Bond, and Geva 2000; Kalla and Broockman
2016; Hertel-Fernandez, Mildenberger, and Stokes 2019), this study, conducted in
conjunction with Timothy Lapira, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Lee Drutman, and
Kevin Kosar, tests the counterfactual that constituents are less likely to gain access
to congressional offices than donors and lobbyists. We introduce a novel extension
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to prior studies that have focused on the identity of a lobbyist or petitioner, by
varying the experimental treatment to include different policy relevant information
in their request, some of which come from explicit ideological sources. In addition
to whether staffers would take the meeting, we measure staffers’ likelihood to use
information from, or to side with, the petitioner’s request. Using an original survey
of over 400 DC-based congressional staffers in 2017 (the 2017 Congressional Capacity
Survey, or CCS 2017), the vignette experiment is a hypothetical request to meet with
the respondent staffer. The script manipulates three variables: the identity of the
petitioner, the intent to introduce legislation or to block legislation, and the nature of
the information offered in support of the request. The outcomes we measure include
the likelihood of taking a meeting, using the information, of siding with the petitioner
and the perception that the petitioner represents geographic constituencies.
Thus our outcomes measure additional, more nuanced responses to campaign
donors and lobbyists beyond merely granting access. Seeking and gaining access
has long been considered a prerequisite condition for influencing legislation (Austen-
Smith 1995; Wright 1995). However, even though gaining access is a prerequisite for
influence, it does not mean that legislators or their staff really use what they learn
from lobbyists, or do so equally for all of those to whom they grant access. The prac-
tical consequence of granting a constituent, donor, or lobbyist a meeting is relatively
low compared to other actions in the legislative process. First, the norm in congres-
sional offices is that staffers should grant meetings with as many requests as possible
as a matter of professional courtesy. Second, the stakes are low, especially among staff
hired in part to be the eyes and ears of members’ legislative enterprises. Legislators’
time — especially given their limited presence in Washington — is pressed between
committee meetings, floor voting, fundraising, media appearances, and other events.
Alternatively, the consequence for acting in response to a petitioner’s request made
during a meeting is higher. These consequences include the costs in time and effort
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to follow through, the reputation risk for recommending the “wrong” position to take,
the potential publicity associated with advocating on behalf of the interest or policy
in question, and so on. These actions are potentially more transparent to attentive
sub-constituencies, policy stakeholders, journalists, and real and imagined political
rivals. Finally, acting on an issue being requested by a petitioner means not acting
on hundreds of other possible issues, which is primarily what private interests seek
from legislators (Hall and Deardorff 2006).
Our results corroborate this logic. After being prompted with a hypothetical
request, a large majority (70%) of respondents indicate they would be very or some-
what likely to take a meeting with the petitioner. However, of those staffers, only
half indicate they would be very or somewhat likely to use the information being
offered.1 Among those likely to both take the meeting and to use the information
from the petitioner, less than a third would subsequently recommend that their boss
side with the petitioner.2 Therefore, our design differentiates between granting access
and actions that reflect more consequential legislative behavior. While distinguishing
between access and the behavior that access is intended to affect may seem unremark-
able, many prominent studies of interest group activity measure access alone (e.g.,
2016; n.d. 2000; 1995; 2018) However, we are careful not to equate these hypothetical
actions as evidence of influence per se, but do presume they reflect more intense or
consequential forms of legislative participation (Hall 1996).3
Study 2, which I conducted as part of the 2019 Congressional Capacity Survey,
builds on the design and findings from Study 1. Where Study 1 highlights the role that
providing ideological information plays in shaping whether and how congressional staff
respond to a petitioner’s request, Study 2 investigates how staffers evaluate specific
1. Pr(Use Information ∈ {Very likely, Somewhat likely} | Take Meeting ∈ {Very likely, Somewhat
likely}) = 49%.
2. Pr(Recommend to Boss ∈ {Very likely, Somewhat likely} | Use Information ∈ {Very likely,
Somewhat likely} & Take Meeting ∈ {Very likely, Somewhat likely}) = 29%.
3. See Appendix C for descriptive statistics for these responses.
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sources of information at the micro level. The design isolates whether staffers rely
on the source of information as a heuristic when evaluating a source, or whether
they evaluate information based on its content. Study 2 is an embedded survey
experiment using a forced-choice conjoint design in the 2019 Congressional Capacity
Survey, which I fielded with Timothy LaPira. In this experiment, staffers are asked
to choose between two hypothetical white papers with either liberal or conservative
policy content, coming from either liberal or conservative think tanks.
I find that staffers are substantially more likely to rely on a white paper that
comes from an ideologically aligned source, and one that contains ideologically con-
sonant policy content. Among the most ideologically extreme staffers, these effects
are particularly strong when they occur together, with staffers choosing to rely on
policy analysis that is from both an aligned source and containing aligned content
even more than the simple additive effect.
Study 2 demonstrates that not only are staffers likely to choose information sub-
sidies that contain aligned policy content, but they are also more likely to choose a
white paper from an aligned source irrespective of the policy content.
3.3 Study 1: Lobbying Vignette Experiment
In the subsequent sections, I present the results of the lobbying vignette experi-
ment conducted as part of the Congressional Capacity survey designed and fielded in
coordination with the full survey team, comprised of myself, Tim LaPira, Alexander
Hertel-Fernandez, Lee Drutman, and Kevin Kosar.
3.3.1 Data: The 2017 Congressional Capacity Survey
Study 1 is a survey experiment embedded within in the 2017 Congressional Ca-
pacity Survey (CCS). The 2017 CCS is the largest academic survey of congressional
staffers to date. Using a complete census of congressional staffers from payroll records
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purchased from LegiStorm, we identified 8,485 prospective respondents who worked
in D.C. offices who have some responsibility to contribute to legislative operations,
broadly defined. We sent the survey to all 8,458 staffers by email. We also recruited
a variety of non-partisan, ideologically-diverse non-profit organizations to promote
participation and to serve as external validators.4
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N = 891, 441 survey respondents and 445 randomly selected non-respondents. 95% CIs.
The final response rate of the survey was 5.2% (N = 441). CCS 2017 respon-
dents comprise a diverse and largely representative sample of congressional staff on
most observable characteristics. The modal respondent is a 25 to 29 year old white
male employed as a mid-level legislative assistant in a majority party member’s office
4. Details on the 2017 CCS methodology are in Appendix A.
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with roughly four years experience on Capitol Hill. As Figure 3.1 shows, respondent
balance is very strong on career trajectory covariates (number of prior employers,
tenure, salary), several key institutional covariates (party, chamber, office type, and
seniority), and the ideology of their employers. All respondents were given inverse
probability weights using a post-stratification procedure conditioning on the joint
distribution of chamber, office type (personal, committee, other), and party in the
sampling frame (Lumley et al. 2004; Lumley 2017). The maximum weight applied to
any case was 4.82, and the minimum 0.749.
It is important to note that despite the potential limitations of this sample, this is
the largest experiment sample of Congressional staffers to date.5 Direct observational
and experimental study of congressional staff behavior is a blind spot in the study of
Congress. These data offer a unique opportunity to assess fundamental questions of
representation, information processing, and policy decision making by congressional
staffers.
3.3.2 Experiment Design
This section reports a vignette experiment with a fully randomized factorial design.
The experiment is a 4× 2× 4 factorial design, with 32 conditions. The hypothetical
scenario mimics a common occurrence in Congress: an individual representing some
constituency, group, or organization contacts a staffer in pursuit of a policy goal by
offering evidence in support of their position. The vignette can be thought of as an
instance of in-person lobbying or policy advocacy. We manipulate three factors : (1)
the Identity of the petitioner, (2) the Action the petitioner is requesting, and (3) the
supporting Information the petitioner offers. The vignette reads:
Legislative staff like yourself rely on information from a variety of sources.
Suppose you received a request for a meeting with a {Identity}. The
5. Hertel-Fernandez, Mildenberger, and Stokes (2019), for instance, focused on surveying the most
senior members within an office, i.e., chiefs of staff and legislative directors only.
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individual is asking your office to {Action}. They offered to give your
office {Information}.
The three manipulated factors in the vignette take the prompts in Table 3.1. We
Factor Prompt
Identity Constituent
Donor to your Member’s campaign
Lobbyist representing a national consumer group
Lobbyist representing a large, national business
Action Propose a new bill
Stop a bill currently under consideration
Information Polling from your constituency that shows support for their position
Evidence of how their proposal will help jobs and unemployment in
your constituency from an analysis they conducted
Evidence of how their proposal will help jobs and unemployment in
your constituency from a center-left think tank
Evidence of how their proposal will help jobs and unemployment in
your constituency from a center-right think tank
Table 3.1: Experiment Design Factors and Values
present respondents with four questions in sequence immediately after the vignette.
The first three questions ask staffers to rate how likely they would be to (1) take the
meeting, (2) use the information provided by the individual to prepare recommen-
dations for their boss, and (3) side with this individual in their recommendation to
their boss. Responses were measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale with likelihood
anchors. Each of these actions implies different costs and policy ramifications. For
example, taking a meeting implies no policy commitments, and costs only a rela-
tively small amount of time from a staffer; this is a relatively inconsequential action.
However, using information from a source is of more consequence; by relying on a
particular source a staffer risks their own credibility within their office, and incorpo-
rates that source’s worldview into the brief they produce. Of higher consequence still,
is recommending that a member side with a particular petitioner on a policy issue:
such a recommendation implies both the opportunity costs of not recommending an
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alternative position, and the coalitional and partisan consequences of publicly taking
that position if the member chooses to follow the staffer’s advice. Getting a staffer
to explicitly recommend that their boss side with a petitioner is a major advocacy
victory, and an extremely consequential result. In the fourth question, we ask respon-
dents how much they believe the petitioner is representative of their district or state’s
opinion as a whole, recorded with a 5-point Likert-type scale with a representativeness
anchor.6
3.3.3 Partisan Information Processing Effects
We pre-registered an analysis plan which included testing all factorial combina-
tions using ANOVA and pairwise t-tests.7 Our sample size relative to the number
of possible pairwise combinations is insufficient, so we opt to estimate the Average
Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) of the levels of each factor.8 The AMCE of a
particular element (e.g., {Identity} = “constituent”) is the marginal effect of that ele-
ment averaged over the joint distribution of the other manipulated factors, {Action}
and {Information} (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). While Hainmueller,
Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014) identify AMCE in the context of conjoint experi-
ments, they note that it may serve as a causal estimand in any factorial design, and
is applicable to both choice and ratings based dependent variables. Just as Hain-
mueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014) do, we convert our Likert-scale dependent
variables to numeric scales, then rescale them from 0-1 to simplify interpretation. We
then fit an ordinary least squares (OLS) model to calculate AMCE for each attribute
in the factorial design. Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014) demonstrate
that OLS functions as a subclassification estimator, so it calculates nonparametric
6. Exact question wording is available in Appendix B.
7. Open Science Foundation pre-registration available at https://osf.io/fvyg9/?view_only=
3124f1570ff740cfbeedaba737d605f6.
8. We report ANOVA and t-test results in Appendix D to be consistent with our pre-registration.
The relationship between party identification and the ideology of the source information is consistent
with our expectations using pairwise t-tests.
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coefficients for AMCE. Therefore, converting our ordinal measures to interval scales
is justified given our application. All models estimate effects using post-stratification
weights and heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors (HC3) (Long and Ervin 2000).
Additionally, in this section we report AMCE for subgroups defined by the party of
the staffer’s employer.
3.3.3.1 Taking a Meeting
We first turn to the least consequential outcome for a staffer: taking a meeting
with the individual described in the request. These results are shown in Figure 3.2.9
It is important to highlight that results regarding donors should be interpreted with
caution, as social desirability bias may disproportionately influence respondents’ an-
swers regarding campaign donors. However, it is important to note that respondents
were only presented with one vignette and were not made aware of which factors were
being manipulated. Because they did not respond to vignettes with both constituents
and donors, it was not possible for lower responses to donors to be driven by “an-
choring” on constituents, and then responding lower to donors for social desirability
reasons. Rather, these results would be driven by social desirability only if the mere
mention of donors, without any comparisons to non-donors or additional framing, is
sufficient to engage socially desirable responding.
That said, compared to a request from a constituent (the reference category),
staffers are nominally less likely to take a meeting with donors or lobbyists, though
the effects are not statistically distinguishable. The notable exception here is that
staffers in Democrats’ offices are less likely to take meetings with donors. Consistent
with Chin, Bond, and Geva (2000) but contrary to Kalla and Broockman (2016), staff
are no more likely to grant meetings to donors than to non-donors.10
9. We display both 95% and 85% confidence intervals. Payton, Greenstone, and Schenker (2003)
demonstrate non-overlapping 85% confidence intervals are an appropriate test of statistical signifi-
cance for the difference between two parameter estimates with roughly equal variance.
10. It is worth noting that our design does not map perfectly to that of Kalla and Broockman
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N = 436. The dependent variable is a five-category “likelihood” Likert-type scale. The baseline
categories are Identity = “Constituent,” Action = “Propose bill,” and Information = “Supportive
Polling.” 95% and 85% confidence intervals shown.
We find no relationship between the action being requested or the evidence being
offered and the likelihood to grant the petitioner a meeting.
3.3.3.2 Using Information
Figure 3.3 presents staffers’ likelihood to use the information offered by the pe-
titioner in preparing recommendations for their boss. Compared to simply taking a
meeting, using the information provided by a petitioner is a more consequential action
(2016), who compare donors and non-donors within the subset of geographic constituents, while our
design compares constituents to donors with no mention of whether those donors are or are not also
constituents.
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by a staffer. With previous caveats regarding the possibility of social desirability bias
in mind, all staffers are less likely to use information provided by donors. This effect
is stronger among Democrats, and not significant among Republicans. In the full
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N = 436. The dependent variable is a five-category “likelihood” Likert-type scale. The baseline
categories are Identity = “Constituent,” Action = “Propose bill,” and Information = “Supportive
Polling.” 95% and 85% confidence intervals shown.
sample, the estimated effects are null for the petitioner’s identity other than donors,
the action being requested, and the evidence being offered. However, we do observe
distinguishable differences in how staffers in Republican and Democratic offices rate
their likelihood of using information from a center-right think tank, with Republicans
more likely and Democrats less likely. This partisan difference is not statistically
appreciable when petitioners provide information from center-left think tanks.
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3.3.3.3 Making a Recommendation to the Boss
The most consequential outcome we measure is whether staffers would side with
the petitioner when making recommendations to their boss. Staff are expected to
maintain their own credibility with their superiors, so picking a side is a costly pro-
fessional commitment. Moreover, as gatekeepers, merely meeting with a person or
consuming information presumes no further action, whereas elevating it to a superior
is a step towards observable public action. As staffers routinely consult on policy mat-
ters, their recommendations can be quite consequential (Kingdon 1989; Hall 1996).
Results are presented in Figure 3.4.
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N = 436. The dependent variable is a five-category “likelihood” Likert-type scale. The baseline
categories are Identity = “Constituent,” Action = “Propose bill,” and Information = “Supportive
Polling.” 95% and 85% confidence intervals shown.
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The identity of the petitioner has no effect on a staffer siding with them. Consis-
tent with institution-level status quo bias (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Enns et al. 2014),
staffers are significantly more likely to recommend stopping legislation then they are
proposing a bill, an effect that holds for both parties. This is perhaps not surprising
given that introducing legislation requires significant time and resources from an of-
fice, while impeding legislation can be as easy as a member telling their leader they
oppose it, sitting on a bill in committee, or withholding unanimous consent in the
Senate, all substantially less resource intensive activities.
There is minimal evidence that staffers are overall more likely to side with a
petitioner bearing information from an ideological think tank. If anything, staffers
are less likely to side with party-aligned groups compared to individuals offering their
own analysis (the reference category). Disaggregated results by party reveal a very
different pattern. Democratic (Republican) staff are substantially more likely to side
with the petitioners offering supportive information from center-left (center-right)
think tanks and less likely to side with center-right (center-left) ones. The estimated
effects for both Democrats and Republicans are significant. The penalty associated
with offering information from a non-aligned think tank is roughly twice the benefit
gained from offering information from an aligned one. That is, relative to a petitioner
that presents supportive polling (the baseline category), petitioners pay twice as large
a penalty for presenting information from an ideologically misaligned think tank as
they stand to gain by presenting information from an aligned think tank.
3.3.3.4 Representativeness
In addition to outcomes measuring some action, we also ask respondents, ”How
representative do you think this individual is of your district or state’s opinion as
a whole?” Results among all staffers and party subgroups are shown in Figure 3.5.
Political elites, including legislators and staffers, are systematically biased in their per-
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ceptions of public opinion (Brookman and Skovron 2018; Hertel-Fernandez, Milden-
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N = 435. The dependent variable is a five-category “likelihood” Likert-type scale. The baseline
categories are Identity = “Constituent,” Action = “Propose bill,” and Information = “Supportive
Polling.” 95% and 85% confidence intervals shown.
Staffers view donors, business lobbyists, and consumer lobbyists as less represen-
tative of their district or state’s opinion than constituents. However, this effect is
null among Republican staffers for donors. Both Democrats and Republicans are
less likely to see business and consumer lobbyists as representative. These results
suggest staffers negatively perceive the so-called “Scarlet L” label for lobbyists. Most
importantly, political elites are fully cognizant that donors and lobbyists are not rep-
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resentative of their home-based constituencies, even though the vignette does not
specify any particular issue or any opinions per se.
When petitioners are seen as presenting information from think tanks, we obtain
the most striking asymmetric partisan effects of perceived representativeness. Both
Democrats and Republicans find individuals presenting policy evidence from an ide-
ologically aligned think tank to be more representative than individuals presenting
supportive polling from their geographic constituencies. Republicans reject evidence
from a center-left think tank as less representative of their constituency’s opinion. In
contrast, Democrats’ evaluations of the center-right think tanks are indistinguishable
from polling of their constituents.
3.3.4 Information Source Effects
We undertake an exploratory sub-sample analysis to understand which staffers
drive these partisan results. We re-code the information source variable as “aligned
think tank” and “non-aligned think tank” by party. The subsequent analysis pools the
partisan effects as the relationship between an ideological think tank and a partisan
staffer. We then repeat the same analyses above, splitting the sample by five staffer
characteristics to simplify interpretation: self-reported ideology (moderate vs. ex-
treme), self-reported party identification (strong vs. weak/independent), knowledge
of parliamentary procedure (median split for correct responses to battery of factual
questions), chamber, and office type (personal office or committee/party leadership
office).11
In Figure 3.6, we present the AMCE for petitioners presenting policy evidence
from aligned and non-aligned think tanks, across all four dependent variables.
While we see no significant differences across subsets in the likelihood to take
a meeting, differences do appear in the higher stakes actions. Strong partisans are
11. Details of measurement construction for these five factors are reported in Appendix F.
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Figure 3.6: Subgroup Tests for Ideologically Aligned Sources
Take Meeting Use Information Recommend to Boss Representativeness

































Policy evidence from 
 non−aligned think−tank
Policy evidence from 
 aligned think−tank
N = 436 (435 for ”representativeness”). The dependent variables are five-category “likelihood” Likert-
type scales (Take Meeting, Use Information, and Recommend to Boss) or “Representativeness”
Likert-type scales. Prompts for center-left (center-right) think tanks have been transformed to match
staff working in Democratic (Republican) offices for aligned, and vice versa for non-aligned. See
Appendix G for full model estimates. 95% and 85% confidence intervals shown.
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more likely to use information from an aligned think tank, whereas the likelihood
of using information from aligned and non-aligned think tanks is indistinguishable
among weak partisans. Similarly, personal office staff use ideological alignment as a
cue for information use, but committee/leadership staff do not.
Staffers rely more on ideology as a heuristic when taking a side. This is consistent
with Kingdon’s 1989 explanation of legislators looking to cue givers to find agreement
within their “field of forces” when making voting decisions. Ideological extremists,
strong partisans, more knowledgeable staffers, and personal office staffers are all more
likely to make a recommendation on the petitioner’s behalf. Staff in both chambers
discount evidence from non-aligned think tanks when making recommendations. And,
strong partisans, more knowledgeable staffers, staffers in both chambers, and personal
office staffers interpret petitioners as more representative when they come bearing
ideologically aligned evidence.
Taken together, this exploratory subgroup analysis suggests that ideological align-
ment is a powerful signal to staff. Requests for legislative action depend heavily on
how the request is packaged, which is distinct from the substance of the request itself.
3.3.5 Discussion
Importantly, Study 1, itself, does not reveal preferential access or legislative influ-
ence to donors qua donors. However, it does reveal that the presence of information
from ideologically aligned sources of policy information affect whether staff use the in-
formation and how they interpret it. Congressional staff are substantially more likely
to use policy evidence from a source ostensibly matching their own ideological leaning,
and to side with organizations presenting this information when they make recom-
mendations to their bosses. Moreover, ideological extremists and staff working in
members’ personal offices are more likely to interpret a petitioner presenting evidence
from an aligned source as representative of their constituents. The same patterns are
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not true of polling demonstrating support among geographic constituents.
We might read the low weight that staff give to meeting with and to using infor-
mation from donors as encouraging. That said, we are aware that staff are trained
not to reveal that donors hold sway over offices. Polarized attitudes about campaign
finance reform may trigger a socially desirable response. It is possible that staffers
have convinced themselves that they are not likely to grant meetings to donors, even
though they do (Kalla and Broockman 2016); this partisan attribute may not have
been as salient when Chin, Bond, and Geva (2000) found null results for PAC rep-
resentatives. This apparent contradiction merits further investigation. It may be
equally likely that donors qua donors indeed have little direct influence. Staffers may
be more likely to meet with lobbyists because they provide useful, actionable infor-
mation about policy, whereas donors rarely do. This result may also be the result of
staffers cognitive anchoring as they answer this question, as staffers may genuinely
spend more time meeting or talking with constituents than they do donors, even if
the true conditional probability of an individual donor getting a meeting is higher
than the true conditional probability of any individual constituent, given their rela-
tive base-rates. Alternately, work on costly signalling (1995; n.d.) argues that it is
not the fact that donors give money that leads to access, but rather that the act
of donating signals aligned policy goals, which facilitates trust and subsequently, a
willingness to engage. In this telling it is donorship as a proxy for allyship that is
instructive to the staffer. Perhaps, in the presence of another, clearer signal of ide-
ological alignment—information source—staffers are less likely to rely on whether a
staffer is a donor for this sort of cue.
Indeed, Kalla and Broockman (2016) find that the most likely staffer to grant
meetings to donors is Chief of Staff, who is typically designated within an office to be
the liaison to partisan constituencies. These low-risk meetings are often granted as
a courtesy. Most legislators care which organized interests belong to supportive and
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opposing policy coalitions, so meeting with various stakeholders is a matter of due
diligence; the same would not be true for donors to opposing campaigns.
Our results show that while staffers seem to be open to meetings with a variety of
groups and individuals, when it comes to actions of more consequence, there are real
differences in who and what they pay attention to. This suggests that while access
to congressional staffers may be relatively easy, influence over policy making is not.
Our findings are particularly telling for those seeking to influence Congress: bring
policy evidence from an ideologically “correct” think tank. Staffers are more likely
to make recommendations to their bosses in line with a petitioner request if that
petitioner brings policy evidence from a think tank that the staffer is ideologically
aligned with. This is encouraging if, on balance, staffers seek out credible analysis
before recommending a policy. Deliberation depends on sound evidence, even if it is
produced by organizations with the imprimatur of the party.
Alternatively, strongly partisan and ideologically extreme staffers’ reliance on in-
group cues may be evidence of epistemic closure, not robust deliberation. Moreover,
because we ask about the post-treatment behaviors that are highly specialized to the
legislative context, congressional staff — under supervision of members — may be
professionally socialized to be unwilling to hear the other side (Hacker and Pierson
2010; Grossmann and Hopkins 2016). This is consistent with Bauer, Pool, and Dex-
ter’s 1963 contention that staffers and members hear what they want to hear, and
use evidence to justify policy positions that they hold ex-ante.
Thus, our evidence reveals micro-level foundations that underlie endemic polar-
ization in Washington. The largest effects are associated with ideological alignment
within parties. While we omit brand names such as the Brookings Institution and
Heritage Foundation in Study 1, we take them up in Study 2. It may hardly be surpris-
ing that Democrats discount evidence from the right, and vice versa. But our findings
are not tied to knee-jerk, normative partisan talking points; rather, it is worth noting
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that the experimental vignette did not describe the ideologically opposite think tanks
as offering any different substantive conclusions. This suggests that the results we
observe are purely the function of the source cue. Healthy democratic deliberation
presumes that all ideas are given equal consideration, even if they are to be rejected
on merit or used to develop counterarguments. The interest group deliberation ideal
can’t be satisfied when the other side is summarily ignored, especially if its credibility
is judged solely on the messenger rather than the message (Mansbridge 1992).
3.4 Study 2: White Paper Conjoint Experiment
Study 1, embedded within the 2017 CCS, showed that staffers were more likely to
side with petitioners, or view them as representative of constituents when they offered
information from ideologically aligned sources. This finding motivated a follow up
study, Study 2, which I designed to assess how staffers evaluate policy information
more precisely.
Both Study 1 and the results from Chapter 2 provide strong evidence that ab-
sent any other details about the credibility of the information they are receiving,
congressional staff report a higher likelihood of trusting and using information from
ideologically aligned think tanks. In particular, Study 1 suggests that this has a
material impact on representation. However, because these studies measured differ-
ences in staffer evaluations of information based only on general types of sources (e.g.,
left-of-center think tank), they are not able to identify what, specifically, is driving
staffers ideological selection of information. Indeed, if staffers are satisficing agents
(Simon 1955) interested in reducing the uncertainty over how policies map to out-
comes (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990), they may simply be relying on the ideology of
the source of information as a heuristic to infer aligned policy goals. This is consis-
tent with members of Congress accepting legislative subsidies from interests based on
signals of alignment (2006; n.d.).
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While the reliance on such cues can be an effective cognitive shortcut under ap-
propriate conditions (Lupia 1994), they can also substantially bias decision-making
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Petersen et al. 2013; Lodge and Hamill 1986). Of
particular normative concern in this case, is whether staffers rely on the ideology of
an information source and disregard the actual policy content that source provides,
abdicating their responsibilities to actually consider policy alternatives. If staffers
function as information gatekeepers that only rely on information from ideologically
consonant sources, they functionally outsource their own reasoning over policy alter-
natives to these unaccountable actors.
In this experiment, I decouple source and content, allowing for identification of
whether staffers are relying on the alignment heuristic offered by the information
source, or whether they are selecting policy materials that match their own. This de-
sign provides leverage with which to assess whether staffers use ideology as a rational
cue in an environment with incomplete information, or whether counter-attitudinal
ideological cues may bias them against their preferred policies.
This study uses a conjoint design embedded in the 2019 Congressional Capac-
ity Survey to assess whether staffers rely on white papers from ideologically aligned
sources because of the ideological cue that those sources signify, or because informa-
tion from those sources features ideologically consonant content. This study randomly
varies the institution issuing the hypothetical reports which staffers must choose be-
tween, as well as the content of those reports.
Staffers are highly politically sophisticated, and as such are more likely to process
information using partisan schema (Lodge and Hamill 1986) which shape coding and
recall of information. Politically sophisticated people are more likely to think in
ideological terms, and to use heuristics based on political schema when they make
decisions (Converse 1964; Lau and Redlawsk 2001). The well-documented reliance of
political source cues of this kind, generates hypothesis 6.
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Hypothesis 6 (H6): Staffers will be more likely to choose white papers from ideo-
logically aligned sources than misaligned sources.
In addition to manipulating the source of the white paper, the content of the white
paper is also manipulated so that it reflects a conservative or a liberal policy. Rather
than simply using source cues to reduce uncertainty about policy tradeoffs, however,
staffers may be genuinely interested in specific policy options and prefer different
types of interventions. Price (1971) argues that staffers are policy motivated, and
use their positions to pursue particular outcomes as “policy entrepreneurs.” In this
case, we should expect staffers to be considerably more attentive to the policy-content
of the reports they are asked to evaluate. This view of staffers as policy-motivated,
generates hypothesis 7, wherein I expect Republican staffers to choose white papers
with conservative content, and Democratic staffers to choose white papers with liberal
content.
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Staffers will be more likely to choose white papers with aligned
policy content than misaligned content.
As I argue in Chapter 2, staffers’ propensity for confirmation bias, and need to
rely on heuristics in complex information environments leads to a reliance on partisan
or ideological source cues in information processing. In general, I present a theory in
which staffers function as information gatekeepers, able to condition what they pass
on to their bosses based on ideological alignment. Petersen et al. (2013) argues that
if people use partisan or ideological cues as a heuristic as we should expect boundedly
rational agents to (Simon 1955; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990), then some degree of
bias is an unfortunate byproduct of this shortcut. If, however, people are cognitively
invested in their political identities, they will engage in motivated reasoning and these
biases are an inevitable and systematic result of how they reason. In the experiment
I present here, a staffer with a strong sense of ideological identity should be more
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attuned to the explicit ideological signal sent by the source of the information than
the content of the policy paper. I argue that a staffer engaged in motivated reasoning
will convince themselves that information from an aligned source should be relied on,
even if the information provided is counter-attitudinal. In this case we should expect
hypothesis 8 to be true.
Hypothesis 8 (H8): The effect of ideological alignment between a staffer and an
information source will be stronger than the effect of the alignment between a staffer
and the content.
Finally, I expect the effects hypothesized above to be stronger among staffers
who are more ideologically extreme. Where Chapter 2 reported stronger associations
among more extreme staffers’ self-reported levels of trust and use of information, this
experiment provides the opportunity to identify these effects causally. Staffers that
are more ideologically extreme, I argue, should have stronger attachments to their
ideological identities, and thus have stronger directional goals (Kunda 1990). The
stronger these attachments and goals, the more strongly they should respond to the
ideological signals sent by the manipulated factors. This insight suggests hypothesis
9.
Hypothesis 9 (H9): More ideologically extreme staffers will be more likely to choose
information from ideologically aligned sources.1213
In the next section, I detail the data used to assess these hypotheses.
12. In the preregistration this hypothesis was mis-worded, referring to ‘ideologically extreme
sources” rather than ideologically aligned sources. It is not feasible to test whether extreme staffers
use more extreme sources, because my ideal points for staffers and think tanks are not on a com-
mon scale. However, I am able to test whether staffer extremism conditions the use of ideologically
aligned sources, which I do here instead. Future work on common scaling of these institutions and
actors may enable such comparisons, however, which rely on relative proximity between staffers and
institutions.
13. These hypotheses (with a slightly different version of H9) were pre-registered, along with an
analysis plan at https://osf.io/wvnxm.
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3.4.1 Data: The 2019 Congressional Capacity Survey
I evaluate these hypotheses using a survey experiment embedded in the 2019 Con-
gressional Capacity Survey (CCS). This survey followed much the same procedure as
the 2017 CCS, and was fielded with Tim LaPira, and funded by Democracy Fund.
We constructed the sampling frame from the full Legistorm contact list of congres-
sional staffers as of July 18, 2017, which included individual’s names, employers, and
official email addresses. The contact list contained the full census of 10,369 legislative
branch employees with a Washington, DC office address. The contact list included
729 House, Senate, and bicameral offices and organizational units. The list excluded
legislative support agencies (such as the Congressional Research Service, Government
Accountability Office, and the Congressional Budget Office) that employ personnel as
federal civil servants. From this list of organizational units, the research team selected
633 organizational units with names suggesting the primary mission contributed to
legislative operations, as broadly as could be determined by public information about
the office. Primarily, these units focus on members’ personal offices, standing com-
mittees, and party leadership offices. Secondarily, we included “other” administrative
offices (such as the House Parliamentarian)14 and institutionalized caucuses or mem-
ber organizations (such as the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control and
the House Republican Study Committee).
This process resulted in 6,505 individual staffers employed as political appointees
in the legislative branch, summarized in Table 3.2. The table cross-tabulates prospec-
tive respondents by chamber and office type.
The survey was conducted exclusively online in three sequential data collection
stages between May 14th and September 11th. Each of the 6,505 prospective staffers
were contacted first by mail with a personalized survey link and then by three subse-
14. Institutional officers and their staff are arbitrarily attributed to the respective majority party,
though they operate in fact as non-partisan employees.
84
Personal Committee Party Leadership Total
House 2756 953 184 3893
Senate 1768 741 103 2612
Total 4524 1694 287 6505
Table 3.2: 2019 Sampling Frame
quent emails with a personalized link to identify respondents with existing biograph-
ical data and to maintain strict confidentiality. In addition to direct contacts, the
research team recruited senior legislative staffers in our professional networks to ask
them to spread the word as much as they were willing, and partnered with external
validator groups including the Congressional Management Foundation, R Street, the
Legislative Capacity Working Group and Demand Progress to promote participation.
The overall response rate was 5.5 percent (355 of 6,505). The margin of error
at the 95% confidence level is 5.2%. All respondents were given inverse probability
weights using a post-stratification procedure conditioning on the joint distribution of
chamber, office type (personal, committee, other), and party in the sampling frame
(Lumley et al. 2004; Lumley 2017). Respondents were counted as having taken the
survey for the purpose of inclusion in the numerator when calculating weights if they
responded affirmatively regarding participation in the study and responded to any
other question in the survey. The maximum weight applied to any case is 1.588, and
the minimum is 0.556.
Potential non-response bias presents a significant challenge to inference with a
sample of this kind. In Figure 3.7, I show that the unweighted experimental sam-
ple over-samples Democratic staffers, House staffers, Committee office staffers, and
those who have worked in a larger number of offices within Congress, suggesting that
respondents and non-respondents may differ in some systematic ways.
Respondents and non-respondents work for ideologically quite similar members of
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Congress, as the within party comparisons show.15 The sample is also quite repre-
sentative along gender lines, and of the percentage of staffers in legislative roles.16
Using the post-stratification weights provides substantially better balance on impor-
tant institutional and partisan covariates like the percent of staffers that work in the
Chamber, Party and Office Type (shown in yellow). This suggests that weighted
responses are likely to be less subject to potential non-response biases. I use these
15. Committee and subcommittee staffers are coded as working for the chairs of the committee or
subcommittee, respectively.
16. Identified for this purpose by a simple search for ”legis” or ”policy” in their titles. This inevitably
under counts committee staffers, who often have the title of “Professional Staff Member” regardless
of their responsibilities, however this is equally true of both respondents and non-respondents in
committee offices.
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weights in all subsequent analysis reported in this paper.
3.4.2 Experimental Design
This experiment uses a fully randomized choice-based conjoint design (Hain-
mueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014), to causally identify the impact of two types
of alignment on staffers’ choices of think tank policy white papers: 1) ideological
alignment between the staffer and the policy content, and 2) ideological alignment
between the staffer and the source of the white paper.
The conjoint comparison task was designed to mimic a common situation that
congressional staff often face: quickly choosing among several potential sources of
information when making policy recommendations. In the experimental setting, I
distill this to its simplest instantiation, a choice between two policy documents, or
white papers. I manipulate two factors: (1) the policy content of the white paper, (2)
the source of the white paper. The experimental prompt read:
While this might not be an issue you usually work on, imagine that [your
boss/ a member]17 has asked you to evaluate policies to lower prescription
drug prices.
As you are working on this issue, the following two white papers come
across your desk:
They were then presented with two hypothetical white papers, in which the policy
content and institutional source were randomly varied. After viewing the two options,
staffers were then asked “If you could only choose one, which report would you rely
on? (If Reports A and B are identical, select at random.)”18 Staffers were given radio
buttons to select either Report A or Report B.
17. Personal office staff received the prompt with “your boss” wording, while committee and lead-
ership office staffers received the prompt with “a member” wording.
18. It was possible that staffers received identical reports because the conjoint design was fully
randomized. This occurred in 111 out of 1224 tasks completed by staffers). Results are substantively
the same when these responses are excluded from the analyses.
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Immediately following this choice, staffers were presented with a second forced
choice conjoint task following the same design on the topic of the minimum wage.
They were presented with the following analogous prompt:
Next, imagine that [your boss/ a member] has asked you to evaluate the
impact of raising the minimum wage.
As you are working on this issue, the following two white papers come
across your desk:
Table 3.3 shows the Executive Summary prompts which were used in the conjoint
presentations for each of the two different policy areas, as well as whether they were
intended to capture a conservative or liberal position on these issues. The executive
summaries presented were modified from existing policy reports published by well
known conservative and liberal think tanks.19 Generally, the liberal positions were
selected to favor a greater degree of government involvement in the economy (i.e.,
setting a minimum wage or setting drug prices) and the conservative positions were
selected to focus on market mechanisms (i.e., increasing competition to lower drug
prices, or focusing on how minimum wage might impact prices).
In addition to randomizing the executive summaries of the white papers, each
white paper was attributed to one of six random think tanks, three conservative and
three liberal, shown in table 3.4. These think tanks were coded as either conservative
or liberal according to their IGScores, which are revealed preference estimates based
on position-taking activity (2020).







Issue Position Executive Summary
Drug Prices Conservative Congress should reduce regula-
tions and address patent abuse
that hinder the ability of pri-
vate firms to bring cheaper
generics to market.
Drug Prices Liberal Congress should authorize
drug price-setting that will
help public and private insur-
ance providers negotiate lower
prices
Minimum Wage Conservative Increasing the minimum wage
raises the costs of goods and
services and are poorly tar-
geted to benefit low-income
families.
Minimum Wage Liberal Increasing the minimum wage
raises the earnings of people
with low incomes with little
risk of significant job loss.
Table 3.3: Experiment Manipulation: Policy Content
Source Ideology
American Enterprise Institute Conservative
Heritage Foundation Conservative
R Street Institute Conservative
Center on Budget & Policy Priorities Liberal
Center for American Progress Liberal
Demos Liberal
Table 3.4: Experiment Manipulation: Information Source
3.4.3 Methods: Analysis
I began by recoding individual respondent-white paper dyads according to whether
the staffer and the white paper content were aligned or not-aligned, and whether
staffer and the white paper source were aligned. Republican staffers were coded
as being aligned with conservative (generally pro-market) content and conservative
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Figure 3.8: Example of White Paper Conjoint Presentation
This figure shows the white paper conjoint as it was presented to staffers in the 2019 Congressional
Capacity Survey. The Executive Summary and Issuing Institution were fully randomized for each
report.
think tanks (Heritage, AEI and R Street), and Democratic staffers were coded as be-
ing aligned with liberal (generally regulatory) content and liberal think tanks (Center
for American Progress as a left of center source, Center on Budget & Policy Priori-
ties, and Demos). Staffer partisanship is taken from Legistorm, which uses staffers’
congressional work histories to determine partisanship.
In order to assess the impact of source ideology and report content on staffer evalu-
ations of hypothetical reports, I follow Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014)’s
analysis protocol. I calculate the average marginal component effect (AMCE) estima-
tor on the direct effects of alignment between staffer and source, and the alignment
between a staffer and the content of the report. I estimate the Average Component
Interaction Effect (ACIE) on the interaction between these two forms of alignment.
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In a choice-based conjoint with binary outcomes (chosen or not), effect sizes of the
AMCE and ACIE can be interpreted simply as the increase in the probability of
selection over the baseline case.
In addition to estimating the marginal effects for these components and interac-
tions, I condition the analysis fully on the extremism of staffers to investigate whether
more extreme staffers evaluate white papers differently than their more moderate
peers. In all analyses standard errors are clustered by respondent.
3.4.4 Results: Conjoint Experiment Analysis
I begin by reporting the descriptive marginal means of the different treatments
in the conjoint experiment. Column one of 3.9 presents the marginal means pooling
across both issues, while column two and three present these results separately. To
illustrate how the treatments are evaluated differently by partisan staffers, I calculate
the marginal means on partisan subsets of staffers. Marginal means are a descriptive
method of evaluating conjoint data, and represent simply the mean outcome for all
instances of a given feature level in the data (e.g., Center for American Progress as
a source or conservative policy content), averaged over the rest of the features. In a
forced choice context with two options, like the one presented here, marginal means
average .5 by definition with a range of [0-1] (Leeper 2020). A marginal mean of 0,
would mean that no respondents in the sample (or subsample) chose a report with
that factor, a marginal mean of 1 would mean that every staffer in the sample (or
subsample) chose the report when that factor was displayed. Thus, a marginal mean
above .5 indicates that a factor is associated with an increased likelihood of selection,
and one below .5 indicates that it is associated with a decreased likelihood of selection.
Figure 3.9 shows substantial differences between the marginal means in demo-
cratic and republican subsamples for almost every factor, in both the pooled and
issue specific cases. There are a few notable exceptions to this, however. The R
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This figure presents the marginal means of each treatment factor from the full conjoint design, with
the 95 percent confidence intervals.
Street Institute, a moderate center-right think tank, enjoys relative parity in how it
is evaluated by both democratic and republican staffers. The Center on Budget &
Policy Priorities, a left of center think tank with a reputation for rigorous work, is pos-
itively evaluated by both Democrats and Republicans, although democratic staffers
are even more likely to select it than Republicans. These results suggest that staffers
are appropriately recognizing the ideological affiliations of the think tanks chosen as
treatment conditions. The descriptive results appear broadly similar in both the pre-
scription drug price task and the minimum wage task. However, the results appear
slightly more muted in the case of the minimum wage task.
There is clear separation between the level of support indicated by the marginal
means for the liberal and conservative policy content in partisan subsamples, with
higher marginal means for the liberal content among Democrats and higher marginal
means for the conservative content among Republicans.
Following these descriptive marginal means, Figure 3.10 displays the causal esti-
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mands of interest for Aligned Content, Aligned Source (AMCE) and the interaction
between Aligned Content and Aligned Source (ACIE). The substantive interpretation
of AMCE and ACIE are somewhat different than that of the marginal means pre-
sented above. Zero is indicative of no effect, and the estimated effect sizes correspond
to the increase (or decrease) in probability of selecting a white paper with a particular
attribute relative to the baseline category. Here, the baseline case is non-aligned con-
tent and non-aligned source, so the effects presented indicate the percentage increase
in the probability that a staffer would choose a white paper with aligned content (or
from an aligned source) relative to a white paper with non-aligned content (or from a
non-aligned source). Full results of these models are shown in Table L.1 in Appendix
A.




































Average marginal effects based on white paper/staffer alignment. Estimates presented are AMCE
for main effects ACIE for the interactive effect with 95 percent confidence intervals.
Results from the full conjoint data indicate that staffers are ∼ 22 percent more
likely to choose a white paper with aligned content (e.g, liberal content if the staffer
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is a Democrat, conservative content if the staffer is a Republican), than they are to
choose a white paper with content of the opposing alignment. Similarly, congressional
staffers are ∼ 24 percent more likely to select a white paper coming from a think
tank that ideologically aligned with them (e.g., liberal for Democrats, conservative
for Republicans). There is no statisitically distinguishable interaction between aligned
content and aligned source for the white paper, suggesting that the effects of each
of these types of alignment is, broadly speaking, additive. Furthermore, figure 3.10
shows the marginal effects estimated on important subsets of the conjoint data. These
results indicate strong support for both H6 and H7.
We observe broadly comparable results in each of the two separate issue-based
tasks, suggesting that these findings generate beyond one specific issue area, and alle-
viating potential concerns about carryover across tasks. To fully test the assumption
of no carryover, and demonstrate that the results hold equivalently across topics, I
interacted the full model with an indicator variable for the task topic (Drug Prices
or Minimum Wage) and conducted a restricted hypothesis F-test for the joint signifi-
cance of the interaction terms (F(3, 1216) = 1.0462, p = .371). Thus, I cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the effects are identical across topics and tasks.
Finally, Figure 3.10 shows the average marginal effects broken out by partisanship
of the staffer respondent. Again, results are broadly consistent across both Demo-
cratic and Republican staffers, with strong effects of both information coming from
an aligned source and information containing aligned content. Notably, the effect
of an aligned source appears somewhat weaker among Republicans. Returning to
the marginal means displayed in table 3.9, we can see that Republican staffers tend
to view the Center on Budget & Policy Priorities quite favorably despite it’s liberal
alignment, so this factor level may be attenuating the effect of “aligned source” among
Republican staffers. Despite the appearance of some differences in marginal effects
between Republican and Democratic staffers, a restricted hypothesis F-test for the
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joint significance of the interaction terms of the full model, interacted with staffer par-
tisanship, cannot reject the null hypothesis that the marginal effects for Democratic
and Republican staffers are identical at conventional levels (F(3, 1216) = 1.9564, p
= 0.1187).
Together the results in Figure 3.10 demonstrate that the effects of source and
content alignment generalize beyond a single issue, or party, supporting H6 and H7.
Next, I turn to hypothesis 8, that the effect of source alignment is stronger than
content alignment. The average marginal component effects of aligned content and
aligned source appear of roughly equivalent magnitude in both the full data set and
subsets reported in Figure 3.10. A restricted hypothesis F test cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the effects are the same (F(1, 1220) = 0.539, p = .463). Accordingly,
I find no support for H8.
Finally, Figure 3.11 presents results of the conjoint analysis conditioned on ideolog-
ical extremism, a respondent varying characteristic. To obtain estimates of ideological
extremism, I follow the same procedure outlined in Chapter 2. Staffers were asked
a battery of five questions with likert-type agreement responses from Heinz (1993),
and scaled using a Rasch Partial Credit Model (PCM) a special case of item-response
theory adapted to suit categorical response items. The distribution of staffer ideology,
and the item specific cutpoints from the scaling can be seen in Figure L.1 in Appendix
A. In order to obtain a measure of ideological extremism, I first standardize (with
weights) the ideology measure produced by the PCM and then take its absolute value.
The results shown in Figure 3.11 present the same basic model of the conjoint data
as those in Figure 3.10 but the model is fully conditional on staffer extremism. When
conditioning on extremism, it is clear that the interaction between aligned content
and aligned source becomes an increasingly important effect, both substantively and
statistically significant among the most extreme staffers. Staffers in the 75th per-
centile of ideological extremism remain between ∼ 20 and ∼ 30 percent more likely to
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Average marginal effects based on white paper/staffer alignment in fully interacted extremism model
(AMCE for main effects ACIE for the interactive effect.
select a white paper with aligned content or from an aligned source, but they are also
almost 50 percent more likely to select a source that both offers aligned content and
comes from an aligned source. This interactive effect is significant in four subsets of
the conjoint data to varying degrees, with the strongest interactive effect appearing
among Republican staffers.
3.4.5 Discussion
Together these experimental results make several important aspects of staffer eval-
uation of white papers clear: 1) both the content in a paper and the ideological valence
of the source shape how partisan staffers evaluate information that comes across their
desk; 2) this is particularly pronounced among more ideologically extreme staffers,
for whom I uncover an especially strong average component interactive effect when
both the source and the content are aligned with the staffer; 3) these results appear
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to be broadly consistent in both the prescription drug price task and the minimum
wage task, as well as among Democratic and Republican staffers, suggesting a high
degree of generalizability of these findings.
The strong effects of ideological alignment of both content and source demonstrate
strong support for hypotheses 6, 7 and the more pronounced effects among more
ideologically extreme staffers support hypothesis 9. While these results suggest that
the ideological cue provided by the source of a policy report has a significant effect
on whether a staffer will rely on that report regardless of its ideological content, I
find no support for the notion that the effect of source cues are larger than the effect
of the content itself, contra hypothesis 8. While the effects of source cues are strong
as bounded rationality expectations would lead us to believe, when given additional
information, such as a summary of the content of a report, staffers incorporate that
information into their assessment of the report.
3.5 Discussion
The bottom line is that legislators and their staff do want information and analysis,
but they especially want it from their friends. Think tanks offer an easy heuristic
for credibility and belief confirmation, but only if they are already on your side. As
with most heuristics, their use may lead to correct decisions, but can also introduce
blind-spot errors. Consequently, think tanks have become important interlocutors
in the Washington influence spheres, as both producers and marketers of important
policy ideas.
Together these findings suggest that political polarization in Congress may be
self-reinforcing (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Sinclair 2006). If staff are
disproportionately responsive to information from co-partisans or ideology-confirming
experts regardless of policy content, and draw especially from sources that confirm
their priors within their own ideological networks of information providers (see also
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Curry 2015), then they may be creating feedback loops that alienate out-partisans
and minimize deliberation.
In the context of representation, these results support the notion that legislative
subsidy occurs along ideological lines (Hall and Deardorff 2006), with staffers drawing
only from their allies. However, because staffers rely so heavily on the ideological cue
offered by the source of policy information, these information sources can substantially
influence the priorities and policy activities of policy makers (Fagan 2019). However,
think tanks depend on private funding, which is not always transparent (Campbell
and Pedersen 2014). Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests business lobbyists advise
their clients to fund a trusted think tank to do research supporting their position
(Baumgartner et al. 2009; Drutman 2015). These often opaque motivations should
raise concerns about moneyed interests, information provision, and action in Congress.
This highlights the importance of ongoing and future work on whether and how
funding the production and dissemination of policy information serves as a powerful
tool for well resourced interests.
Think tanks, as inherently partisan organized interests, merit further study if
they indeed serve as credible signals for those seeking policy influence. For example,
how do the research and policy agendas of left and right think tanks differ? What
policies do they prioritize and ignore? And how do corporations, wealthy donors,
and foundations who fund think tanks shape these agendas? Recent observational
work by Smith (2018), Lerner (2018), Fagan (2019), and others have explored think
tanks as ideological actors in national policymaking. Together with this project, this
scholarship suggests that the role of think tanks as institutions embedded in party
network,s and as conduits of interest group influence, deserves increased attention.
Finally, this investigation suggests a possible causal mechanism for recent obser-
vations that while both Democrats and Republicans listen only to co-partisans, Re-
publicans support policies more favored by rich constituents than poor constituents
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(Lax, Phillps, and Zelizer 2019). Perhaps think tanks act as intermediaries, validating
low-tax, anti-regulatory concerns of wealthy donors primarily on the political right
(see, e.g., Smith 2009; Mayer 2016; Hertel-Fernandez 2019). If so, there’s little need
for wealthy donors to seek anything more than mere access, so long as others produce
and package the right message for them. In this case, campaign donations buy very
little. And, both lawmakers and their wealthy benefactors can claim the absence of a
quid pro quo. Meanwhile, think tank benefactors — the campaign donors themselves,
or those with very similar political interests — subsidize their credibility as definitive
sources of policy information.
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CHAPTER IV
Coalitions and Coordination in Washington Think
Tanks: Board Interlock Among Washington
DC-based Policy Research and Planning
Organizations
4.1 Introduction
The last 40 years have seen a precipitous rise in both the number and influence
of policy-planning organizations, often called “think tanks” (Medvetz 2012). Recent
research in American politics has begun to reckon with the role that policy-planning
organizations play in substantive policy-making and party politics. Indeed, incoming
presidents routinely staff their administrations with high-level think tankers, and
think tanks have been central actors in the rise of policies like Welfare Reform, and
the Affordable Care Act (Medvetz 2012).
In previous chapters, I have focused on how individual staffers evaluate informa-
tion produced by organizations outside of Congress. I’ve shown that staffers are more
likely to trust and use information from ideologically aligned think tanks, and that
this effect is particularly strong among the most extreme staffers. The source of pol-
icy information has large effects on how staffers treat petitioners seeking meetings
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and making policy requests, and has as large an effect on how staffers evaluate white
papers as does ideological valence of the content. The importance of this outside
information, and particularly the substantive and significant effect of source ideology,
suggests that the organizations that produce these policy subsidies play an important
role in what perspectives are heard on Capitol Hill.
Think tanks’ allocation of attention across issues tends not only to reflect, but also
to shape partisan issue ownership (Fagan 2019). Both the ideological perspective and
proximity to power of a think tank shape how their work is used by Congress (Lerner
2018). Moreover, as previous chapters have demonstrated, congressional staffers both
disproportionately trust policy evidence from partisan-aligned think tanks, and are
more likely to favorably evaluate petitioners presenting evidence from aligned think
tanks.
Despite this recent growth in attention to think tanks, the full ecosystem of these
policy-planning organizations remains under-mapped. Following work in interest or-
ganization population ecology, and population demography, (Gray and Lowery 2000;
Carroll 1984), this chapter catalogues policy research and analysis organizations ac-
tive in Washington D.C.. In particular, I focus on the connections between these
organizations, examining how they coordinate and share information, as well as miti-
gate systemic risk. Viewing this set of organizations in a networked context is critical
to understanding the system of policy information production and legitimation.
As Hertel-Fernandez (2019) details in his thorough accounting of the network of
conservative activists, think tanks, and party adjacent organizations in the states,
organizations engaged in crafting draft legislation and policy research benefit from
coordination and cross-subsidization. Just as the individual components of the con-
servative “troika" of ALEC, the State Policy Network, and Americans for Prosperity
cannot be fully understood without a focus on their interactions, I argue that the
full ecosystem of policy information production must be viewed as relational. In
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this chapter, I begin the process of examining the broader, networked organizational
context in which policy information is produced.
As legislators and staff depend on the informational subsidies produced by these
organizations, the manner in which they coordinate amongst themselves, boost par-
ticular policies, confer status and legitimacy, seek funding, and shape the bounds
of debate is substantively important for understanding policymaking in the United
States. In this chapter, I take an inductive approach at how these central—yet
understudied—actors in the American political landscape coordinate among them-
selves. I conduct the largest mapping of the Washington D.C. think tank ecosystem
to date (Burris 2008). Following an approach common in organizational sociology, I
leverage interlocking directorates of organizations to examine patterns of organiza-
tional coordination (Mizruchi 1996). Two organizations are said to have an “interlock”
between their directorates when one (or more) people sit on the boards of both or-
ganizations. While there are surely many forms of coordination and communication
among think tanks, interlock signifies a particularly strong organizational tie between
two groups. I construct and analyze the board interlock network for 277 Washington
D.C.-based organizations, using IRS 990 disclosure data.
Prior interlock scholarship has tended to focus largely on connections between
corporate boards (Mizruchi 1996). However, even in these contexts, scholars have
found that interlock has been central in enabling political activity (Mizruchi 1982),
with highly interlocked directors being more active in policy associations (Useem
1979). Research on bank control over corporate boards has indicated that centrality
in the interlock network can be understood as power or importance in the community
(Mariolis 1975), with some arguing that these ties are particularly important as they
facilitate social capital and access to information flowing through the network of
organizations (Davis 1991; Mizruchi 1996).
A more thorough accounting of policy-planning organizations and the manner in
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which they coordinate is of central importance in understanding contemporary Amer-
ican political institutions. As legislative staff capacity has declined in members’ offices
(Crosson et al. 2020a), policy-making in Congress has become centralized in party
leadership (Curry 2015). We can understand this partisan legislating in the context
of a recently prominent theory of American politics, which conceptualizes political
parties as extended networks of policy demanding constituencies, organizations and
interest groups (Bawn et al. 2012). This theory is usually applied to the role these
networks play in setting party agendas or nominating and supporting candidates for
elected office. To be sure, the nomination and election process serves a fundamental
role in identifying and prioritizing issues for government attention. However, I ar-
gue that think tanks serve as the policy-apparatus of these extended party networks
of policy-demanders. As such, we should expect them to coordinate along ideolog-
ical dimensions in their attempts to support and influence partisan and ideological
lawmakers (Noel 2014).
Prior interlock research among policy planning organizations has focused on small
subsets of the full network, with particular attention given to the largest actors. Bur-
ris (2008) evaluated interlock among twelve prominent think tanks, and Salas-Porras
(2018) focused on a more inclusive set of connections — beyond board interlock —
among 33 economic policy think tanks during the financial crisis. These studies have
found strong evidence of ideological coordination among these elite policy planning
actors. In a study of policy networks around estuaries, Berardo and Scholz (2010)
demonstrate that organizations connect both to popular and well-resourced organi-
zations. These connections enable both information flow in the network, and the
establishment of bonding structures that facilitate higher-stakes coordination.
This research differs from this prior work on think-tank interlock in two impor-
tant ways. First, I analyse a far larger set of organizations, as policy information,
especially on niche issues, may come from players beyond the few most prominent.
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Current work gives us no sense of whether or how these organizations are integrated
into the network. Second, I use exponential random graph modeling to more sys-
tematically evaluate the interlock network. Beyond simply describing the observed
characteristics of the network (Burris 2008; Salas-Porras 2018), this enables me to
conduct a statistical assessment of what features of individual organizations are di-
rectly associated with greater connectivity in this network.
Because of the inductive nature of this investigation of coordination and coalition
formation among policy-planning organizations, I do not detail explicit theory-driven
hypotheses to test. However, it is useful to lay out some general expectations about
what evidence of different network structures and interlock patterns might indicate.
Following the findings in Burris (2008) and Salas-Porras (2018), I expect that organi-
zations will be more likely to foster ties with other organizations that are ideologically
aligned with them. However, it remains to be seen if this effect extends to this broader
set of organizations beyond the top, often quite ideological, players. I also expect or-
ganizations with access to greater financial resources to be more heavily interlocked, as
access to resources is a substantial motivator of interlock in other contexts (Mizruchi
1996).
I do not have strong prior beliefs about the direction or magnitude of the re-
lationships between other dyadic and organizational factors and the probability of
connection. Common explanations for strategic interlock in the corporate context
include preferences for diverse connections to increase information gathering breadth,
and preferences for connections to other similar organizations to monitor competi-
tion, or engage in collusion (Mizruchi 1996). Similar explanations map to this case:
organizations may seek to build cross-issue coalitions increasing the scope of their
information networks (issue heterophily), or they may choose ties within their lo-
cal issue space to increase efficiency and avoid duplicated effort (issue homophily).
Similarly, we might imagine justifications for either homo- or heterophilic preferences
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in other dimensions of organization type, like whether the organization engages in
lobbying, has dues paying members, or hires contractors.
Following Berardo and Scholz (2010), we can interpret the presence of centrally
located bridging ties as indicative of the network’s ability to facilitate information
transfer and mitigate low-level risk, while a tendency for transitivity and triadic
closure can be understood as offering the potential for greater collaboration within
communities.
In this chapter, I have three main goals. First, I set out to describe the scope and
properties of the U.S. federal policy-planning network, at a much larger scale than
has previous work. Second, I model the organizational factors which are associated
with a greater embeddedness in this community. Finally, I detail the communication
and coordination strategies that these interlock trends imply.
4.2 Describing The U.S. Federal Policy-planning Network
In this project, I construct and analyze the board interlock network of policy
planning organizations headquartered in Washington D.C.. I analyze all organiza-
tions active between 2008-2015 with average annual budgets over $100,000, which
are classified as subtype “Research Institutes & Public Policy Analysis” according to
the IRS’ National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities Core Codes (NTEE-CC). As part of
their determination of tax exemption status, “Determination specialists” at the IRS
classify organizations by type using the NTEE-CC. The first digit of the NTEE-CC
is a letter A-Z, which represents the “Major Group,” a broad sectoral categorization
(e.g. Education, Environment, Crime & Legal-Related etc.). The second and third
digit of the NTEE-CC subdivide organizations by specific areas, organization types,
or activities. The NTEE includes a set of, so-called, “common codes,” that code for
particular types of activity that are common across all major groups, such as ad-
vocacy, technical assistance, fundraising, or research. In this analysis, I include all
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organizations classified with the “05” common code for “Research Institutes & Public
Policy Analysis,” regardless of their major group.
4.2.1 Think tank data
Figure 4.1, shows the breakdown of the 277 research institutes and public pol-
icy analysis organizations included in this analysis by their major group. Notably,
the most common type in the dataset are International, Foreign Affairs & National
Security organizations, followed by Public & Societal Benefit, Education, and Envi-
ronment.
Figure 4.1: Think Tanks by Area of Focus
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This figure presents a breakdown of Washington D.C.-based Research Institutes & Public Policy
Analysis organizations (subtupe 05) by NTEE-CC Major Codes.
Data about these organizations, including their classifications, complete listings of
their boards of directors, annual revenues, membership dues, lobbying expenditures,
and contracting are from their Internal Revenue Service (IRS) form 990 mandatory
annual disclosures, as collected and digitized by GuideStar. In addition to IRS 990
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data, I gathered campaign contributions made by employees of these organizations,
summed by party, using data from the Center for Responsive Politics, and organiza-
tions’ ideal points, IGScores (2020). IGScores are ideal points on a unidimensional,
left-right scale based on organizations’ public position-taking activity between 2005-
2016, which are particularly well-suited to this application (2020). Edges have been
dichotomized to code for the existence of an interlock tie between organizations. Ta-
ble 4.1 below, shows descriptive statistics for the variables which are used in the
subsequent analysis.
Variable Percent True Percent False
Has IG Score 28.9 71.1
Has Members 14.8 85.2
Hires Contractors 55.6 44.4
Engages in lobbying 90.6 9.4
Variable Mean SD
Total Revenue $4,085,478.76 $10,572,496.46
Membership Dues $61,838.29 $332,845.65
Lobbying Spending $12,712.53 $151,517.58
Number of Contractors 1.39 3.80
Contributions to Democrats $21,936.59 $9,0503.17
Contributions to Republics $9,934.49 $6,0659.49
IGScore (all) -0.07 0.88
IGScore (real) 0.06 1.09
IGScore (imputed) -0.12 0.77
Table 4.1: Think Tank Descriptive Statistics
As table 4.1 shows, IGScores were only available for 28.9 percent of the organiza-
tions included in the analysis. Because of this missingness, I employed multiple im-
putation using Amelia (Honaker, King, Blackwell, et al. 2011), to generate imputed
values for IGScores for think-tanks without scores. In service of a more accurate
imputation model, I then collected two campaign finance variables for each organi-
zation using data from the Center for Responsive Politics: 1) total contributions to
democratic candidates from the organizations’ employees, and 2) total contributions
to republican candidates from the organizations’ employees. I found contributions
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to democratic candidates from 61.0 percent of organizations and contributions to
republican candidates for 54.1 percent of organizations. Organizations with no con-
tributions found from employees to either republicans or democrats were treated as
missing. I also included variables for the average IGScore of the three and five or-
ganizations with the most semantically similar names in a 300 dimensional vector
space constructed using latent semantic analysis (Furnas et al. 1988; Deerwester et
al. 1990; Rehurek and Sojka 2011). Both the contribution variables and the proximate
IGScore variables were used in the imputation model, along with average revenue, av-
erage membership dues, average number of contractors, average total revenue, NTEE
code, and average end of year assets during the period 2008-2015. Contributions
to democrats, contributions to republicans, revenue, membership dues, total revenue
and end of year assets were logged, while NTEE was treated as a nominal variable.
Bounds for the IGScores to be imputed as well as the campaign finance variables
were set at the empirically observed minimum and maximum values in the dataset. I
generate 100 imputed datasets and conduct my subsequent analysis in parallel across
datasets, combining results.
The distribution of real versus imputed IGScore values is shown in Figure 4.2,
below. The imputed values for missing IGScores is substantially more unimodal and
centrally aligned than the distribution of actual IGScores. Additional imputation
diagnostics are shown in Appendix A, in Figures 7 and 8. It is important to note that
because I use these scores to measure ideological distance between organizations, the
moderate, unimodality of the imputed scores will tend to yield conservative estimates
of ideological distance, and bias against finding substantive ideological results.
In expectation, overly moderate IGScores for these organizations will artificially
shrink the distance between organizations—the key dyadic measure of ideological
alignment. This should attenuate estimated effects, and as a result the test of dyadic
alignment presented here is a conservative one.
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Density plot of IGScores for the research institutes and public policy analysis organizations in the
study sample. Imputed values for organizations without IGScores shown in light grey with a dotted
line.
4.2.2 Detecting think tank interlock
To facilitate the detection of interlocks, I standardized directors names using a
three-stage process. First, I used key collision clustering with a two letter fingerprint
with manual verification to correct for typos. Next, I used key collision clustering
based on word-tokens, with manual verification to identify names that may have been
entered in different formats (e.g. Firstname Lastname vs. Lastname, Firstname).
This clustering and merging was done in OpenRefine (Verborgh and De Wilde 2013;
Kusumasari et al. 2016). Finally, I removed titles, honorifics, and post-nominal letters
or initials such as Esq., PhD or Jr., as they are applied extremely inconsistently
throughout the data.1 Following this name standardization procedure, the 277 think
tanks included in this analysis had, in total, 9,469 unique directors between 2008
1. While it is certainly true that titles and post-nominal letters provide additional information
which may distinguish between otherwise identically-named individuals, they are applied so incon-
sistently (even when the same person’s name is being entered by the same organization in successive
years) that matching on names including titles and post-nominals would induce substantial false
negatives.
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and 2015. Two organizations were coded as having an interlock tie between them if
they had directors with identical post-standardization names at any point during that
eight year window. Using this method, 234 of these directors served on the boards
of more than one organization in the dataset. For example, Ambassador C. Boyden
Gray, founding partner of the DC-based law firm, Boyden Gray & Associates LLP,
served on the board of 5 organizations in the dataset during this period, the most of
any director, — American Action Forum, Atlantic Council of the US, The European
Institute, Center for Global Development, and Freedomworks Foundation.
Because having a common board member within this time window is coded as an
interlock tie, organizations can be coded as being interlocked without actually having
a board member simultaneously serve on both boards. For example, if John Smith
serves on the board of organization A from 2008-2011 and then organization B from
2013-2015, my procedure would code organizations A and B as being interlocked al-
though they were not, in the strictest sense, actually interlocked. In this analysis, I
attempt to analyze the structure of the policy-planning network during the Obama
Administration, looking at the whole time period. Because I use interlock ties as an
indicator of coordination and communication, I count asynchronous ties like the hy-
pothetical one between organisations A and B. As a member of the board of directors
for organization B, John Smith would retain social-network connections to the board
members he formerly served with on the board of organization A. Because these exist-
ing social ties would still serve as effective means of coordination and communication,
I consider these asynchronous interlocks as valid for my analytic purposes.
4.2.3 Properties of the think tank interlock network
The interlock network of these D.C.-based research institutes and public policy
analysis organizations is shown in Figure 4.3, below. The degree distribution of this
network is shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.3: Think Tank Board Interlock Network
Edges represent instances where the same individual served on the board of directors of two orga-
nizations between 2008 and 2015. Node size is proportional to organizations’ average total revenue
during this period, and color is a function of the organization’s ideological ideal point (IGScore),
where blue indicates more liberal and red indicates more conservative. The network is displayed
using the Fruchterman & Reingold force-directed algorithm (Fruchterman and Reingold 1991)
Following Gerber, Henry, and Lubell (2013) who conduct a similar network anal-
ysis on the regional planning network in California, I report a series of network statis-
tics on the observed interlock network. These are shown in table 4.2. The 277 node
undirected interlock network has a density of .005, which means that only 1
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of all
possible dyads are connected by an interlock. The average organization in the net-
work has a degree of 1.4 other organizations, while the most connected organization,
the Atlantic Council of the US, is connected to 20 other organizations. There are 127
organizations in the largest connected component of the network, which comprises
∼ 46 percent of the network. Path length, or the degree of separation between nodes,
refers to the minimum number of “hops” that are required to travel from one node to
the other. Mean path length is equal to 1
n·(n−1) ·
∑
i 6=j d(vi, vj) where n is the number
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of vertices in the network, and d(vi, vj) is the length of the shortest path between
vertex i (vi) and vertex j (vj). Networks with longer mean path lengths are more
disparately connected, while those with shorter mean path lengths are more closely
connected. The interlock network has an mean path length of 4.825, substantially
lower than the expected average path length of 9.29 calculated from 100 randomly
generated Erdős-Rényi random graphs (Erdős and Rényi 1960; Newman, Strogatz,
and Watts 2001), in which the probability of ties between any two of the 277 nodes
was set equal to the observed density in the interlock network. The global clustering
coefficient is the share of all triplets (sets of three nodes) which are closed (i.e. all
connected to each other). Networks with higher global clustering coefficients will tend
to have more tightly-knit clusters of nodes. The interlock network has a global clus-
tering coefficient of .158 which far exceeds the expected global clustering coefficient
estimated from Erdős-Rényi random graphs.







Size of largest component 127
% in largest component 0.458
Global clustering 0.158
Mean path length 4.825
Expected global clustering 0.005
Expected path length 9.29
Table 4.2: Think Tank Interlock Network Statistics
clustering coefficient than we would expect by random chance suggests that the in-
terlock network is a “small-world network” (Watts 1999), a type of network common
in social and other real-world phenomenon that tend to have more highly connected
subgraphs with high-degree hubs and relatively short paths between nodes.
Scholars have long noted the importance of an actor’s position in a network for a
variety of salient outcomes such as access to information (Granovetter 1985; Carpen-
ter, Esterling, and Lazer 2004), ability to engage in brokerage (Burt 1992; Heaney
2006), and status (Podolny 2010; Heaney and Lorenz 2013). I focus on betweenness
centrality to identify potentially influential organizations in the interlock network, as
suggested by Heaney and Lorenz (2013). Betweenness centrality measures how fre-
quently a given organization lies on the shortest path between other organizations in
the network (Freeman 1978). For descriptive purposes I present the top twenty most
central nodes according to betweenness centrality in table 4.3.
All but one of the twenty most central organizations, the Albert Shanker Institute,
have average yearly revenues above the median revenue in the network of $1,189,176.
This suggests that revenue is strongly related to connectedness in the network, a
proposition which I test more rigorously below.
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Organization Betweenness Revenue
Atlantic Council of the U.S. 2932.31 $14,830,739.38
National Quality Forum 2129.40 $19,507,711.62
Economic Policy Institute 1811.19 $6,308,457.50
Brookings Institution 1799.28 $98,120,399.86
Center for Global Development 1150.49 $12,671,746.12
World Resources Institute 954.05 $52,983,077.14
InterAction 847.39 $9,080,699.25
Families USA Foundation 847.33 $6,925,062.38
Washington Inst for Near East Policy 785.95 $10,627,693.75
Committee for Economic Development 768.53 $4,508,123.43
Center on Budget & Policy Priorities 754.52 $29,939,195.12
Center for us Global Leadership 694.39 $4,486,452.25
AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety 686.79 $4,241,489.75
Environmental Law Institute 675.64 $5,278,672.88
New America Foundation 618.39 $19,859,039.00
Albert Shanker Institute 614.00 $907,843.57
Competitive Enterprise Institute 570.56 $5,887,372.14
American Enterprise Institute 568.04 $53,042,058.86
Institute on Taxation & Economic Policy 510.22 $1,452,101.25
Results for Development Institute 491.23 $13,642,474.25
Table 4.3: Most Central Policy Planning Organizations
4.3 Modeling think tank interlock connections
In this section, I model the individual organizational, dyadic, and endogenous
network factors which shape the patterns we observe in the interlock network I have
described above.
4.3.1 Methods
I use an exponential-family random graph model (ERGM) to interrogate the in-
terlock network described above. Interdependence between ties presents a critical
challenge to inference when working with network data, as the higher-order relational
structure of the data violates the usual assumptions of simple linear regression models.
ERGMs allow an analyst to explicitly model these higher-order network structures
in addition to node-level and dyad-level covariates of interest (Robins et al. 2007a;
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Robins et al. 2007b).
Exponential random graph modeling treats the full observed network as the de-
pendent variable, and node variables, dyadic variables, and endogenous network struc-
tures act as independent variables which influence the probability of any given tie to
form within that network. The observed network is understood as a random draw
from a probability distribution of possible networks given those independent variables,
maximized via Monte Carlo maximum likelihood (MCMLE).
The ERGMs in this paper are fit using MCMLE (Handcock et al. 2008), using a
single chain of 33,562,620 iterations and a thinning interval of 8,196 for an effective
sample size of 4090.
The full model of board interlock estimated here includes the following “exogenous”
terms:
Ideological Distance (absdiff)—dyadic covariate for each (i, j), defined as
the absolute value of the difference between the IGScores of nodes i and j.
Match NTEE (nodematch)— a statistic for “uniform homophily.” Accounts
for the propensity for groups to connect with others of the same NTEE-CC type
(assumes this probability is uniform across types).
Match Dues Collecting (nodematch)—a statistic for “uniform homophily.”
Accounts for the propensity for groups to connect with others that also (do not)
have dues paying members.
Match Lobbying (nodematch)—a statistic for “uniform homophily.” Accounts
for the propensity for groups to connect with others that also (do not) spend
money on lobbying.
Match Contracting (anodematch) —a statistic for “uniform homophily.” Ac-
counts for the propensity for groups to connect with others that also (do not)
hire contractors.
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Log(Revenue) (nodecov)—a node covariate which captures the propensity
for organizations with higher revenues to have more connections. Logged to aid
convergence, as the distribution of revenue is extremely left-skewed.
Membership Dues (nodecov)—a node covariate which captures the propen-
sity for organizations to connect to others with larger revenues from membership
dues specifically.
Lobbying Fees (nodecov)—a node covariate which captures the propensity
for organizations to connect to others that spend more money on lobbying.
When I take endogenous network structure into effect using the ERGM, I include
the following “structural” terms:
Edges (edges)—a count of the number of edges in the graph. This can be
thought of as analogous to an intercept in a linear model.
Concurrent (concurrent)—a network statistic equal to the number of nodes
with degree two or higher.
Isolates (isolates)—a network statistic equal to the number of nodes with
degree zero.
GWESP (gwesp.fixed)—a statistic equal to the Geometrically weighted edge-
wise shared partner distribution with a decay parameter of θ = .8. See (Hunter
2007) for details. This statistic captures the tendency of the network towards
transitivity, but is less sensitive to degeneracy than a simple triangles statistic.
The Edges term is included to capture the base-rate of connections within the
network, and the Concurrent, Isolates, and GWESP terms are included to account
for endogenous network dependency in the interlock network. These terms capture
the tendency of the interlock network to form clusters while having a relatively large
percentage of isolates.
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Following best practices, I report several intermediary models prior to the full
ERGM specification (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011; Schrodt 2014). I present models
which include only the primary variables of interest (Ideological distance and NTEE
typo homophily, as well as those without endogenous network controls.
The models are run using identical specifications across 100 imputed datasets.
Each of these datasets is identical in all regards other than that they contain different
values of the imputed IGScores used to calculate the ideological distance between
nodes. Results from these 100 separate estimates are combined using Rubin’s rules
(Rubin 1987; Honaker, King, Blackwell, et al. 2011).
4.4 Results
The results from the ERGM analysis is presented in table 4.4, below. ERGM
coeficients can be interpreted similarly to those of a logit regression. In fact, because
models 1-3 contain no model terms for endogenous network effects, the ERGM esti-
mation procedure defaults to logistic regression on the network dyads. Coefficients
are the log-odds of a particular tie given the rest of the interlock network (Leifeld
and Schneider 2012). Model 4 is the full ERGM model including endogenous net-
work statistics, estimated using MCMC MLE on the 100 imputed datasets. If the
p-value from the multivariate geweke test was greater than or equal to .95, indicating
poor convergence of the MCMC model, the model was re-estimated for that dataset.
ERGM convergence and goodness-of-fit diagnostics are presented in the Appendix N.
Compared to the simpler specifications, Model 4, which includes all substantive
covariates as well as endogenous network effects, offers the best fit as indicated by
the lowest AIC and BIC. It is worth noting, however, that across all specifications
there is strong evidence of homophily by issue area of the think tank as indicated by
the Match NTEE parameter estimates.
However, these results in Table 4.4 offer mixed evidence as to whether ideological
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Ideological Distance 0.014 0.037 -0.100 -0.066
(0.141) (0.142) (0.121) (0.053)
Match NTEE 1.447 1.355 1.066
(0.158) (0.160) (0.022)
Match Dues Collecting -0.628 -0.410
(0.166) (0.017)
Match Is Lobbying 0.127 0.103
(0.189) (0.017)




Membership Dues 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Lobbying Fees 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Edges -5.290 -5.571 -20.496 -12.073















Replicates 100 100 100 100
Median AIC 2450.750 2386.328 2128.629 2008.582
Median BIC 2467.852 2411.982 2205.590 2111.198
Table 4.4: Results from ERGMs run on 100 datasets with imputed
IGScores.
distance is associated with a decreased probability of connection between organiza-
tions. In the complete model, think tanks are less likely to be connected to those
that are ideologically more distant from them. However, the magnitude of this effect
is quite small, and after propagating uncertainty from the imputation using 100 im-
puted datasets the effect is not significant at conventional levels. In order to assess
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whether this uncertainty is the result of missingness and imputation, I plot the sep-
arate estimates for each imputed dataset in Figure 4.5, below. This plot shows the
marginal effect of an increase of 1 unit in distance between organizations i and j on
the probability of a tie between those two organizations across each of the ERGMs
estimated. In 85 out of 100 replicates (85 percent), ideological distance was asso-
ciated with a significantly lower likelihood of a tie between two organizations. This
suggests that these results are substantially attenuated by measurement error induced
by missingness in the ideology measure, and variance introduced by imputation.

























This figure reports the estimated marginal effect of ideological distance between two think tanks on
their probability of interlock separately for each imputed dataset. Each estimate is shown with 95
percent confidence intervals. Results are statistically significant at conventional levels in 85 out of
100 replications.
The most persistent and substantively significant finding across models 2-4, is
that organizations are significantly more likely to be connected to each other if they
are both of the same NTEE-CC classification. With log-odds of ∼1.07, a given
think tank is ∼190 percent more likely to be connected to another think tank that
works in the same issue area (according to NTEE classification), than it is to be
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connected to a think tank that works in a different issue area. This is strong evidence
of issue-based homophily in the interlock network. This is consistent with several
existing explanations for interlock behavior. Because the information transfer and
coordination enabled by interlock can mitigate risk (Mizruchi 1996), scholars have
argued that organizations tend towards homophilic interlock when they are dependent
on other organizations in their sector. For example, organizations active within the
same policy area may need to rely on the same sets of funders, and knowledge of each
others’ activities may allow them to avoid challenging each others’ funding streams.
While not as strong as the propensity for organizations to connect with those work-
ing in the same area, organizations are also ∼ 10 percent more likely to be connected
to those that lobby if it also hires lobbyists. Similarly, organizations are ∼ 11 percent
more likely to interlock if they both hire contractors. One possible explanation for
this is that contractors and lobbyists may serve as potential vectors of informal rela-
tionships between organizations, which ultimately facilitates later institutionalization
via interlock.
In contrast, membership organizations that collect dues are significantly less likely
to be connected to others that collect membership dues. Organizations connect to
those that are dissimilar along this dimension, suggesting that they find benefit in
the differential expertise and resources that the other can provide. However, the
amount of lobbying an organization does, or amount of membership dues it collects are
not associated with interlock. Non-member organizations and member organizations
appear to seek each other out for interlock.
As expected, think tanks are substantially more likely to have interlocking boards
as the revenue of the organizations increase; particularly successful fundraisers appear
to be more attractive targets for interlock. Because the dependent variable in an
ERGM is represented as log odds, the estimated effect of revenue can be interpreted as
a log-log model , in which the proportional change in the probability of tie associated
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with a p percent increase in Revenue = exp(aβR), where a = log([100+p]/100) and βR
is the coefficient estimated for Log(Revenue) (Benoit 2011). Using this, an increase
in revenue of 100 percent is associated with a 19.1 percent increase in the likelihood
of a tie. An organization with the revenue at 75th percentile ($3,433,207) has a 65.0
percent higher probability of a given tie than an organization with revenues at the
25th percentile ($473,935).
In order to better understand the within-issue area homophily that the ERGM re-
sults indicate, I present a breakdown of the subgraph density of the interlock network
by NTEE-CC code of the organization. These results are shown in table 4.5.
NTEE-CC Code Organizations Edges Density
International, Foreign Affairs & Nat. Sec. 47 26 0.0241
Public & Societal Benefit 42 11 0.0128
Education 30 5 0.0115
Environment 28 4 0.0106
Health Care 22 6 0.0260
Community Improvement & Capacity Building 18 1 0.0065
Social Science 14 3 0.0330
Civil Rights, Social Action & Advocacy 13 0 0.0000
Food, Agriculture & Nutrition 12 1 0.0152
Science & Technology 11 0 0.0000
Crime & Legal-Related 10 0 0.0000
Arts, Culture & Humanities 6 0 0.0000
Employment 4 0 0.0000
Human Services 4 1 0.1667
Medical Research 3 0 0.0000
Mental Health & Crisis Intervention 3 0 0.0000
Animal-Related 2 0 0.0000
Religion-Related 2 0 0.0000
Voluntary Health Assoc. & Medical Disciplines 2 0 0.0000
Mutual & Membership Benefit 1 0 N/A
Public Safety, Disaster Prep. & Relief 1 0 N/A
Philanthropy, Voluntarism & Grantmaking 1 0 N/A
Housing & Shelter 1 0 N/A
Full Network 277 195 0.0051
Table 4.5: Subgraph density by organization NTEE-CC code
Density within the subgraph composed of the 47 organizations in the International,
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Foreign Affairs & National Security sector is almost five-times higher (.024) than
in the full interlock network (.005). In fact, the five most common categories all
have higher subgraph density than the density in the full graph. This suggests that
organizations form interlock communities with each other based on their activity in
the same policy sector. This effect is particularly strong among the most common
types of organizations in the network.
4.5 Discussion
The results presented here represent the most extensive look at the network struc-
ture of interlock among active policy-planning organizations in Washington D.C. con-
ducted to date. The network appears to exhibit small-world properties, suggesting it
is relatively efficient for transmitting information within the connected component.
The tendency for triadic closure represented by the positive effect of the GWESP
parameter in the ERGM is consistent with organizations forming dense ties within
their local communities, a form of network structure often thought to facilitate col-
laboration.
In contrast to prior work on small subsets of the policy network, I find mixed
and inconclusive evidence of ideological alignment as a substantial driver of interlock.
This may in part be related to ideology indeed playing a substantially less significant
role among niche organizations, for whom issue area is a more salient part of their
organizational identity than ideology. However, substantial missingness in my mea-
sure of ideology – and a conservative imputation process – may have attenuated these
results as well. Future work should extend and validate more extensive measures of
ideology for think tanks and explore the potentially conditional nature of ideological
coordination.
Organizations tend to interlock with those with the most resources, and those
active in their own issue areas. In the case of membership organizations, the network
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structure indicates that organizations tend to connect with organizations unlike them-
selves; membership organizations are more likely to connect with non-membership
organizations and vice versa. This is particularly interesting because, by virtue of
their organizational structure, membership organizations may tend to have better
access to diffuse information from their membership, or a greater ability to mobilize
an outside lobbying campaign (Kollman 1998).
While the analysis presented in this chapter does not directly address the pro-
duction of policy information, the way that think tanks coordinate has important
implications for the production and dissemination of information. Future research
should address whether information producers that are more embedded within the
think tank network have more stable access to funding, produce more cross organiza-
tional collaborative research, are perceived by policymakers as more credible, or are
more successful at getting their research in front of policymakers. Ultimately, whether
such disparities in the organizational support for information production translate to




This dissertation sits at the nexus of three literatures: Congress, the psychology of
political decision-making, and interest group representation. First and foremost, it is
a dissertation about Congress, specifically about how congressional staff function as
information processors, and the manner in which their individual information process-
ing decisions, in aggregate, can impact the institution’s representational functioning.
To appropriately engage with this question, I have tried to be sensitive to two strains
of scholarship that are not often in dialogue with each other: legislative institutions
and the political psychology of information processing. While foundational research
in both the study of legislative institutions and political psychology take seriously
the idea that their subjects of inquiry are boundedly rational, the former has tended
to emphasize the rationality and the latter has tended to emphasize the bounded-
ness. In examining how staffers evaluate privately provisioned outside information
in the policy making process, I have attempted to learn from both of these scholarly
traditions.
5.1 Summation
Beginning in Chapter 2, I laid out a theory of congressional information processing
that centers individual staffers in a complex decision-making environment. Staffers
124
operate under considerable constraints in both time and resources. In this theorizing,
I have attempted to be conscious of how the institutional structure of Congress, and
the incentives placed on individual members, shape the demands placed on staffers.
Faced with overloaded schedules, short timelines, competing incentives, and a wealth
of possible information providers, staffers function as information gatekeepers tasked
with evaluating and selecting legislative subsidy. Scholarship on political information
processing has highlighted how environments of this kind are particularly ripe for
biased information processing. In this dissertation, I have sought to apply lessons
and methods from scholarship on motivated reasoning, confirmation bias and the
use of ideological heuristics especially, to micro-level processes that comprise critical
components of congressional activity.
In Chapter 2, I presented three competing theoretical frameworks for understand-
ing how staffers serve their members as they evaluate information. The first of these,
the “faithful agent” theory suggests that staffers process information in line with the
directional goals of the members of Congress for whom they work. I find little evi-
dence to support this theory, with the notable exception that the use of right-of-center
think tank information is driven by the extremism of the member for whom a staffer
works in conjunction with the staffer’s own ideology. Overall, however, I find a great
deal of support for the “independent agent” theory, in which I posit that staffer’s
evaluation of information is driven largely by their own ideological positions, rather
than their bosses. In fact, across a set of information sources tested, staffers’ own
ideologies explain more than 10 times the variance in their reported levels of trust in
information as the ideologies of the members they work for. The relationship between
staffers’ ideology and their evaluation of information sources is especially pronounced
among the most extreme and most conservative staffers. Finally, I show that staffers’
propensity to trust and use information that aligns with their own ideologies is not
conditional on whether their bosses’ seat is vulnerable in the next election. That is to
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say, staffers do not act as more faithful agents of their bosses — as better employees
— if their boss might lose their seat, as we should expect if they act strategically.
This lack of strategic action is consistent with the view that staffers select information
that fits their priors as a subconscious aspect of their search and evaluation procedure,
rather than intentional agency-slacking in pursuit of their own policy goals.
In Chapter 3, I tested the relationship between ideological information sources
and staffer behavior that I uncovered in Chapter 2, using two novel experimental
designs. These experiments built on the findings from Chapter 2 in several important
ways. I designed both the lobbying vignette and white paper conjoint experiments
to mimic real situations faced regularly by staffers based on the numerous interviews
conducted with congressional staffers in 2017 and 2018. While survey experiments
are always somewhat limited in their external validity, these specific designs represent
a substantial increase in verisimilitude over the direct evaluations of trustworthiness
and likelihood of use which are the core of Chapter 2. Secondly, Study 2 in Chapter 3
uses specific sources of information with well known ideological perspectives, and finds
results which are consistent with my previous findings using general categories of think
tanks. Furthermore, these experiments demonstrate that the source of information
and its content have a causal effect on how information is evaluated.
The survey experiments that I designed and fielded in the 2017 and 2019 Con-
gressional Capacity Survey represent the largest survey experimental samples of con-
gressional staffers fielded to date. They offer a unique insight into the role that
ideological source cues play in how staffers respond to meeting requests, and pro-
cess white papers. In particular, this experiment reveals large and consistent effects
of source ideology across a range of substantively important outcomes including the
likelihood of using information, siding with an organization when making recommen-
dations, and viewing a petitioner as representative of district constituents. In fact,
a staffer’s view of a petitioner bearing an ideologically aligned think-tank report as
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more representative of district constituents than one that comes bearing supportive
polling from that staffer’s district. The effects of ideological information identified
in this experiment are strongest among personal office staff, strong partisans, and
ideologically extreme staff. In the white paper conjoint experiment, I find that both
content and source are important in how staffers evaluate information. The results
demonstrate that even when staffers are provided with conservative or liberal policy
information, the source of that information shapes the extent to which they will rely
on it. These effects are robust across multiple policy domains, think tanks, and in
both Democratic and Republican staffers.
While this research is focused largely on Congress, its motivations are fundamen-
tally those of an interest group scholar. In large part, this is a demand side look at the
micro-foundations of legislative subsidy (Hall and Deardorff 2006), and the studies
presented in Chapters 2 and 3 present empirical evidence on how staffers condition
the opportunities to grant those subsidies. Of course, as Hall and Deardorff (2006)
theorize, outside actors providing matching grants to allies is a powerful tool for in-
terest group influence. The questions I have addressed, and results I’ve presented,
are especially normatively and theoretically important when viewed in the context of
interest group representation.
This research suggests that the logic of parties-as-networks extends beyond the
campaign, as these same long coalitions of interests fund institutions of external
knowledge creation that subsidize aligned legislators. Policy is, then, not the prod-
uct of Congress and elected, but of parallel organs of external, partisan, ideological,
and interest-based policy production created and funded by largely opaque actors.
These institutions have the potential to launder the interests of industry or donor
organizations, providing the imprimatur of non-partisan policy-research and analysis
(Hertel-Fernandez 2019; Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016). Prominent reporting
in recent years has documented the ability of wealthy interest to set think tank agen-
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das on a wide array of issues (Wakabayashi 2020; Lipton and Williams 2016; Lipton,
Williams, and Confessore 2014). Insofar as interests are able to influence the agendas
of think tanks with known ideological identities, their policy goals gain the benefits
of the biased information processing by staffers that I have documented. If a staffer
is more likely to trust and use information from an ideologically aligned think tank
no matter what that information says, the ideological seal of approval think tanks can
offer is a valuable asset for interests to cultivate.
This insight suggests numerous avenues for future research, with a particular em-
phasis on the wider ecosystem of political knowledge production. Chapter 4 begins
that research program by mapping the network of think tanks active in policy plan-
ning in Washington D.C.. In this chapter, I used IRS 990 records to examine the
patterns of coordination among 277 think tanks across a wide array of issue areas
based on overlapping board memberships. I find strong evidence of coordination
within issue areas, and connection patterns that are consistent with think tanks pur-
suing financial and organizational resources. Understanding the networked nature
of policy information production is particularly critical. Researchers at think tanks
routinely cite each other, collaborate on projects— including launching fully joint
programs like The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center—, host and serve on panels
with each other, and both coordinate and compete in their grant-seeking activity.
Embeddedness within this network of mutuality confers privilege, access to resources,
and legitimacy. While Chapter 4 is only a first look at this network of policy informa-
tion producers, it suggests that these organizations are status and resource seeking,
and coordinate strongly within their issue areas. While there is less evidence from
this particular study regarding the role that organizational ideology plays in this sort
of coalition formation, this lack of evidence is not itself evidence against such coor-
dination. The extent to which ideology structures the funding of these institutions,
and the production, and dissemination of the information they produce remains an
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important topic for further scholarly work.
5.2 Implications
Much of the canonical work in the study of Congress depends on the assumption
that legislators are rational unitary agents. This dissertation challenges that assump-
tion and suggests that the critical unit of inquiry is the organizational structure of
congressional offices. Observed legislative behavior, from bill introductions and floor
speeches to committee activity and constituent communication, is better understood
as outputs of the legislative enterprise than it is as the actions of the member of
Congress herself. As such, the organizational processes within this enterprise are im-
portant. If members truly delegate to their staffers, then these staffers have the ability
to impact that activity. I have shown in this dissertation that, as far as evaluating
information is concerned, staffers’ activity deviates from what we would expect from
the actions of members themselves. Because of this, I argue that congressional schol-
arship needs to take more seriously the organizational information processing biases
and limitations of legislators’ staffs, and contextualize member legislative behavior
as an outcome of this selective information processing, and often independent staffer
activity.
This insight has profound implications for the study of Congress. Understanding
legislative behavior as the output of the legislative enterprise, suggests that the ways in
which Members of Congress differ as managers is likely to have a meaningful impact
on the activity we observe. Rather than looking to personality, style, or member
biographical characteristics to understand legislative behavior, scholars should attend
to office level and organizational characteristics. For instance, scholars should focus
on features like whether and why offices are more or less hierarchical, how much
initiative staffers are encouraged to take, or how much ownership over issues they are
granted. Following Crosson et al. (2020a), it may be useful to view how a legislator
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allocates their resources across hiring different types of staffers as an expression of
their priorities, and the capabilities of the enterprise they run.
A view of staffers as information aggregators and gatekeepers, as I have presented
here, highlights the importance of the distribution of policy positions, evidence, and
subsidy that outside interests are able to provide. Recent work building on Schloz-
man, Verba, and Brady (2012) and Bonica (2013), has demonstrated renewed interest
in the distribution of preferences in the broad interest community, and the representa-
tional implications of differential activity by these actors (e.g. Lerner 2018; Crosson,
Furnas, and Lorenz 2020; Abi-Hassan et al., n.d.). In particular, Crosson, Furnas, and
Lorenz (2020) argue that different levels of intense activity by interest groups may
shape the perceived distribution of preferences by congressional staffers and other po-
litical elites that may explain persistent misconceptions of public opinion (Brookman
and Skovron 2018; Hertel-Fernandez, Mildenberger, and Stokes 2019; Miler 2018).
If staffers understand the world through biased sampling from the distribution of
subsidies provided by these organizations, then the ideologies and activities of these
organizations, and the policy apparatuses they maintain, can have tremendous impact
on what issues are prioritized, what policy alternatives are considered, and what pol-
icy is enacted. The relationship between these interconnected networks of institutions
and outcomes is worthy of further study.
5.3 Future Work
The themes and findings of this dissertation suggest numerous avenues for future
research. The survey and experimental work I have presented in Chapters 2 and 3
focused on how individual staffers evaluate information sources. Future work should
focus on how this micro-level activity manifests in aggregate, institution-wide pro-
cesses and outcomes. Research could examine, for example, how the composition
of sources that are referenced in committee reports or during committee hearings
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changes over-time as the composition of committee staff changes. It is commonplace
for new committee chairs to bring many of their own staffers with them to com-
mittee offices when they are appointed. These institutional changes—particularly in
the set of exogenous committee departures—could provide some causal leverage on
how staffing changes affect the information that committees use in this observational
setting.
The empirical observation from Chapter 2 that the ideologies of staffers and their
bosses are only weakly correlated within party is worthy of further study as well. In
future work, I plan to use the method developed by Esterling (2018) to generate com-
mon space scores that place staffers and members of Congress on the same ideological
scale. A common space measure of this kind will allow me to further interrogate ques-
tions such as: do some members tend to hire staffers that are more moderate or more
extreme than themselves, or do members tend to curate ideologically heterogeneous
offices, as we might expect them to, if they hope to counter individual staffer’s bias
by triangulating based on multiple staffers’ input.
The centrality of staff in information processing within the institution takes on
additional importance in an era where meaningful policymaking is centralized in lead-
ership offices, as is now increasingly the case (Lee 2016; Curry and Lee 2020; Curry
2015). Staffers in leadership offices may differ systematically from those in other
institutional positions, and are particularly well-placed to influence legislative out-
comes. The manner in which leadership staffers’ incentives and information environ-
ments differ from those in personal or committee offices warrants further exploration.
Leadership staffers may have less issue-specific domain expertise than their committee
counterparts, or fewer connections to trusted interlocutors on a particular issue. They
may also be stronger partisans or more ideologically extreme than their committee
counterparts, which should lead us to expect a stronger influence of their directional
goals on their decision-making. Moreover, they may feel additional pressure to rely
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on sources of information that are embedded in their partisan networks over more
neutral arbiters. Leadership staffers make up a small proportion of overall staff on the
hill, and are difficult to survey. However years of payroll records can help identify the
career trajectories of these staffers and how those who end up serving in leadership of-
fices may differ from other staffers. Understanding who becomes a leadership staffer
will help us understand the extent to which findings about personal or committee
staffers are likely to generalize to leadership staff.
Perhaps the most significant and ambitious research agenda this work calls for is
the one that I began in Chapter 4: mapping the growth, development and mainte-
nance of the infrastructure of policy legitimation. The Unites States is unique among
OECD democracies in the extent to which the production of policy relevant infor-
mation is privately provisioned. As privately funded organizations, institutions that
produce and disseminate policy information are subject to the same sorts of chal-
lenges in organization and maintenance as other interest groups. As such, we should
expect their actions, including the policy information that they produce, to be shaped
by their ongoing needs for funding. The ability of the well-resourced to found and
support the organizational scaffolding of policy creation—the organizations that not
only generate policy ideas, but legitimate those ideas in the elite D.C. policy planning
networks—is a substantial tool of influence which is worthy of further study.
This dissertation has shown that staffers rely on this privately provisioned in-
formation, and do so in ways that are biased. This points to how crucial it is to
understand the forces that shape the interests and agendas of those that produce the
information that the congressional enterprise is relying on. Just as lobbying or cam-
paign finance are often understood as costly signals of alignment between interests
and lawmakers, the interconnectedness of think tanks may represent participation
in ideological networks that are powerful influencers of policy. This view suggests
multiple theories that might underpin the behavior of corporate and high net worth
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individuals that fund these institutions. For example, access to partisan networks
(Bawn et al. 2012), investments in long-term ideological projects (Noel 2014), or ac-
cess oriented hedging strategies (Drutman 2015) could all motivate the financing of
private policymaking institutions. This dissertation demonstrates that it is critical to
understand how these organizations are built and maintained, and how that impacts
what positions are reflected in the policy discourse, to begin to appreciate the full
ramifications of Congress’s reliance on outside organizational information.
This dissertation suggests that Congress must be thought of as an institution
embedded within a wider ecosystem of political and policy knowledge production.
This perspective suggests that committees’ informational needs, chairs’ and mem-
bers’ relationships, staffers’ individual constraints and biases, extended partisan and
ideological networks, and interest group activities combine to create a system of infor-
mation processing for the institution. To understand how Congress meets (or fails to
meet) representational, oversight, and legislative goals, we, as scholars must observe
how information flows within and between actors in this broader network, and what






Chapter 2 Full Models and Additional Tests
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Right TT Left TT Univ CRS CBO GAO
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Not at all|Somewhat -0.488 -1.064 -3.821 -5.457 -5.453 -4.052
(2.517) (2.243) (2.298) (2.355) (2.358) (2.291)
Somewhat|Mostly 2.598 1.656 -1.115 -3.999 -3.994 -1.722
(2.513) (2.246) (2.283) (2.322) (2.325) (2.257)
Mostly|Completely 7.05 6.313 2.211 -1.321 -1.317 0.829
(2.568) (2.326) (2.284) (2.311) (2.314) (2.254)
Staffer Ideology 0.603 -0.817 -0.649 -0.52 -0.52 -0.589
(0.195) (0.185) (0.181) (0.191) (0.191) (0.172)
Boss Ideology 0.722 -0.239 -0.339 -0.303 -0.303 -0.053
(0.203) (0.184) (0.184) (0.187) (0.186) (0.173)
Log(Salary) 0.21 0.095 0.028 -0.19 -0.189 0.001
(0.244) (0.222) (0.226) (0.231) (0.231) (0.224)
Mid-Level Staffer -0.012 0.041 -0.718 0.242 0.233 0.629
(0.372) (0.358) (0.376) (0.391) (0.389) (0.359)
Senior Staffer 0.37 -0.518 -1.327 -0.097 -0.106 0.457
(0.521) (0.484) (0.511) (0.504) (0.502) (0.474)
Health Issue 0.613 0.521 0.657 0.164 0.162 -0.019
(0.315) (0.304) (0.312) (0.311) (0.311) (0.296)
Nat Sec Issue 0.504 0.672 0.144 0.649 0.647 0.189
(0.282) (0.277) (0.281) (0.294) (0.294) (0.272)
IssueKnowledge 0.279 -0.04 0.722 1.581 1.582 0.717
(0.474) (0.463) (0.468) (0.500) (0.500) (0.456)
Committee Office -0.767 -0.07 -0.073 -0.052 -0.051 0.103
(0.341) (0.312) (0.320) (0.325) (0.325) (0.307)
Party Office -1.176 -0.01 -0.543 -0.492 -0.492 -1.717
(0.639) (0.580) (0.558) (0.544) (0.544) (0.557)
Senate 0.261 0.049 -0.242 0.031 0.031 0.24
(0.263) (0.241) (0.250) (0.255) (0.254) (0.237)
IMR -1.387 -0.584 -0.778 -0.043 -0.044 -0.721
(0.791) (0.617) (0.624) (0.519) (0.519) (0.511)
Nobs 317.73 318.53 315.00 328.94 328.94 327.26
logLik -277.08 -292.73 -301.52 -256.27 -256.27 -312.44
AIC 584.16 615.45 633.05 542.54 542.54 654.88
Table A.1: Second stage of two stage ordinal logistic regression models
DV: Trust of information sources
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Right TT Left TT Univ CRS CBO GAO
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Never|Occasionally -0.356 -1.689 -2.294 -2.623 -2.354 1.237
(2.271) (2.334) (2.232) (2.121) (2.264) (2.147)
Occasionally|Frequently 2.605 1.612 0.793 -0.279 -0.527 3.466
(2.277) (2.331) (2.231) (2.115) (2.261) (2.154)
Staffer Ideology 0.046 -0.829 -0.622 0.017 -0.051 -0.102
(0.179) (0.185) (0.175) (0.160) (0.170) (0.163)
Boss Ideology 1.092 -0.229 0.255 0.057 0.084 0.14
(0.194) (0.183) (0.179) (0.164) (0.173) (0.165)
Log(Salary) -0.02 -0.043 -0.033 -0.16 -0.033 0.152
(0.223) (0.230) (0.222) (0.213) (0.226) (0.215)
Mid-Level Staffer 0.639 0.559 0.591 0.454 0.24 0.987
(0.358) (0.377) (0.374) (0.354) (0.390) (0.352)
Senior Staffer 0.857 0.655 0.342 0.937 0.035 1.039
(0.475) (0.506) (0.489) (0.465) (0.502) (0.461)
Health Issue 0.521 0.158 0.184 -0.336 -0.455 -0.372
(0.310) (0.311) (0.308) (0.284) (0.307) (0.289)
Nat Sec Issue 0.417 0.087 -0.302 -0.85 0.062 -0.227
(0.276) (0.281) (0.276) (0.260) (0.289) (0.257)
IssueKnowledge 0.396 -0.334 -0.372 0.997 0.72 0.66
(0.471) (0.480) (0.485) (0.434) (0.474) (0.437)
Committee Office -0.228 -0.103 -0.615 0.411 -0.524 0.937
(0.314) (0.331) (0.320) (0.295) (0.312) (0.306)
Party Office -2.365 -0.852 -1.772 -0.988 -1.599 -0.882
(0.633) (0.572) (0.556) (0.499) (0.491) (0.493)
Senate -0.015 0.113 0.291 -0.187 -0.466 0.027
(0.242) (0.250) (0.245) (0.227) (0.242) (0.226)
IMR -0.321 -0.892 -0.759 0.207 0.45 -0.316
(0.574) (0.730) (0.510) (0.441) (0.504) (0.443)
Nobs 326.16 326.16 326.16 338.78 337.92 337.92
logLik -276.16 -264.92 -285.26 -330.79 -281.07 -332.60
AIC 580.32 557.83 598.51 689.58 590.14 693.19
Table A.2: Second stage of two stage ordinal logistic regression models
DV: Use of information sources
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Right TT Left TT Univ CRS CBO GAO
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18
Not at all|Somewhat -0.998 -1.228 -3.668 -7.148 -7.129 -4.708
(2.691) (2.377) (2.412) (2.524) (2.528) (2.378)
Somewhat|Mostly 2.161 1.504 -0.97 -5.626 -5.607 -2.328
(2.674) (2.377) (2.394) (2.483) (2.487) (2.340)
Mostly|Completely 6.513 6.188 2.402 -2.84 -2.822 0.271
(2.733) (2.454) (2.400) (2.460) (2.463) (2.334)
StaffLeft -0.945 -0.637 -0.225 -0.367 -0.365 0.45
(0.584) (0.546) (0.548) (0.599) (0.598) (0.532)
StafferExtremism 0.166 -1.019 -0.611 -1.03 -1.03 -0.924
(0.328) (0.316) (0.309) (0.298) (0.298) (0.276)
BossLeft 0.454 -0.212 -0.67 -0.24 -0.237 -0.163
(0.993) (0.914) (0.920) (1.031) (1.032) (0.898)
BossExtremism 0.686 -0.275 -0.317 -0.818 -0.818 -0.133
(0.524) (0.482) (0.477) (0.475) (0.475) (0.462)
Log(Salary) 0.214 0.105 0.039 -0.234 -0.232 -0.015
(0.247) (0.225) (0.230) (0.235) (0.236) (0.225)
Mid-Level Staffer 0.006 0.068 -0.695 0.325 0.32 0.604
(0.383) (0.370) (0.382) (0.406) (0.407) (0.365)
Senior Staffer 0.415 -0.514 -1.343 0.085 0.081 0.538
(0.539) (0.504) (0.521) (0.521) (0.521) (0.486)
Health Issue 0.568 0.492 0.644 0.166 0.168 0.006
(0.319) (0.309) (0.316) (0.317) (0.317) (0.302)
Nat Sec Issue 0.499 0.647 0.111 0.671 0.672 0.241
(0.285) (0.279) (0.282) (0.297) (0.297) (0.275)
IssueKnowledge 0.268 -0.037 0.719 1.72 1.719 0.78
(0.476) (0.465) (0.470) (0.510) (0.510) (0.459)
Committee Office -0.786 -0.084 -0.074 -0.154 -0.155 0.058
(0.356) (0.322) (0.329) (0.336) (0.336) (0.317)
Party Office -1.149 0.063 -0.476 -0.451 -0.452 -1.788
(0.655) (0.588) (0.563) (0.554) (0.554) (0.563)
Senate 0.265 0.105 -0.169 0.021 0.021 0.221
(0.274) (0.252) (0.259) (0.263) (0.263) (0.245)
IMR -1.487 -0.635 -0.786 -0.312 -0.314 -0.832
(0.857) (0.673) (0.667) (0.567) (0.567) (0.545)
StaffLeft:StafferExtremism -0.743 1.951 1.418 1.179 1.18 0.908
(0.472) (0.477) (0.463) (0.482) (0.482) (0.429)
BossLeft:BossExtremism -1.473 0.978 1.426 0.94 0.934 0.069
(0.911) (0.858) (0.862) (0.952) (0.954) (0.824)
Nobs 317.73 318.53 315.00 328.94 328.94 327.26
logLik -275.07 -291.46 -300.35 -252.36 -252.37 -309.36
AIC 588.145 620.92 638.70 542.71 542.75 656.72
Table A.3: Second stage of two-stage ordinal logistic regression models with
interactions
DV: Trust in information sources
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Right TT Left TT Univ CRS CBO GAO
Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24
Never|Occasionally -0.607 -1.463 -2.02 -3.167 -4.013 0.522
(2.398) (2.447) (2.324) (2.178) (2.361) (2.223)
Occasionally|Frequently 2.353 1.885 1.073 -0.811 -2.15 2.764
(2.403) (2.449) (2.325) (2.170) (2.354) (2.227)
StaffLeft 0.193 0.514 0.036 -0.504 -0.31 -0.084
(0.538) (0.521) (0.524) (0.490) (0.516) (0.486)
StafferExtremism -0.158 -0.533 -0.533 -0.096 -0.648 -0.169
(0.302) (0.294) (0.288) (0.270) (0.285) (0.266)
BossLeft 0.672 0.151 0.458 -0.008 -0.501 -0.687
(0.924) (0.959) (0.915) (0.830) (0.917) (0.851)
BossExtremism 1.234 -0.328 0.421 -0.302 -0.418 -0.448
(0.484) (0.493) (0.486) (0.434) (0.497) (0.443)
Log(Salary) -0.043 -0.039 -0.034 -0.165 -0.082 0.148
(0.226) (0.231) (0.223) (0.212) (0.228) (0.217)
Mid-Level Staffer 0.601 0.557 0.561 0.516 0.304 1.083
(0.369) (0.387) (0.382) (0.359) (0.406) (0.360)
Senior Staffer 0.911 0.644 0.303 1.006 0.267 1.159
(0.494) (0.520) (0.499) (0.470) (0.517) (0.471)
Health Issue 0.526 0.202 0.175 -0.346 -0.478 -0.327
(0.314) (0.316) (0.312) (0.287) (0.314) (0.295)
Nat Sec Issue 0.459 0.115 -0.295 -0.879 0.076 -0.239
(0.279) (0.283) (0.278) (0.262) (0.296) (0.260)
IssueKnowledge 0.407 -0.359 -0.395 1.038 0.872 0.74
(0.473) (0.480) (0.486) (0.436) (0.485) (0.441)
Committee Office -0.208 -0.084 -0.574 0.37 -0.607 0.852
(0.322) (0.343) (0.326) (0.302) (0.321) (0.313)
Party Office -2.351 -0.795 -1.756 -1.021 -1.717 -0.92
(0.631) (0.571) (0.555) (0.501) (0.501) (0.500)
Senate -0.076 0.051 0.267 -0.199 -0.476 0.028
(0.254) (0.260) (0.254) (0.235) (0.255) (0.236)
IMR -0.34 -0.88 -0.696 0.139 0.215 -0.477
(0.598) (0.762) (0.527) (0.455) (0.527) (0.466)
StaffLeft:StafferExtremism -0.228 1.347 1.195 0.218 0.291 0.281
(0.455) (0.458) (0.448) (0.409) (0.434) (0.419)
BossLeft:BossExtremism -2.869 0.187 -0.904 0.101 0.355 0.352
(0.877) (0.887) (0.848) (0.774) (0.857) (0.792)
Nobs 326.16 326.16 326.16 338.778 337.92 337.92
logLik -275.14 -263.60 -285.01 -329.71 -276.11 -331.33
AIC 586.27 563.19 606.03 695.42 588.23 698.66
Table A.4: Second stage of two-stage ordinal logistic regression models with
interactions
DV: Use of information sources
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Trust Use Trust Use
All Offices All Offices Non-Competitive Non-Competitive
1|2 -7.339 -2.677 -8.451 -3.419
(2.079) (1.865) (2.205) (2.233)
2|3 -3.927 0.482 -5.154 -0.338
(2.059) (1.844) (2.188) (2.215)
3|4 -0.353 -1.792
(2.041) (2.175)
StaffAligned -4.734 -2.501 -4.523 -2.348
(0.818) (1.732) (0.813) (1.732)
StaffNonAligned -5.058 -2.77 -4.865 -2.607
(0.226) (0.813) (0.206) (0.813)
StafferExtremism -0.709 -0.339 -0.565 -0.189
(0.770) (0.205) (0.770) (0.206)
BossAligned -0.673 0.126 -0.886 -0.406
(0.373) (0.771) (0.362) (0.770)
BossNonAligned 0.037 0.53 -0.174 0.022
(0.828) (0.364) (0.823) (0.362)
BossExtremism -0.291 -0.208 -0.425 -0.286
(0.780) (0.831) (0.788) (0.835)
Log(Salary) 0.042 -0.013 -0.069 -0.076
(0.247) (0.780) (0.193) (0.786)
Mid-Level Staffer 0.011 0.614 0.16 0.708
(0.393) (0.165) (0.347) (0.174)
Senior Staffer -0.19 0.728 0.095 0.708
(0.473) (0.329) (0.465) (0.351)
Health Issue 0.29 -0.093 0.498 0.067
(0.272) (0.387) (0.272) (0.386)
Nat Sec Issue 0.603 -0.127 0.5 -0.046
(0.248) (0.268) (0.247) (0.270)
IssueKnowledge 0.912 0.911 0.814 0.704
(0.438) (0.248) (0.429) (0.260)
Committee Office -0.294 0.203 -0.168 0.354
(0.271) (0.429) (0.269) (0.436)
Leadership Office -1.246 -1.193 -0.803 -1.226
(0.565) (0.277) (0.696) (0.347)
Senate 0.144 -0.338 0.135 -0.31
(0.236) (0.565) (0.236) (0.563)
IMR -0.89 -0.349 -1.162 -0.542
(1.036) (0.380) (0.521) (0.383)
StaffAligned:StafferExtremism 1.221 0.618 1.05 0.604
(0.259) (0.454) (0.259) (0.454)
StaffNonAligned:StafferExtremism -0.373 -0.309 -0.53 -0.508
(0.433) (0.259) (0.433) (0.259)
BossAligned:BossExtremism 1.084 1.107 1.253 1.441
(0.281) (0.434) (0.281) (0.436)
BossNonAligned:BossExtremism -0.296 -0.499 0.029 0.009
(0.450) (0.284) (0.450) (0.284)
Nobs 1621.38 1666.93 1351.93 1390.52
logLik -1405.20 -1460.24 -1188.61 -1220.60
AIC 2860.41 2968.47 2427.23 2489.19
Table A.5: Second stage of two-stage mixed effects ordinal logistic regres-
sion models of trust and use, repeated measures dataset
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Responded to Survey {0,1}
Tenure −0.008
(0.014)




Boss Ideology (Nominate Dim1) 0.734∗∗
(0.314)
Number of Issues Worked on 0.010
(0.013)
Number of Job Titles 0.028
(0.029)
























Office Management(Job Title) −0.260
(0.506)













∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
Table A.6: Example Stage 1 Selection model results14
APPENDIX B
Question Wording
Respondents were asked whether they work on a list of issues “never," “occasion-
ally" or “daily."1 If respondents answered “daily" to one and only one of the follow:
1) “Budget & Appropriations", 2) “Health", or 3) “Defense" and/or “International
Affairs" they were directed to a specific question block corresponding to Budget &
Appropriations, Health Policy or National Security Policy respectively. All other
respondents were randomly distributed among the three issue blocks.
The analyses in this paper use two types of scales which were constructed from re-
spondents’ answers: 1) issue specific knowledge scales, and 2) an ideology scale. Each
issue block contained a battery of 4 or 5 knowledge questions designed in coordination
with issue expert consultants. Issue specific knowledge scales were constructed by tak-
ing the standardized sum of the number of knowledge questions that the respondents
answered correctly.
The staffer ideology scale was is constructed using a PCM Rasch model (a form of
IRT) on the likert-type response items (1-5) of respondents’ answers to a five question
ideology battery designed and validated in Esterling 2018.
1. The survey used a list of 24 policy domains adapted from the Comparative Agendas Project
Master Codebook (http://www.comparativeagendas.net/pages/mastercodebook). We replaced “Na-
tional Budget" with “Budget and Appropriations" but all other issues were identical.
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Standardized Ideology Scale
Liberal Conservative
Respondents that declined to answer the party identification question are shown as “Party Q NA".
Figure B.1 shows the distribution of ideology scores for staffers that responded
to the 2017 Congressional Capacity Survey by their party identification. Democratic
staffers tend to be ideologically left-of-center, while Republican staffers tend to be
ideologically right-of-center. Strong partisans tend to be more extreme ideologically
than weak partisans, and Independents and staffers that did not answer the party
ID question have ideologies across the spectrum. It is useful here to note that this is
consistent with the notion that partisans in congress think in schematic, sophisticated
and ideologically coherent terms. The absolute value of this ideological measure is
used to capture staffer extremism.
In their assigned issue blocks, respondents were given batteries that asked about
how much they trust and use a variety of sources. In this analysis I focus on the trust
and use of three sources inside the government (CRS, CBO and GAO) and three
sources outside the government (left-of-center Think Tanks, University Researchers,
and right-of-center Think Tanks). Respondents were asked to rate sources on a four
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item likert-type trustworthiness scale (not at all, somewhat, mostly, completely trust-
worthy) and a three item use scale (never use, occasionally use, frequently use). The
question prompt format for these items is shown below
Ideology Battery Questions
Q19 Thinking about YOUR OWN personal opinions -- not what you think
your boss believes -- what do you think about the following?
q19.1 The protection of consumer interests is best insured by a vigorous
competition among sellers rather than by federal government regulation on behalf
of consumers.
(1) Strongly agree (n=104)
(2) Somewhat agree (n=111)
(3) Neither agree nor disagree (n=47)
(4) Somewhat disagree (n=119)
(5) Strongly disagree (n=40)
q19.2 There is too much power concentrated in the hands of a few large companies
for the good of the country.
(1) Strongly agree (n=109)
(2) Somewhat agree (n=151)
(3) Neither agree nor disagree (n=65)
(4) Somewhat disagree (n=72)
(5) Strongly disagree (n=24)
q19.3 One of the most important roles of government is to help those who cannot
help themselves, such as the poor, the disadvantaged, and the unemployed.
(1) Strongly agree (n=178)
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(2) Somewhat agree (n=116)
(3) Neither agree nor disagree (n=37)
(4) Somewhat disagree (n=65)
(5) Strongly disagree (n=25)
q19.4 All Americans should have access to quality medical care regardless of
ability to pay.
(1) Strongly agree (n=205)
(2) Somewhat agree (n=83)
(3) Neither agree nor disagree (n=46)
(4) Somewhat disagree (n=65)
(5) Strongly disagree (n=22)
q19.5 The differences in income among occupations should be reduced.
(1) Strongly agree (n=47)
(2) Somewhat agree (n=97)
(3) Neither agree nor disagree (n=75)
(4) Somewhat disagree (n=86)
(5) Strongly disagree (n=116)
For purposes of summative scale construction q19.1 was reverse coded so that
higher number always were the more conservative codes.
Source use and trust prompts
Indicate how often you use the following resources [INSIDE/OUTSIDE]
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT when you make [federal budget/health policy/national
security policy] recommendations.
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Indicate how trustworthy you find the following resources [INSIDE/OUTSIDE]
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT when you make [federal budget/health policy/national
security policy] recommendations.
Party Identification Battery
Q21 Generally speaking, do you usually think of YOURSELF as a Republican,
a Democrat, an Independent, or something else? Note: your response here may




(4) Other (n = 7)
(5) No preference (n=3)
q21_4_text [text if Q21== 4]
[Display This Question if Q21== 1]
Q23 Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?
(1) Strong (n=96)
(2) Not very strong (n=44)
[Display This Question if Q21== 2]
Q25 Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?
(1) Strong (n=120)
(2) Not very strong (n=19)
[Display This Question if Q21 === 3,4 or 5]





Q83 Please answer the following questions about the legislative process as
accurately as you can.
Q34 Which of the following is accurate in reference to the Committee of the Whole
in the House?
(1) Amendments are generally debated for five minutes (n=74)
(2) A majority of the membership constitutes a quorum (n=54)
(3) The previous question is always in order (n=32)
(4) Calling for a recorded vote requires the support of a majority of
the chamber (n=39)
q34_correct Correctly responded (1) in Q34
(0) No (n=125)
(1) Yes (n=74)
Q73 How many signatures are required for a successful discharge petition?
(1) A majority of all members chosen and sworn (n=26)
(2) A majority of the chamber (218) (n=168)
(3) A majority of the majority party (n=8)
(4) A majority of the minority party (n=1)




Q81 What are 302(a) allocations?
(1) The amounts set by the House and Senate Budget Committees for their
respective Appropriations Committees at the start of the budget process (n=141)
(2) The amounts given to each committee in the House and Senate to spend on staff (n=21)
(3) The number of seats in the House given to each state following the
decennial census (n=2)
(4) The amounts set by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees for
their respective subcommittees as part of the budget process (n=36)
q81_correct Correctly responded (1) in Q81
(0) No (n=59)
(1) Yes (n=141)
Q82 What does it mean to invoke "martial law" in the House?
(1) There is no required layover period between the filing of a bill and
debating it (n=143)
(2) The leadership may adjourn the chamber at any point (n=17)
(3) Only the Speaker of the House may preside over the chamber (n=13)
(4) No amendments on the floor are permitted (n=25)
q82_correct Correctly responded (1) in Q82
(0) No (n=55)
(1) Yes (n=143)
know_house_st percent of correct answers to Q34, Q73, Q81, and Q82
(mean =0.65; SD=0.26)
End of Block: House Procedure Block
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Senate Procedure Questions
Q84 Please answer the following questions about the legislative process as accurately
as you can.
Q38 What does Senate Rule XIV do?
(1) Allows bills to bypass committee consideration in the Senate (n=102)
(2) Allows for unlimited debate on the Senate floor (n=4)
(3) Sets requirements for committee hearings (n=3)
(4) Restricts amendment opportunities on the floor of the Senate (n=15)
q38_correct Correctly responded (1) in Q38
(0) No (n=22)
(1) Yes (n=102)
Q37 Why does the majority leader often vote against cloture?
(1) He does not want to end debate on the underlying measure (n=16)
(2) He wants to limit the ability of minority party senators to offer
amendments (n=17)
(3) He wants to make it easier to hold another cloture vote on the same bill
in the future (n=87)
(4) He wants to send the bill back to committee for further consideration (n=4)
q37_correct Correctly responded (3) in Q37
(0) No (n=37)
(1) Yes (n=87)
Q36 What is one procedural advantage of using amendments between the
houses to resolve differences between the House and Senate?
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(1) A House amendment is privileged for consideration in the Senate (n=43)
(2) A House amendment cannot be filibustered in the Senate (n=15)
(3) There are no limits on the number of times a particular bill may go back
and forth between the chambers (n=50)
(4) Amendment exchanges cannot introduce new content into the bill (n=11)
q36_correct Correctly responded (1) in Q36
(0) No (n=76)
(1) Yes (n=43)
Q35 When does a cloture motion ripen?
(1) The same day of session it is filed (n=4)
(2) The second day of session after it is filed (n=84)
(3) The third of day of session after it is filed (n=34)
(4) The fourth day of session after it is filed (n=4)
q35_correct Correctly responded (2) in Q35
(0) No (n=42)
(1) Yes (n=84)


































Chamber	 	 Office	Type	 	 Total	
	 	 Other	 Personal	 Committee	 Party	 	 	House	 	 141	 3,511	 1,185	 143	 	 4,980	Senate	 	 52	 2,459	 871	 123	 	 3,505	Total	 	 193	 5,970	 2,056	 266	 	 8,485		The	process	intentionally	made	no	assumptions	about	individual	staffers	within	an	office	based	on	common	job	titles	to	maximize	the	variety	of	staff.	This	sampling	frame	conservatively	biases	toward	over-coverage	of	prospective	participants	that	may	reasonably	be	thought	of	as	politically	appointed	staff	engaged	in	legislative	operations.	The	ex	ante	expectation	is	that	response	rates	would	be	artificially	deflated	because	we	were	likely	asking	non-legislative	staff	employed	in	“legislative	offices”	to	participate.	We	expect	these	non-legislative	staff	employed	in	“legislative	offices”	to	be	more	likely	to	decline	to	participate	in	survey.		
Fielding	Process,	Pre-registration,	and	Timeline	The	survey	was	offered	exclusively	online	using	the	James	Madison	University	license	to	the	Qualtrics	survey	platform.	The	survey	was	offered	in	three	sequential	data	collection	stages	between	August	and	December.	Each	of	the	8,485	prospective	staffers	were	contacted	directly	by	email	with	a	personalized	link	to	identify	respondents	with	existing	biographical	data	and	to	maintain	strict	confidentiality.	In	addition	to	direct	contacts,	the	research	team	recruited	senior	legislative	staffers	in	our	professional	networks	to	ask	them	to	spread	the	word	as	much	as	they	were	willing,	and	partnered	with	external	validator	groups	including	PopVox,	Congressional	Management	Foundation,	Pew	Charitable	Trusts,	Bipartisan	Policy	Center,	and	the	Stennis	Center	to	promote	participation.		Pre-registration	documentation	was	filed	with	Open	Science	Framework	before	data	collection	was	initiated.	An	addendum	was	added	to	the	pre-registration	while	data	collection	was	ongoing,	but	prior	to	any	data	analysis.		The	fielding	process	was	conducted	over	the	course	of	five	months	in	2017,	including:	1. July	24-31:	Professional	network	and	external	validator	promote	forthcoming	survey.	2. August	4-15:	Initial	invitation	emails	sent	in	batches	of	100.	3. August	9:	Finalized	“Congressional	Capacity	Staff	Survey”	pre-registration	documentation	submitted	for	review.	4. August	13:	Pre-registration	documentation	approved	and	embargoed.	
5. September	21:	Email	response	declines	and	survey	completions	identified,	dropped	from	first	follow-up	contact	list.	6. September	21-October	2:	First	reminder	email	sent.	7. October	30:	Second	round	email	response	declines	and	survey	completions	identified,	dropped	from	second	follow-up	contact	list.	8. October	30-October	31:	Second	and	final	reminder	email	sent.	9. November	4th:	Survey	closed	and	response	data	collected	from	Qualtrics.	10. December	7:	LegiStorm	delivers	biographical	data	for	in-	and	out-samples.	11. December	7-18:	Survey	response	and	Legistorm	biographical	data	processing.	12. December	31:	Pre-registration	embargo	completed.		
Response	Rates	and	Margins	of	Error	The	overall	response	rate	was	5.2	percent	(441	of	8,485).	The	margin	of	error	at	the	95	percent	level	of	confidence	is	4.5	percent.	In	addition,	survey	respondents	were	blocked	for	two	banks	of	questions.			First,	staff	were	asked	a	series	of	questions	about	chamber-specific	parliamentary	procedures,	so	subsample	margins	of	error	for	House	staff	is	5.9	percent	and	Senate	staff	is	7.7	percent	at	the	95	percent	level.			Second,	staff	were	selectively	or	randomly	assigned	to	one	of	three	policy	domain	blocks	for	series	of	questions	about	policy	substance	and	information	source	credibility.	Selections	were	determined	by	a	question	reading,	“Please	indicate	how	frequently	you	work	on	each	of	the	following	issues	for	your	boss	in	a	typical	week	when	Congress	is	in	session:	never,	occasionally,	or	daily,”	for	a	list	of	24	policy	domains	adapted	from	the	Comparative	Agendas	Project	Master	Codebook	(http://www.comparativeagendas.net/pages/master-codebook).4	Domain	specialists	were	selected	into	the	relevant	block	if	they	responded	“daily”	for	“Budget	and	Appropriations,”	for	“Health,”	or	for	“Defense”	and/or	“International	Affairs.”	Respondents	indicating	specialization	in	more	than	one	domain	were	randomly	assigned	to	one	of	their	specialties.	All	other	respondents	were	randomly	assigned	to	one	of	the	three	domains.	The	actual	valid	subsamples	were	30.3	percent	(125	of	412)	in	budget	and	appropriations	(margin	of	error	=	8.7	percent,	95	percent	level),	29.1	percent	(120	of	412)	in	health	policy	(margin	of	error	=	8.9	percent,	95	percent	level),	and	40.5	percent	(167	of	412)	in	national	security	policy	(margin	of	error	=	7.5percent,	95	percent	level);	6.6	percent	of	the	sample	were	missing	responses	to	questions	in	these	blocks.	Questions	for	chamber	and	policy	domain	are	comparable	across	blocks,	so	generally	responses	may	to	be	aggregated	up	to	the	full	sample	to	maximize	statistical	power.		
Post-stratification	Weights	and	Sample	Balance	Post-stratification	survey	weights	were	calculated	using	the	‘survey’	package	in	R	(Lumley	2004,	2017).	For	the	purpose	of	calculating	weights,	respondents	were	counted	as	having	taken	the	survey	for	the	purpose	of	inclusion	in	the	numerator	if	they	if	they	agreed	to	Q68	











































































































































































































































































































Additional Balance Statistics for CCS 2017
In general, unweighted balance is quite good on most covariates. The sample
has approximately the same share of Senate staffers, staffers in Republican offices,
leadership staffers, and staffers of different levels of seniority as a random sample of
non-respondents. However, there are some significant differences. The survey over-
samples committee staffers and legislative staffers, which is not-unexpected given its
frame as a study of congressional capacity. The largest difference between respondents
and non-respondents is in gender: according to LegiStorm’s coding 34.7 % of survey
respondents are women while 50.2 % of the non-respondent sample are women. To
some degree, these imbalances are not independent. Men are over represented among
legislative staffers and committee staffers within Congress.1 The only roles in which
women are over-represented in Congress are communication professionals and admin-
istrative positions such as staff assistants or schedulers, which were under-represented
in the survey responses. This is not entirely unexpected as staffers in these roles act
as gatekeepers for the rest of their offices and as such are likely to receive especially
high volumes of email inquiries and be some of the most selective in who they respond
to.
1. 59 percent of legislative staffers and 54 percent of committee staffers in Congress are men.
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●DW−Nominate Dim1 (for Dems)
DW−Nominate Dim1 (for Reps)
0 0.02 0.04 0.06
Difference in Means (Survey Sample − Random Sample)
Difference in Means (Survey Sample − Random Sample)
Difference in Means (Survey Sample − Random Sample)
95% confidence intervals shown
Covariate balance between respondents and non-respondents is extremely good
on several key career variables. Both groups have nearly identical mean salaries,
number of years working in Congress, and a similar number of total employers during
their time in Congress (a sum of the number of different members of Congress and
committees for which the staffer worked).
In addition to the good partisan balance between respondents’ and non-respondents’
offices, the two samples work for ideologically indistinguishable sets of bosses accord-
ing to their first dimension DW-Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal 2000). Com-
mittee staffers are coded as working for either the committee chair or ranking member
depending on whether they are majority or minority staff.2 While respondents’ bosses
are slightly more conservative than the bosses of non-respondents for both Democrats
2. Committee staff that are assigned to a committee generally rather than the minority or majority
are coded as working for the committee chair.
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and Republicans, the ∼ 0.025 difference in means in their DW-Nominate scores is only
about 1.5 percent of the full range (−0.758, 0.94) of the variable.
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APPENDIX E
Linear Models of main results
Right TT Left TT Univ CRS CBO GAO
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 1.587 1.629 2.333 3.729 3.715 3.084
(0.733) (0.731) (0.767) (0.695) (0.698) (0.814)
Staffer Ideology 0.153 -0.247 -0.21 -0.136 -0.137 -0.191
(0.052) (0.055) (0.057) (0.052) (0.052) (0.058)
Boss Ideology 0.226 -0.091 -0.097 -0.092 -0.091 -0.019
(0.056) (0.058) (0.060) (0.054) (0.055) (0.061)
Log(Salary 0.026 0.033 0.021 -0.073 -0.072 0.016
(0.072) (0.071) (0.074) (0.068) (0.068) (0.080)
Junior 0.497 0.287 0.439 0.288 0.287 -0.052
(0.303) (0.293) (0.301) (0.252) (0.252) (0.281)
Mid-Level 0.47 0.284 0.17 0.312 0.31 0.14
(0.306) (0.292) (0.300) (0.248) (0.248) (0.277)
Senior 0.583 0.123 -0.012 0.254 0.251 0.069
(0.328) (0.311) (0.320) (0.267) (0.267) (0.300)
Health Issue 0.155 0.176 0.195 0.036 0.037 -0.045
(0.093) (0.098) (0.100) (0.092) (0.092) (0.102)
Nat Sec Issue 0.141 0.201 0.019 0.148 0.149 0.03
(0.084) (0.088) (0.090) (0.084) (0.084) (0.094)
IssueKnowledge 0.083 -0.039 0.219 0.371 0.371 0.238
(0.143) (0.149) (0.153) (0.141) (0.141) (0.158)
Committee Office -0.202 -0.019 -0.036 -0.002 -0.003 0.013
(0.099) (0.101) (0.105) (0.095) (0.096) (0.109)
Leadership Office -0.241 0.007 -0.175 -0.09 -0.092 -0.649
(0.178) (0.176) (0.184) (0.167) (0.167) (0.191)
Senate 0.088 0.012 -0.058 -0.019 -0.019 0.055
(0.077) (0.077) (0.081) (0.072) (0.072) (0.082)
IMR -0.386 -0.191 -0.294 0.064 0.063 -0.246
(0.174) (0.171) (0.175) (0.153) (0.153) (0.172)















AIC 608.665 641.490 653.172 642.631 642.668 710.174
Table E.1: Second stage of 2SLS regression models
DV: Trust of information sources
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Right TT Left TT Univ CRS CBO GAO
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 1.788 1.906 2.027 2.249 2.378 1.27
(0.696) (0.670) (0.687) (0.764) (0.727) (0.786)
Staffer Ideology 0.022 -0.224 -0.174 0.013 -0.015 -0.033
(0.050) (0.048) (0.051) (0.056) (0.054) (0.058)
Boss Ideology 0.311 -0.07 0.063 0.001 0.016 0.035
(0.053) (0.051) (0.053) (0.058) (0.056) (0.060)
Log(Salary) -0.018 -0.005 -0.015 -0.087 -0.023 0.026
(0.068) (0.066) (0.067) (0.074) (0.071) (0.077)
Junior 0.035 0.033 0.195 0.643 0.262 0.191
(0.263) (0.251) (0.265) (0.278) (0.268) (0.286)
Mid-Level 0.22 0.182 0.359 0.781 0.376 0.533
(0.261) (0.249) (0.263) (0.273) (0.263) (0.282)
Senior 0.271 0.198 0.265 0.987 0.345 0.573
(0.281) (0.268) (0.282) (0.295) (0.284) (0.304)
Health Issue 0.151 0.049 0.053 -0.122 -0.134 -0.133
(0.091) (0.086) (0.091) (0.100) (0.097) (0.104)
Security Issue 0.137 0.02 -0.09 -0.317 0.016 -0.09
(0.083) (0.079) (0.083) (0.091) (0.088) (0.095)
IssueKnowledge 0.095 -0.064 -0.112 0.33 0.245 0.248
(0.141) (0.134) (0.141) (0.155) (0.150) (0.160)
Committee Office -0.065 -0.04 -0.163 0.161 -0.12 0.345
(0.096) (0.092) (0.096) (0.105) (0.101) (0.108)
Leadership Office -0.554 -0.219 -0.499 -0.302 -0.523 -0.278
(0.155) (0.153) (0.155) (0.169) (0.163) (0.175)
Senate -0.015 0.017 0.088 -0.06 -0.151 0.02
(0.072) (0.070) (0.072) (0.079) (0.076) (0.082)
IMR -0.103 -0.254 -0.138 0.082 0.098 -0.094
(0.162) (0.169) (0.151) (0.161) (0.154) (0.174)















AIC 614.336 581.120 619.256 720.003 692.867 737.181
Table E.2: Second stage of 2SLS regression models
DV: Use of information sources
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Right TT Left TT Univ CRS CBO GAO
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 1.796 1.634 2.226 4.166 4.173 3.345
(0.780) (0.772) (0.809) (0.724) (0.721) (0.859)
StaffLeft -0.267 -0.164 -0.037 -0.188 -0.189 0.045
(0.165) (0.173) (0.179) (0.158) (0.158) (0.179)
Staffer Extremism 0.014 -0.296 -0.207 -0.363 -0.363 -0.346
(0.086) (0.090) (0.100) (0.084) (0.084) (0.094)
BossLeft 0.052 -0.098 -0.251 -0.056 -0.053 -0.062
(0.288) (0.295) (0.305) (0.268) (0.268) (0.306)
BossExtremism 0.192 -0.092 -0.077 -0.213 -0.214 -0.035
(0.150) (0.152) (0.158) (0.140) (0.141) (0.161)
Log(Salary) 0.026 0.036 0.024 -0.08 -0.081 0.004
(0.074) (0.072) (0.075) (0.068) (0.068) (0.081)
Junior 0.493 0.32 0.507 0.307 0.307 -0.013
(0.311) (0.303) (0.312) (0.253) (0.253) (0.286)
Mid-Level 0.468 0.321 0.241 0.336 0.336 0.163
(0.313) (0.300) (0.309) (0.248) (0.248) (0.280)
Senior 0.591 0.153 0.049 0.309 0.31 0.13
(0.336) (0.320) (0.329) (0.267) (0.267) (0.304)
Health Issue 0.148 0.169 0.191 0.035 0.036 -0.042
(0.094) (0.099) (0.102) (0.091) (0.091) (0.103)
Nat Sec Issue 0.138 0.19 0.008 0.153 0.153 0.043
(0.084) (0.089) (0.091) (0.083) (0.083) (0.094)
IssueKnowledge 0.094 -0.041 0.217 0.399 0.399 0.264
(0.143) (0.150) (0.155) (0.140) (0.139) (0.158)
Committee Office -0.214 -0.022 -0.04 -0.031 -0.03 0.003
(0.104) (0.105) (0.108) (0.097) (0.097) (0.112)
Leadership Office -0.221 0.034 -0.157 -0.056 -0.056 -0.623
(0.183) (0.179) (0.188) (0.166) (0.166) (0.194)
Senate 0.092 0.03 -0.03 -0.021 -0.021 0.054
(0.080) (0.080) (0.084) (0.074) (0.074) (0.085)
IMR -0.437 -0.208 -0.303 -0.017 -0.016 -0.284
(0.189) (0.188) (0.190) (0.159) (0.158) (0.182)
StaffLeft:Staffer Extremism -0.178 0.563 0.438 0.368 0.368 0.354
(0.131) (0.138) (0.146) (0.127) (0.127) (0.145)
BossLeft:Boss Extremism -0.386 0.357 0.449 0.298 0.296 0.071
(0.267) (0.273) (0.283) (0.249) (0.249) (0.286)















AIC 611.211 647.077 658.904 635.465 635.421 711.338
Table E.3: Second stage of 2SLS regression models with interactions
DV: Trust in information sources
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Right TT Left TT Univ CRS CBO GAO
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 1.825 1.876 1.907 2.427 2.761 1.519
(0.727) (0.700) (0.719) (0.786) (0.744) (0.817)
StaffLeft 0.049 0.147 -0.013 -0.212 -0.168 -0.038
(0.154) (0.146) (0.156) (0.167) (0.160) (0.172)
Staffer Extremism -0.04 -0.142 -0.143 -0.053 -0.227 -0.06
(0.083) (0.079) (0.084) (0.093) (0.089) (0.096)
BossLeft 0.115 0.016 0.127 -0.078 -0.166 -0.333
(0.273) (0.268) (0.275) (0.293) (0.282) (0.303)
Boss Extremism 0.367 -0.11 0.12 -0.094 -0.088 -0.166
(0.142) (0.138) (0.142) (0.153) (0.148) (0.161)
Log(Salary) -0.025 -0.003 -0.013 -0.087 -0.031 0.029
(0.069) (0.066) (0.068) (0.074) (0.070) (0.077)
Junior 0.058 -0.004 0.195 0.647 0.307 0.18
(0.272) (0.258) (0.274) (0.285) (0.271) (0.293)
Mid-Level 0.223 0.146 0.352 0.801 0.42 0.546
(0.268) (0.255) (0.270) (0.278) (0.264) (0.287)
Senior 0.298 0.16 0.251 1.006 0.423 0.59
(0.288) (0.275) (0.290) (0.300) (0.285) (0.309)
Health Issue 0.152 0.061 0.048 -0.129 -0.14 -0.124
(0.092) (0.088) (0.093) (0.101) (0.097) (0.106)
Nat Sec Issue 0.147 0.028 -0.09 -0.332 0.012 -0.098
(0.084) (0.080) (0.084) (0.092) (0.089) (0.096)
IssueKnowledge 0.109 -0.071 -0.121 0.344 0.278 0.266
(0.142) (0.135) (0.143) (0.156) (0.149) (0.161)
Committee Office -0.055 -0.038 -0.15 0.146 -0.146 0.309
(0.099) (0.096) (0.098) (0.108) (0.103) (0.112)
Leadership Office -0.556 -0.205 -0.502 -0.322 -0.54 -0.288
(0.156) (0.154) (0.157) (0.171) (0.162) (0.178)
Senate -0.022 0.002 0.084 -0.049 -0.137 0.029
(0.075) (0.073) (0.075) (0.082) (0.078) (0.086)
IMR -0.098 -0.249 -0.112 0.044 0.027 -0.168
(0.173) (0.181) (0.161) (0.170) (0.163) (0.183)
staff_left:staff_extremism -0.082 0.366 0.344 0.081 0.119 0.104
(0.129) (0.123) (0.131) (0.143) (0.136) (0.148)
boss_left:boss_extremism -0.735 0.077 -0.224 0.156 0.178 0.238
(0.252) (0.247) (0.254) (0.274) (0.263) (0.284)















AIC 620.737 586.346 626.658 724.982 688.924 742.442
Table E.4: Second stage of 2SLS regression models with interactions
DV: Use of information sources
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APPENDIX F
Study 1 Experiment Question Wording
Legislative staff like yourself rely on information from a variety of sources.
Suppose you received a request for a meeting with a \${e://Field/ident}.
The individual is asking your office to \${e://Field/action}.
They offered to give your office \${e://Field/info}.
ident Factor 1: source identity
(1) constitutent
(2) donor to your Member’s election campaign
(3) lobbyist representing a large, national business
(4) lobbyist representing a national consumer group





action Factor 2: requested legislative action from source
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(1) propose a new bill
(2) stop a bill currently under consideration
action_ short factor 2
(0) Propose (n=279)
(1) Stop (n=270)
info Factor 3: information provided to support legislative action request
(1) evidence of how their proposal would help jobs and employment in
your constituency from a center-left think-tank.
(2) evidence of how their proposal would help jobs and employment in
your constituency from a center-right think-tank.
(3) evidence of how their proposal would help jobs and employment in
your constituency from an analysis they conducted.
(4) polling from your constituency that shows support for their position
Info_ short factor 3
(0) Left tank (n=152)
(1) Right tank (n=136)
(2) Self (n=123)
(3) Polling (n=138)
takemeeting: How likely would you be to take a meeting with this individual?
(1) Very unlikely (n=35)
(2) Somewhat unlikely (n=31)
(3) Neither likely nor unlikely (n=64)
(4) Somewhat likely (n=151)
(5) Very likely (n=155)
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useinfo: How likely would you be to use the information this individual
provided to
prepare recommendations for your boss?
(1) Very unlikely (n=35)
(2) Somewhat unlikely (n=42)
(3) Neither likely nor unlikely (n=183)
(4) Somewhat likely (n=150)
(5) Very likely (n=26)
recommendtoboss: How likely would you be to side with this individual in
your recommendation to your boss?
(1) Very unlikely (n=25)
(2) Somewhat unlikely (n=45)
(3) Neither likely nor unlikely (n=306)
(4) Somewhat likely (n=55)
(5) Very likely (n=5)
representativeness: How representative do you think this individual is
of your district or state’s opinion as a whole?
(1) Very unlikely
(2) Somewhat unlikely (n=63)
(3) Neither likely nor unlikely (n=222)
(4) Somewhat likely (n=115)
(5) Very likely (n=10)
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APPENDIX G
Descriptive Patterns for Legislative Action
Responses
Previous legislative staff experiments measure the construct of access to infer in-
fluence. Our design uses three sequenced questions to differentiate access (variable:
takemeeting) with more costly or difficult legislative actions (variables: useinfo and
recommendtoboss). All three use five-point Likert-type responses anchored on the like-
lihood of taking the action. Table G.3 presents response frequencies for each question
as conditioned on the previous response. For ease of display, we have collapsed “Very
[un]likey" and “Somewhat [un]likely" response categories to a tripartite variable. All
raw frequencies may be found in the 2017 CCS codebook.
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Take Meeting Use Info Recommend to Boss Frequency
Neither Neither Neither 41
Neither Neither Very/Somewhat likely 3
Neither Neither Very/Somewhat unlikely 2
Neither Very/Somewhat likely Neither 8
Neither Very/Somewhat likely Very/Somewhat unlikely 2
Neither Very/Somewhat unlikely Neither 4
Neither Very/Somewhat unlikely Very/Somewhat unlikely 4
Very/Somewhat likely Neither Neither 100
Very/Somewhat likely Neither Very/Somewhat likely 6
Very/Somewhat likely Neither Very/Somewhat unlikely 8
Very/Somewhat likely Very/Somewhat likely Neither 93
Very/Somewhat likely Very/Somewhat likely Very/Somewhat likely 43
Very/Somewhat likely Very/Somewhat likely Very/Somewhat unlikely 14
Very/Somewhat likely Very/Somewhat unlikely Neither 24
Very/Somewhat likely Very/Somewhat unlikely Very/Somewhat likely 2
Very/Somewhat likely Very/Somewhat unlikely Very/Somewhat unlikely 16
Very/Somewhat unlikely Neither Neither 21
Very/Somewhat unlikely Neither Very/Somewhat unlikely 2
Very/Somewhat unlikely Very/Somewhat likely Neither 11
Very/Somewhat unlikely Very/Somewhat likely Very/Somewhat likely 3
Very/Somewhat unlikely Very/Somewhat likely Very/Somewhat unlikely 2
Very/Somewhat unlikely Very/Somewhat unlikely Neither 4
Very/Somewhat unlikely Very/Somewhat unlikely Very/Somewhat likely 3
Very/Somewhat unlikely Very/Somewhat unlikely Very/Somewhat unlikely 20
Table G.3: Response counts to the three action dependent variables
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APPENDIX H
Study 1 Analysis of Variance and Pairwise T-tests
Here we report the results of the analyses of variance (ANOVA) and pairwise
t-tests between sets of treatment conditions that we originally pre-registered. Antici-
pating a significantly higher response rate, we expected to have the statistical power
necessary to conduct pairwise tests between the treatment conditions. Because of
our lower than anticipated sample size, we have chosen to test our pre-registered
hypotheses in terms of average marginal effects of each component we manipulated.
However, for the sake of transparency, in this appendix we report the ANOVA and
pairwise t-test analysis that we pre-registered. It is important to note that these tests
are considerably under-powered to adequately draw inferences.
Table H.1 displays ANOVA results for all four of our dependent variables in the full
sample of staffers. The general pattern here is one of null results, with a few notable
exceptions: 1) The likelihood of staffers using information differs by the identity of the
petitioner, 2) the likelihood that a staffer will side with a petitioner varies depending
on what action the petitioner is requesting, and 3) how representative a staffer finds
a petitioner varies depending on the identity of the petitioner and the information
they provide. The direction and magnitude of these effects is shown in the AMCE
estimates we provide in the main text.
173
Dep Var Term Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Statistic P Value
Take Meeting ident 3.00 0.44 0.15 1.58 0.19
action 1.00 0.03 0.03 0.37 0.54
info 3.00 0.07 0.02 0.23 0.87
ident:action 3.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.99
ident:info 9.00 0.65 0.07 0.77 0.64
action:info 3.00 0.30 0.10 1.06 0.36
ident:action:info 9.00 0.38 0.04 0.45 0.91
Residuals 404.00 37.70 0.09
Use Info ident 3.00 0.79 0.26 4.45 0.00
action 1.00 0.05 0.05 0.90 0.34
info 3.00 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.95
ident:action 3.00 0.04 0.01 0.21 0.89
ident:info 9.00 0.65 0.07 1.22 0.28
action:info 3.00 0.06 0.02 0.34 0.79
ident:action:info 9.00 0.60 0.07 1.13 0.34
Residuals 404.00 24.02 0.06
Recommend to Boss ident 3.00 0.12 0.04 1.26 0.29
action 1.00 0.14 0.14 4.71 0.03
info 3.00 0.11 0.04 1.17 0.32
ident:action 3.00 0.13 0.04 1.41 0.24
ident:info 9.00 0.44 0.05 1.59 0.12
action:info 3.00 0.02 0.01 0.26 0.85
ident:action:info 9.00 0.34 0.04 1.22 0.28
Residuals 404.00 12.43 0.03
Representativeness ident 3.00 0.56 0.19 4.19 0.01
action 1.00 0.02 0.02 0.44 0.51
info 3.00 0.37 0.12 2.73 0.04
ident:action 3.00 0.14 0.05 1.05 0.37
ident:info 9.00 0.36 0.04 0.90 0.52
action:info 3.00 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.92
ident:action:info 9.00 0.41 0.05 1.02 0.43
Residuals 403.00 18.04 0.04
Table H.1: Factorial ANOVA using the full sample of respondents
In Table H.2 we show ANOVA results for all four of our dependent variables in just
the sample of staffers working in Democratic offices. Once again, we see no significant
relationships between any of the manipulated factors and the reported likelihood of a
staffer to take a meeting with the petitioner. However, in this partisan subsample we
observe more pronounced effects for identity and information source. The identity of
the petitioner and the source information they provide do effect the likelihood that a
staffer will use the information provided as they craft recommendations for their boss.
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Similarly, the identity of the petitioner and the information source they present are
associated with different likelihoods that a staffer will side with the petitioner in their
recommendations to their boss and that they will view the petitioner as representative
of district/state constituents.
Dep Var Term Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Statistic P Value
Take Meeting ident 3.00 0.41 0.14 1.74 0.16
action 1.00 0.03 0.03 0.36 0.55
info 3.00 0.13 0.04 0.53 0.66
ident:action 3.00 0.11 0.04 0.45 0.72
ident:info 9.00 0.84 0.09 1.20 0.30
action:info 3.00 0.13 0.04 0.53 0.66
ident:action:info 9.00 0.36 0.04 0.51 0.86
Residuals 176.00 13.82 0.08
Use Info ident 3.00 0.75 0.25 5.18 0.00
action 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.31 0.58
info 3.00 0.49 0.16 3.40 0.02
ident:action 3.00 0.06 0.02 0.38 0.77
ident:info 9.00 0.75 0.08 1.72 0.09
action:info 3.00 0.08 0.03 0.56 0.64
ident:action:info 9.00 0.41 0.05 0.95 0.48
Residuals 176.00 8.51 0.05
Recommend to Boss ident 3.00 0.30 0.10 5.02 0.00
action 1.00 0.09 0.09 4.55 0.03
info 3.00 0.61 0.20 10.17 0.00
ident:action 3.00 0.11 0.04 1.81 0.15
ident:info 9.00 0.11 0.01 0.62 0.78
action:info 3.00 0.03 0.01 0.49 0.69
ident:action:info 9.00 0.39 0.04 2.14 0.03
Residuals 176.00 3.53 0.02
Representativeness ident 3.00 0.31 0.10 3.17 0.03
action 1.00 0.04 0.04 1.18 0.28
info 3.00 0.25 0.08 2.54 0.06
ident:action 3.00 0.07 0.02 0.75 0.52
ident:info 9.00 0.39 0.04 1.32 0.23
action:info 3.00 0.06 0.02 0.58 0.63
ident:action:info 9.00 0.18 0.02 0.60 0.80
Residuals 175.00 5.77 0.03
Table H.2: Factorial ANOVA of Respondents in Democratic Offices
Finally, in Table H.3 we show ANOVA results for all four of our dependent vari-
ables in just the sample of staffers working in Republican offices. Once again, we
see no significant relationships between the any of the manipulated factors and the
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reported likelihood of a staffer to take a meeting with the petitioner. We observe
particularly pronounced effects for the information source in how likely a republican
staffer is to side with the petitioner as they make recommendations to their boss. We
also find that identity, information source, and the interaction of all three factors are
significantly associated with how representative a republican staffer perceives a con-
stituent. A comparison of these individual conditions are shown in table H.4, which
presents the results of pairwise t-tests.
Dep Var Term Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Statistic P Value
Take Meeting ident 3.00 0.23 0.08 0.69 0.56
action 1.00 0.15 0.15 1.35 0.25
info 3.00 0.18 0.06 0.56 0.64
ident:action 3.00 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.95
ident:info 9.00 0.67 0.07 0.68 0.73
action:info 3.00 0.34 0.11 1.03 0.38
ident:action:info 9.00 0.59 0.07 0.60 0.80
Residuals 196.00 21.48 0.11
Use Info ident 3.00 0.24 0.08 1.19 0.31
action 1.00 0.04 0.04 0.62 0.43
info 3.00 0.47 0.16 2.37 0.07
ident:action 3.00 0.07 0.02 0.33 0.80
ident:info 9.00 0.30 0.03 0.50 0.87
action:info 3.00 0.42 0.14 2.13 0.10
ident:action:info 9.00 0.67 0.07 1.12 0.35
Residuals 196.00 12.98 0.07
Recommend to Boss ident 3.00 0.04 0.01 0.39 0.76
action 1.00 0.05 0.05 1.59 0.21
info 3.00 0.84 0.28 8.31 0.00
ident:action 3.00 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.96
ident:info 9.00 0.56 0.06 1.84 0.06
action:info 3.00 0.13 0.04 1.30 0.27
ident:action:info 9.00 0.29 0.03 0.94 0.49
Residuals 196.00 6.63 0.03
Representativeness ident 3.00 0.35 0.12 2.46 0.06
action 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.94
info 3.00 1.60 0.53 11.14 0.00
ident:action 3.00 0.05 0.02 0.33 0.80
ident:info 9.00 0.45 0.05 1.04 0.41
action:info 3.00 0.09 0.03 0.60 0.62
ident:action:info 9.00 0.94 0.10 2.18 0.02
Residuals 196.00 9.38 0.05
Table H.3: Factorial ANOVA of Respondents in Republican Offices
176
The 4× 2× 4 factorial design of this survey experiment yielded 32 possible treat-
ment conditions. There are, therefore, 992 treatment conditions that can be tested
pairwise for each of four dependent variables, which results in a total of 3,968 pair-
wise tests on the full data set. However, because we are interested in differential
effects of identity and information source among Democratic or Republican staffers,
we also need to conduct these test in partisan sub-samples of staffers. All told, this
amounts to 11,904 pairwise t-tests. Of course, when testing such a high number of
hypotheses it is extremely important to account for multiple testing. Here we correct
for false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995). Of these nearly twelve thou-
sand pairwise tests, there were 828 pairs that were statistically distinguishable from
one another at a generous α = 0.10 level, prior to correcting for the false discover
rate in this large number of tests. After accounting for multiple testing, 46 pairs are
statistically significant at α = 0.10 according to their false discovery rate corrected
p-value. These pairs are listed in the Table H.4 below.
These results are broadly in line with the average marginal component affects
we report in our main analysis. We observe significant pairwise differences only
in the dependent variables for a staffer recommending that their boss side with the
petitioner, and for the staffer’s perception of how representative a petitioner is of their
boss’s constituency. And, in particular, we observe these differences in the partisan
sub populations when at least one of the sources of information being offered by the
petitioner has a clear ideological valence. Most frequently, the two conditions with
significantly different means are conditions with opposite source valences.
The clear implication of these (mis)alignment between the ideology information
source provided by the petitioner and the partisanship of the staffer responding have a
large effect on the the likelihood of the staffer to recommend siding with the petitioner
or viewing the petitioner as representative of their boss’s constituency.
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Condition 1 > or < Condition 2 Dep Var Subset Adj P Value
Constit, Stop, RightTT < Constit, Propose, LeftTT Recommend Dems 0.10
Constit, Stop, RightTT < Constit, Stop, LeftTT Recommend Dems 0.10
Constit, Stop, RightTT < Constit, Stop, Polls Recommend Dems 0.10
ConsLob, Propose, LeftTT > BizLob, Propose, Polls Recommend Dems 0.10
ConsLob, Propose, LeftTT > BizLob, Propose, RightTT Recommend Dems 0.03
ConsLob, Propose, LeftTT > BizLob, Stop, RightTT Recommend Dems 0.10
ConsLob, Propose, LeftTT > Constit, Stop, RightTT Recommend Dems 0.00
ConsLob, Propose, RightTT < ConsLob, Propose, LeftTT Recommend Dems 0.04
ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT > Constit, Stop, RightTT Recommend Dems 0.02
ConsLob, Stop, OwnAnalysis > Constit, Stop, RightTT Recommend Dems 0.09
ConsLob, Stop, Polls > BizLob, Propose, RightTT Recommend Dems 0.09
ConsLob, Stop, Polls > Constit, Stop, RightTT Recommend Dems 0.01
ConsLob, Stop, Polls > ConsLob, Propose, RightTT Recommend Dems 0.10
ConsLob, Stop, RightTT < ConsLob, Propose, LeftTT Recommend Dems 0.10
Donor, Propose, RightTT < BizLob, Stop, LeftTT Recommend Dems 0.10
Donor, Propose, RightTT < Constit, Propose, LeftTT Recommend Dems 0.05
Donor, Propose, RightTT < Constit, Stop, LeftTT Recommend Dems 0.06
Donor, Propose, RightTT < Constit, Stop, Polls Recommend Dems 0.05
Donor, Propose, RightTT < ConsLob, Propose, LeftTT Recommend Dems 0.00
Donor, Propose, RightTT < ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT Recommend Dems 0.00
Donor, Propose, RightTT < ConsLob, Stop, OwnAnalysis Recommend Dems 0.06
Donor, Propose, RightTT < ConsLob, Stop, Polls Recommend Dems 0.00
Donor, Stop, OwnAnalysis < ConsLob, Propose, LeftTT Recommend Dems 0.10
Donor, Stop, RightTT < ConsLob, Propose, LeftTT Recommend Dems 0.10
BizLob, Stop, RightTT > BizLob, Propose, LeftTT Recommend Reps 0.02
Constit, Propose, Polls < BizLob, Stop, RightTT Recommend Reps 0.10
Constit, Propose, RightTT > BizLob, Propose, LeftTT Recommend Reps 0.08
Donor, Propose, Polls > BizLob, Propose, LeftTT Recommend Reps 0.06
ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT < BizLob, Propose, Polls Representative Reps 0.10
ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT < BizLob, Propose, RightTT Representative Reps 0.10
ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT < BizLob, Stop, LeftTT Representative Reps 0.10
ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT < BizLob, Stop, RightTT Representative Reps 0.00
ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT < Constit, Propose, OwnAnalysis Representative Reps 0.00
ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT < Constit, Propose, RightTT Representative Reps 0.00
ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT < Constit, Stop, LeftTT Representative Reps 0.08
ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT < Constit, Stop, Polls Representative Reps 0.03
ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT < Constit, Stop, RightTT Representative Reps 0.00
ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT < ConsLob, Propose, Polls Representative Reps 0.04
ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT < ConsLob, Propose, RightTT Representative Reps 0.01
ConsLob, Stop, OwnAnalysis > ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT Representative Reps 0.04
ConsLob, Stop, RightTT < ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT Representative Reps 0.01
Donor, Propose, LeftTT < Constit, Stop, RightTT Representative Reps 0.10
Donor, Propose, OwnAnalysis > ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT Representative Reps 0.06
Donor, Propose, Polls > ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT Representative Reps 0.04
Donor, Propose, RightTT > ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT Representative Reps 0.00
Donor, Stop, Polls < ConsLob, Stop, LeftTT Representative Reps 0.05
Note: Conditions are given as an (Identity, Action, Information provided) tuple. Identities: Constit = Constituent,
ConsLob = Consumer Lobbyist, BizLob = Business Lobbyist. Actions: Propose = Propose Bill, Stop = Stop Bill.
Information: LeftTT = information about jobs and employment from a center-left think tank, Right TT =
information about jobs and employment from a center-right think tank, Own Analysis = information about jobs
and employment from an analysis they (Identity) conducted, and Polls = polling about the issue in your boss’s
constituency. P values are corrected for false discovery rate.
Table H.4: Pairwise T-tests between treatment conditions which are signif-
icant at α = .10
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APPENDIX I
Full Models for Main Effects, Study 1
Models in this appendix correspond to the coefficients shown in Figures 2-5 in the
main text. All models are Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the Average Marginal
Component Effect of the three factors randomized in the 2017 Congressional Capacity
Survey lobbying vignette experiment. Models are estimated with post-stratification
weights and the standard errors shown are HC3 heteroskedastic-consistent standard
errors as Long and Ervin 2000 recommend.
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AMCE via OLS
All Staff Dem Staff Rep Staff
Donor −0.066 −0.112∗∗ −0.009
(0.045) (0.057) (0.073)
Business Lobbyist −0.028 −0.063 0.005
(0.041) (0.055) (0.063)
Consumer Lobbyist −0.076∗ −0.069 −0.059
(0.045) (0.060) (0.066)
Stop Bill 0.020 −0.025 0.064
(0.031) (0.041) (0.046)
Policy Evidence from own analysis 0.009 −0.041 0.056
(0.045) (0.063) (0.066)
Policy Evidence from Center-Right Think-Tank −0.023 −0.070 0.017
(0.043) (0.058) (0.063)
Policy Evidence from Center-Left Think-Tank −0.015 −0.023 −0.021
(0.041) (0.052) (0.062)
Constant 0.749∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.053) (0.071)
N 436 208 228
R-squared 0.014 0.036 0.024
Adj. R-squared −0.002 0.002 −0.008
Residual Std. Error 0.302 (df = 428) 0.276 (df = 200) 0.324 (df = 220)
F Statistic 0.851 (df = 7; 428) 1.058 (df = 7; 200) 0.757 (df = 7; 220)
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1
Table I.1: How likely would you be to take a meeting with this individual?
AMCE via OLS
All Staff Dem Staff Rep Staff
Donor −0.111∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.052
(0.036) (0.043) (0.057)
Business Lobbyist −0.011 −0.061 0.036
(0.032) (0.044) (0.047)
Consumer Lobbyist −0.038 −0.064 −0.003
(0.036) (0.051) (0.052)
Stop Bill 0.021 0.020 0.038
(0.026) (0.033) (0.039)
Policy Evidence from own analysis 0.006 −0.022 0.034
(0.035) (0.048) (0.051)
Policy Evidence from Center-Right Think-Tank 0.016 −0.058 0.083∗
(0.034) (0.050) (0.048)
Policy Evidence from Center-Left Think-Tank 0.017 0.075∗ −0.038
(0.035) (0.044) (0.053)
Constant 0.569∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.040) (0.056)
N 436 208 228
R-squared 0.033 0.114 0.049
Adj. R-squared 0.017 0.083 0.019
Residual Std. Error 0.243 (df = 428) 0.221 (df = 200) 0.256 (df = 220)
F Statistic 2.095∗∗ (df = 7; 428) 3.668∗∗∗ (df = 7; 200) 1.630 (df = 7; 220)
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1
Table I.2: How likely would you be to use the information this individual
provided to prepare recommendations for your boss?
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AMCE via OLS
All Staff Dem Staff Rep Staff
Donor −0.037 −0.048 −0.001
(0.025) (0.032) (0.038)
Business Lobbyist −0.035 −0.046 −0.020
(0.023) (0.028) (0.032)
Consumer Lobbyist −0.011 0.042 −0.030
(0.027) (0.036) (0.037)
Stop Bill 0.038∗∗ 0.043∗ 0.045∗
(0.018) (0.022) (0.026)
Policy Evidence from own analysis −0.023 −0.035 −0.016
(0.021) (0.025) (0.032)
Policy Evidence from Center-Right Think-Tank −0.024 −0.121∗∗∗ 0.059∗
(0.024) (0.036) (0.031)
Policy Evidence from Center-Left Think-Tank −0.044∗ 0.025 −0.107∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.024) (0.041)
Constant 0.508∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.037)
N 436 208 228
R-squared 0.027 0.194 0.110
Adj. R-squared 0.011 0.166 0.081
Residual Std. Error 0.177 (df = 428) 0.144 (df = 200) 0.186 (df = 220)
F Statistic 1.690 (df = 7; 428) 6.892∗∗∗ (df = 7; 200) 3.866∗∗∗ (df = 7; 220)
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1
Table I.3: How likely would you be to side with this individual in your
recommendation to your boss?
AMCE via OLS
All Staff Dem Staff Rep Staff
Donor −0.064∗∗ −0.081∗∗ −0.026
(0.030) (0.039) (0.046)
Business Lobbyist −0.087∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.066
(0.030) (0.039) (0.043)
Consumer Lobbyist −0.096∗∗∗ −0.073 −0.102∗∗
(0.033) (0.045) (0.046)
Stop Bill 0.014 0.030 0.015
(0.021) (0.028) (0.030)
Policy Evidence from own analysis −0.008 0.0002 −0.016
(0.028) (0.036) (0.042)
Policy Evidence from Center-Right Think-Tank 0.051∗ −0.025 0.119∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.042) (0.036)
Policy Evidence from Center-Left Think-Tank −0.028 0.069∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.034) (0.042)
Constant 0.563∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.036) (0.046)
N 435 207 228
R-squared 0.048 0.085 0.152
Adj. R-squared 0.032 0.053 0.125
Residual Std. Error 0.211 (df = 427) 0.180 (df = 199) 0.223 (df = 220)
F Statistic 3.053∗∗∗ (df = 7; 427) 2.654∗∗ (df = 7; 199) 5.626∗∗∗ (df = 7; 220)
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1
Table I.4: How representative do you think this individual is of your district
or state’s opinion as a whole?
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APPENDIX J
Subgroup Analysis Variable Construction
In this appendix we detail the variable construction for the factors analyzed in
the subgroup analysis.
Ideology : We measure Staffer Ideology as a latent variable derived from a five
question battery taken from Heinz 1993, validated by Esterling 2018. We use the
items in this battery to create an ideal point estimate for each staffer using a Partial
Credit Model (PCM), a Rasch model extension of item-response theory (IRT) that
is appropriate for ordinal variables (Fischer and Molenaar 2012; Mair and Hatzinger
2007).1 We standardize this ideology score to have a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1. For more information on question wording see Appendix C.
To classify staffers as moderate or extreme ideologues, we take the absolute value
of this scale, and then split it at the median. Staffers above the median we consider
“extreme" and those below the median we consider “moderate."
Party Identification: We ask staffers the standard American National Election
Study partisanship question battery, reproduced in Appendix B. The results of these
questions were combined into the seven category party identification scale shown
below:
1. Results were substantively the same using a simple additive index of the ideology battery
question items.
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partyid: 7-point party identification derived from Q21, Q23, Q25, and Q27
(0) Strong Democrat (n=120)
(1) Democrat (n=19)
(2) Lean Democrat (n=25)
(3) Independent / Independent (n=3)
(4) Lean Republican (n=22)
(5) Republican (n=44)
(6) Strong Republican (n=96)
Staffers who answered that they would call themselves strong Republicans or
Democrats are classified as “strong partisans" and staffers that identify as Democrats/
Republicans or leaners are classified as “weak partisans" for our subgroup analysis.
Knowledge: Staffers were asked four procedural knowledge questions specifically
tailored to the chamber in which they worked, reproduced in Appendix B for reference.
A knowledge scale was constructed by summing the number of correct answers that
a staffer gave on the procedural knowledge batteries. Staffers were categorized as
“knowledgeable" or “less knowledgeable" based on whether they were above or below
the median value on this scale.
Chamber : Staffers are categorized according to whether they work for offices in the
House or the Senate. Staff employed by joint committees were arbitrarily classified
by their physical office location. This data comes from LegiStorm, the provider of
our sampling frame.
Office Type: Staffers are categorized according to whether they work in members’
of Congress personal offices, committee offices, or in party leadership offices. This
data comes from LegiStorm, the provider of our sampling frame.
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APPENDIX K
Subgroup Analysis Full Models
Models in this appendix correspond to the coefficients shown in Figure 6 in the
main text. All models are Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the Average Marginal
Component Effect of the three factors randomized in the 2017 Congressional Capacity
Survey lobbying vignette experiment. Models are estimated with post-stratification
weights and the standard errors shown are HC3 heteroskedastic-consistent standard
errors as Long and Ervin 2000 recommend.
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How likely would you be to take a meeting with this individual?
AMCE via OLS
Personal Cmmte/Ldr Moderate Extreme Str Partisan
Donor −0.015 −0.187∗ −0.093 −0.028 −0.083
(0.052) (0.097) (0.065) (0.073) (0.073)
Business Lobbyist −0.033 −0.030 −0.005 −0.043 0.006
(0.048) (0.088) (0.061) (0.067) (0.064)
Consumer Lobbyist −0.076 −0.098 −0.099 −0.035 −0.045
(0.052) (0.091) (0.065) (0.072) (0.069)
Stop Bill −0.010 0.108∗∗ −0.014 0.066 0.029
(0.037) (0.052) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045)
Policy Evidence from own analysis −0.041 0.126 −0.033 0.081 0.029
(0.053) (0.091) (0.066) (0.069) (0.065)
Policy Evidence from Non-aligned TT −0.0005 0.024 −0.007 0.044 −0.014
(0.048) (0.084) (0.055) (0.068) (0.065)
Policy Evidence from Aligned TT −0.077 0.054 −0.022 −0.048 −0.080
(0.051) (0.082) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063)
Constant 0.791∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.097) (0.057) (0.077) (0.068)
N 296 140 219 195 214
R-squared 0.021 0.092 0.028 0.037 0.033
Adj. R-squared −0.003 0.044 −0.005 0.001 −0.0004









F Statistic 0.876(df = 7; 288)
1.913∗
(df = 7; 132)
0.860
(df = 7; 211)
1.032
(df = 7; 187)
0.989
(df = 7; 206)
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
Table K.1: Take meeting full models part 1
How likely would you be to take a meeting with this individual?
AMCE via OLS
Wk Partisan Senate House Less Knwl More Knwl
Donor −0.024 −0.077 −0.080 −0.070 −0.053
(0.097) (0.075) (0.057) (0.064) (0.075)
Business Lobbyist −0.015 −0.014 −0.050 −0.028 −0.024
(0.088) (0.067) (0.051) (0.060) (0.065)
Consumer Lobbyist −0.061 −0.017 −0.122∗∗ −0.062 −0.091
(0.106) (0.073) (0.056) (0.065) (0.074)
Stop Bill 0.085 −0.011 0.060 0.011 0.069
(0.070) (0.051) (0.038) (0.044) (0.050)
Policy Evidence from own analysis 0.00001 −0.046 0.023 −0.012 0.109
(0.087) (0.079) (0.053) (0.063) (0.067)
Policy Evidence from Non-aligned TT −0.00004 0.039 −0.033 −0.011 0.015
(0.093) (0.069) (0.053) (0.060) (0.075)
Policy Evidence from Aligned TT 0.016 0.027 −0.098∗ −0.083 0.020
(0.090) (0.070) (0.054) (0.060) (0.073)
Constant 0.696∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.071) (0.059) (0.062) (0.080)
N 111 171 265 226 158
R-squared 0.029 0.016 0.053 0.023 0.041
Adj. R-squared −0.036 −0.026 0.028 −0.008 −0.004









F Statistic 0.447(df = 7; 103)
0.385
(df = 7; 163)
2.074∗∗
(df = 7; 257)
0.749
(df = 7; 218)
0.912
(df = 7; 150)
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
Table K.2: Take meeting full models part 2
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How likely would you be to use the
information this individual provided to prepare
recommendations for your boss?
AMCE via OLS
Personal Cmmte/Ldr Moderate Extreme Str Partisan
Donor −0.149∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.131∗∗∗ −0.103∗ −0.137∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.063) (0.047) (0.058) (0.052)
Business Lobbyist −0.013 0.020 −0.034 0.002 −0.046
(0.038) (0.056) (0.045) (0.054) (0.047)
Consumer Lobbyist −0.052 0.021 −0.022 −0.072 −0.053
(0.041) (0.065) (0.049) (0.060) (0.047)
Stop Bill −0.008 0.097∗∗ −0.010 0.072∗ 0.067∗
(0.030) (0.046) (0.037) (0.040) (0.036)
Policy Evidence from own analysis 0.008 −0.0003 0.036 −0.032 −0.019
(0.043) (0.060) (0.046) (0.056) (0.048)
Policy Evidence from Non-aligned TT 0.123∗∗∗ −0.035 0.109∗∗ 0.054 0.072
(0.038) (0.063) (0.047) (0.053) (0.049)
Policy Evidence from Aligned TT −0.037 −0.101 0.007 −0.091∗ −0.115∗∗
(0.042) (0.069) (0.055) (0.052) (0.053)
Constant 0.590∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.066) (0.046) (0.058) (0.047)
N 296 140 219 195 214
R-squared 0.116 0.057 0.080 0.090 0.120
Adj. R-squared 0.095 0.007 0.050 0.055 0.090











(df = 7; 288)
1.136
(df = 7; 132)
2.628∗∗
(df = 7; 211)
2.626∗∗
(df = 7; 187)
4.022∗∗∗
(df = 7; 206)
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
Table K.3: Use information full models part 1
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How likely would you be to use the
information this individual provided to prepare
recommendations for your boss?
AMCE via OLS
Wk Partisan Senate House Less Knwl More Knwl
Donor −0.133∗ −0.089 −0.117∗∗∗ −0.087∗ −0.168∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.058) (0.044) (0.045) (0.065)
Business Lobbyist −0.009 −0.036 0.011 −0.030 −0.044
(0.074) (0.052) (0.038) (0.048) (0.051)
Consumer Lobbyist 0.025 0.00000 −0.050 −0.053 −0.035
(0.088) (0.056) (0.046) (0.049) (0.064)
Stop Bill 0.009 0.076∗ 0.008 0.019 0.045
(0.060) (0.040) (0.031) (0.034) (0.044)
Policy Evidence from own analysis 0.092 −0.014 −0.002 −0.056 0.143∗∗
(0.075) (0.055) (0.044) (0.046) (0.056)
Policy Evidence from Non-aligned TT 0.149∗ 0.179∗∗∗ −0.002 0.042 0.163∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.051) (0.040) (0.047) (0.056)
Policy Evidence from Aligned TT 0.083 0.048 −0.120∗∗∗ −0.094∗ 0.057
(0.079) (0.059) (0.045) (0.052) (0.057)
Constant 0.538∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.052) (0.047) (0.048) (0.063)
N 111 171 265 226 158
R-squared 0.094 0.134 0.097 0.068 0.139
Adj. R-squared 0.032 0.097 0.073 0.038 0.099









F Statistic 1.520(df = 7; 103)
3.617∗∗∗
(df = 7; 163)
3.953∗∗∗
(df = 7; 257)
2.276∗∗
(df = 7; 218)
3.470∗∗∗
(df = 7; 150)
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
Table K.4: Use information full models part 2
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How likely would you be to
side with this individual in your recommendation to your boss?
AMCE via OLS
Personal Cmmte/Ldr Moderate Extreme Str Partisan
Donor −0.045 0.016 −0.024 −0.053 −0.036
(0.027) (0.054) (0.034) (0.038) (0.037)
Business Lobbyist −0.040 −0.003 −0.038 −0.042 −0.035
(0.025) (0.045) (0.031) (0.038) (0.029)
Consumer Lobbyist −0.015 0.021 −0.022 −0.009 0.023
(0.027) (0.054) (0.038) (0.040) (0.029)
Stop Bill 0.032 0.063∗ 0.023 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.036) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024)
Policy Evidence from own analysis −0.031 0.001 −0.018 −0.028 −0.051∗
(0.023) (0.046) (0.026) (0.037) (0.027)
Policy Evidence from Non-aligned TT 0.058∗∗∗ 0.013 0.029 0.073∗∗ 0.036
(0.022) (0.043) (0.026) (0.035) (0.029)
Policy Evidence from Aligned TT −0.136∗∗∗ −0.064 −0.083∗ −0.137∗∗∗ −0.200∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.058) (0.046) (0.038) (0.037)
Constant 0.526∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.050) (0.026) (0.043) (0.027)
N 296 140 219 195 214
R-squared 0.191 0.050 0.072 0.198 0.274
Adj. R-squared 0.171 −0.0003 0.041 0.168 0.250











(df = 7; 288)
0.994
(df = 7; 132)
2.342∗∗
(df = 7; 211)
6.598∗∗∗
(df = 7; 187)
11.131∗∗∗
(df = 7; 206)
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
Table K.5: Recommend to Boss full models part 1
How likely would you be to
side with this individual in your recommendation to your boss?
AMCE via OLS
Wk Partisan Senate House Less Knwl More Knwl
Donor 0.002 −0.038 −0.015 −0.012 −0.039
(0.051) (0.037) (0.032) (0.032) (0.050)
Business Lobbyist 0.012 −0.088∗∗∗ 0.015 −0.041 −0.012
(0.054) (0.033) (0.028) (0.032) (0.043)
Consumer Lobbyist 0.037 −0.013 0.005 −0.032 0.052
(0.074) (0.044) (0.032) (0.034) (0.054)
Stop Bill 0.020 0.070∗∗ 0.027 0.027 0.037
(0.044) (0.029) (0.021) (0.024) (0.031)
Policy Evidence from own analysis 0.012 −0.044 −0.013 −0.050∗ 0.011
(0.054) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.041)
Policy Evidence from Non-aligned TT 0.069 0.039 0.048∗ 0.020 0.062
(0.045) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.043)
Policy Evidence from Aligned TT −0.017 −0.125∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗ −0.076
(0.067) (0.053) (0.031) (0.037) (0.052)
Constant 0.444∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.031) (0.032) (0.027) (0.053)
N 111 171 265 226 158
R-squared 0.035 0.192 0.108 0.144 0.125
Adj. R-squared −0.031 0.158 0.084 0.117 0.084









F Statistic 0.529(df = 7; 103)
5.548∗∗∗
(df = 7; 163)
4.450∗∗∗
(df = 7; 257)
5.250∗∗∗
(df = 7; 218)
3.053∗∗∗
(df = 7; 150)
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
Table K.6: Recommend to Boss full models part 2
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How representative do you think this individual is
of your district or state’s opinion as a whole?
AMCE via OLS
Personal Cmmte/Ldr Moderate Extreme Str Partisan
Donor −0.057 −0.027 −0.082∗∗ −0.041 −0.020
(0.035) (0.052) (0.038) (0.051) (0.042)
Business Lobbyist −0.095∗∗∗ −0.047 −0.094∗∗ −0.082∗ −0.056
(0.035) (0.048) (0.040) (0.047) (0.041)
Consumer Lobbyist −0.130∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.106∗∗ −0.081∗ −0.026
(0.041) (0.045) (0.044) (0.049) (0.041)
Stop Bill 0.0003 0.046 −0.011 0.042 0.019
(0.026) (0.034) (0.028) (0.033) (0.029)
Policy Evidence from own analysis −0.043 0.071 −0.002 −0.011 −0.001
(0.036) (0.048) (0.039) (0.045) (0.036)
Policy Evidence from Non-aligned TT 0.092∗∗∗ 0.092∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.048
(0.029) (0.049) (0.034) (0.041) (0.040)
Policy Evidence from Aligned TT −0.103∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.021 −0.102∗∗ −0.084∗∗
(0.036) (0.049) (0.042) (0.047) (0.042)
Constant 0.597∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.054) (0.037) (0.050) (0.036)
N 295 140 219 194 214
R-squared 0.145 0.089 0.105 0.123 0.059
Adj. R-squared 0.124 0.040 0.075 0.090 0.027











(df = 7; 287)
1.838∗
(df = 7; 132)
3.530∗∗∗
(df = 7; 211)
3.712∗∗∗
(df = 7; 186)
1.844∗
(df = 7; 206)
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
Table K.7: Representativeness full models part 1
How representative do you think this individual is
of your district or state’s opinion as a whole?
AMCE via OLS
Wk Partisan Senate House Less Knwl More Knwl
Donor −0.069 −0.063 −0.042 −0.041 −0.083
(0.064) (0.046) (0.039) (0.038) (0.053)
Business Lobbyist −0.110 −0.103∗∗ −0.065 −0.046 −0.155∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.052)
Consumer Lobbyist −0.124 −0.095∗ −0.079∗ −0.055 −0.131∗∗
(0.080) (0.051) (0.041) (0.043) (0.055)
Stop Bill −0.004 0.045 0.004 −0.014 0.057
(0.049) (0.033) (0.026) (0.028) (0.036)
Policy Evidence from own analysis 0.007 −0.019 −0.010 −0.003 0.027
(0.065) (0.051) (0.035) (0.040) (0.050)
Policy Evidence from Non-aligned TT 0.139∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.052 0.163∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.040) (0.033) (0.034) (0.047)
Policy Evidence from Aligned TT −0.002 −0.050 −0.094∗∗ −0.097∗∗ −0.007
(0.069) (0.046) (0.040) (0.040) (0.053)
Constant 0.545∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.042) (0.042) (0.037) (0.061)
N 110 171 264 227 156
R-squared 0.129 0.155 0.094 0.087 0.171
Adj. R-squared 0.069 0.118 0.069 0.058 0.132











(df = 7; 102)
4.265∗∗∗
(df = 7; 163)
3.777∗∗∗
(df = 7; 256)
2.975∗∗∗
(df = 7; 219)
4.354∗∗∗
(df = 7; 148)
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
Table K.8: Representativeness full models part 2
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APPENDIX L
White Paper Conjoint Full Marginal Effects
All Drug Prices Min Wage Dem Rep
Aligned Content 0.223 0.224 0.222 0.206 0.246
(0.029) (0.039) (0.038) (0.034) (0.049)
Aligned Institution 0.241 0.286 0.193 0.302 0.166
(0.028) (0.039) (0.041) (0.033) (0.049)
Aligned Content:Aligned Institution -0.098 -0.053 -0.149 -0.145 - 0.055
(0.055) (0.074) (0.087) (0.067) (0.089)
N Obs 1224 634 590 820 404
N Respondents 317 317 295 211 106
Table L.1: Full Models of Marginal Effects from White Paper Conjoint
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Imputation for Chapter 4 models
In this appendix I provide information about the imputation model used, and
diagnostic results of the imputation of IGScores conduced using Amelia IIHonaker,
King, Blackwell, et al. 2011. Because this analysis was not conducted temporally, I
took the the variables presented here are averages for each think tank across the time
series from GuideStar. I took the yearly averages for total revenue, total end of year
assets, total membership dues, total lobbying fees and total number of contractors.
These variables were all logged in the imputation model, while NTEE-CC code was
treated as a nominal variable. I begin by providing a scatter plot matrix of the
numeric variables used in the imputation process for the IGscores, shown in Figure
M.1. In particular, the avberage IGScore of three and five organizations with the
most semantically similar names have strong relationships with the true IGscores.
Figure M.2 shows the paths of EM chains when started from over-dispersed start
values, plotted in the first two principle components of the multidimensional space
that the chains move through. This demonstrates that even with quite different
start values, the imputations converge to the same region of the probability space,
suggesting stable convergence in the imputation model.
Figure M.3 reports the results of an over-imputation diagnostic on the IGScore
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imputation. This diagnostic imputed values for some observations for which true
IGScores already exist, and plots the true values relative to the imputed values, with
appropriate confidence intervals.
The results of the over-imputation diagnostic make it clear that the imputed
scores are correlated with the observed values. However, we also observe substantial
moderation in these values, with the imputed values tending to be closer to zero
than their observed counterparts. This, along with the comparison of observed and
imputed score distributions in Figure 4.2 indicates that the average absolute distance
between think tanks IGScores will be smaller because of the imputation, than if we
had complete data. This should bias results of ideological homophily within groups
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Figure M.2: Imputation convergence over 2 principal components


































Figure M.3: Over-imputation plot


























In this appendix, I report ERGM convergence and goodness of fit diagnostics for
a sample model fit using the same specifications as the 100 replications reported in
table 4.4. Figures N.1 - N.4 show good mixing in the chains, and roughly normal
distributions of sample statistics. This suggests that the models are not degenerate,
but rather converged appropriately. Similarly, all models reported in the paper had
p values above .95 associate for multivariate geweke diagnostic tests.
Finally, I report goodness of fit diagnostics for the ERGM specification reported
as model 4 in Table 4.4. These results indicate excellent fit of the ERGM model, with
very similar distributions for endogenous network statistics in the model produced
networks as the observed network, as shown in Figure N.5. The full ERGM specifica-
tion also does a good job of capturing the distributions of node and edge covariates
as Figure N.6 demonstrates.
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Figure N.5: Goodness-of-fit diagnostics for endogenous network statistics
for a sample ERGM.



































































Figure N.6: Goodness-of-fit diagnostics for node and edge covariates for a
sample ERGM
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